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ABSTRACT
In p e r fe c t cap ita l m a rk e ts , optim al in v estm en t decisions of a 
firm  involve no in cen tiv e  fo r  a firm to d iv e rs ify  o p e ra tio n s . How­
e v e r , in  an im perfec t cap ita l m arke t w here homemade portfo lio  
d iv e rs ifica tio n  in c u rs  h ig h e r  cost o r  faces re s tr ic t io n s , o p era tio n al 
d iv e rs ifica tio n  of a firm  may be  benefic ia l to i ts  sh a re h o ld e rs .
A su b s ta n tia l am ount of em pirical ev idence h as  su p p o rte d  the  
h y p o th es is  th a t  U .S . in v e s to rs  would have  h ig h e r  r is k  a d ju s ted  
perfo rm ance th ro u g h  in te rn a tio n a l portfo lio  in v estm en t. In  re a lity , 
how ever, some m ajor b a r r ie r s  to in te rn a tio n a l d iv e rs ifica tio n  have  
p re v e n te d  U .S . in v e s to rs  from d iv e rs ify in g  in te rn a tio n a lly . Con­
s e q u e n tly , it  can be ex p ec ted  th a t m ultina tionality  of a firm  would 
b e  benefic ia l to in v e s to r s . T h is  h y p o th esis  is th e  c e n tra l issu e  of 
th is  s tu d y .
T he p rim ary  p u rp o se  of th e  d is se rta tio n  is  to exam ine 
w h e th e r fo re ig n  d ire c t in v estm en ts  by  U .S . m ultinational firm s 
p ro v id e  d iv e rs ifica tio n  se rv ice  to  sh a reh o ld e rs  who have  some d if­
ficu ltie s  in  d iv e rs ify in g  th e ir  own po rtfo lio s  in te rn a tio n a lly . The 
im portance of exam ining th e  ex isten ce  of d iv e rs ifica tio n  se rv ice  is 
ju s tif ie d  on th e  g ro u n d  th a t  i t  can be  one of th e  m ost fundam ental 
economic m otives b eh in d  fo re ig n  d ire c t in v estm en ts . If in v e s to rs  
recogn ize  an d  rew ard  i t ,  m ultinational firm s can red u ce  th e ir  cost of 
e q u i ty .
T he d is se r ta tio n  is a r ra n g e d  as follow s. F i r s t ,  b e n e fits  from 
in te rn a tio n a l po rtfo lio  in v estm en ts  a re  d iscu ssed  in  term s of ex  an te  
an d  ex  p o s t a p p ro a ch e s . A su rv e y  of b a r r ie r s  to  in te rn a tio n a l 
p o rtfo lio  in v estm en ts  follows. C o n seq u en tly , sev e ra l te s tab le  
h y p o th e se s  w ith  re s p e c t to m ultina tionality  of a firm  a re  d e riv ed  
an d  d isc u sse d . T he m ajor h y p o th e s is  of m ark e t recogn ition  of 
d iv e rs ifica tio n  se rv ice  is te s te d . V arious te s ts  a re  em ployed w ith  a 
sam ple in c lu d in g  135 U .S . b a se d  m ultina tional firm s and  135 
dom estic firm s. In  th e  re s id u a l an a ly s is , th e  e ffe c ts  of th e  In te re s t  
E qualization  T ax  in J u ly , 1963 an d  th e  F oreign  D irec t In v estm en t 
Program  in  J a n u a ry , 1968 on th e  v a lu es  of m ultinational firm s and  
dom estic firm s a re  exam ined.
The o v e ra ll te s t  re s u l ts  s tro n g ly  show some ev idence  in 
fa v o r of m ark e t reco g n itio n  of m ultina tiona lity  of a firm . H ow ever, 
th e  re s u lts  a p p e a r  to re je c t th e  h y p o th e s is  of th e  e x is ten ce  of a 
d iv e rs ifica tio n  s e rv ic e . I t  can be p resu m ed  th a t  th e re  is no 




Fama and  Miller^ h av e  shown th a t ,  in a p e rfe c t cap ital 
m a rk e t, optim al in v estm en t decisions of a firm  involve no in cen tiv e  
fo r  th e  firm  to d iv e rs ify . S ince in d iv id u a l in v e s to rs  can combine 
sh a re s  of d iffe re n t firm s and  e s tab lish  e ffic ien t portfo lios w ithout
c o s ts , th e  d iv ers ifica tio n  of o pera tional a c tiv itie s  on th e  p a r t  of a
firm  has no economic v a lue  to  i ts  sh a re h o ld e rs .
The Value A d d itiv ity  P rin c ip le , w hich s ta te s  th a t  th e  to ta l
value of a firm can n o t be  in c re ase d  b y  d iv id in g  o r com bining cash
flow s, may be a n o th e r th eo re tic a l fa c to r  which nu llifies th e  o p e ra ­
tional d ivers ifica tio n  on a firm  lev e l. W ithout some sy n e rg y  a lte r in g  
fu tu re  cash  flow s, th e  value  of th e  s e c u r ity  of a d iv e rs ified  firm 
shou ld  be the  sum of th e  sec u ritie s  of th e  firm 's  com ponent p a r ts .  
F u r th e rm o re , even  m ore s tab le  fu tu re  cash  flows of a d iv e rs ified  
firm  canno t be a ttra c t iv e  to in d iv id u a l in v e s to rs  as long  as th ey  can 
d iv e rs ify  th e ir  own portfo lios w ithou t add itio n a l c o s ts .
Many firm s, how ever, have d iv e rs if ie d  o p e ra tio n s  acro ss  
in d u s tr ie s  o r  a c ro ss  c o u n tr ie s . G enera lly , d iv e rs ified  firm s of the  
fo rm er ty p e  a re  called  "C onglom erate firm s" an d  th o se  of th e  la t te r
^Eugene F . Fama, an d  M erton H. M iller, T he T heo ry  of 
F inance  (Illino is: D ry d en  P re s s ,  1972), p .  308.
1
2
a re  called  "M ultinational firm s" (h e re a f te r  M NCs). Only a few 
s tu d ie s  h av e  analyzed  th e  e ffec ts  of in te rn a tio n a l d iv e rs ifica tio n  on 
th e  value  of a firm . U nder th e  m ore re a lis tic  assum ption  of 
im perfec t cap ita l m a rk e ts , m any s tu d ie s  h ave  tr ie d  to  fin d  an 
economic ra tiona le  b eh in d  conglom erate m e rg e rs . Most em pirical 
te s ts  co n ce rn in g  th e  perfo rm ance of conglom erate firm s show th a t
r is k -a d ju s te d  perform ance is n o t s ig n ifican tly  d iffe re n t from th a t  of
2 3sin g le  firm s o r p o rtfo lio s . As in d ica ted  by  Levy and  S a rn a t, th e
availab ility  of homemade portfo lio  d iv e rs ifica tio n  in  a dom estic cap ita l 
m arke t p re v e n ts  conglom erate m e rg e rs  from p ro v id in g  su b s ta n tia l 
b en e fits  to sh a re h o ld e rs . H ow ever, if  th e re  e x is t some d ifficu lties  
in  homemade portfo lio  in v e s tm en ts , th e  o p e ra tio n a l d iversifica tion  
can  be valuab le  to sh a re h o ld e rs . Once in v estm en t o p p o rtu n itie s  a re  
ex p an d ed  in te rn a tio n a lly , some re s tr ic tio n s  on in te rn a tio n a l p o r t ­
folio in v estm en ts  may m otivate firm s to d iv e rs ify  th e ir  opera tio n s  
in te rn a tio n a lly .
o
F o r argum ents  in fa v o r of no b e n e fits  from  conglom erate 
m e rg e rs , see J .  C. E lle r t, "M ergers , A n titru s t  Law E nforcem ent, 
an d  S tockho lder R e tu rn s ,"  Jo u rn a l of F in a n c e , p p . 715-532, May, 
1976, P . J .  H a lp ern , "Em pirical E stim ates of th e  Amount and  D is­
tr ib u tio n  of Gains to Companies in  M e rg e rs ,"  Jo u rn a l of B u s in e s s , 
p p . 554-574, O c to b e r, 1973, G, M andelker, "R isk  an d  R e tu rn : The
C ase of M erging F irm s,"  Jo u rn a l of F inancia l Econom ics, p p . 303- 
335, D ecem ber, 1974, and  P . D odd, "M erger P ro p o sa ls , M anagem ent 
D iscre tion  and  S tockho lder W ealth ," Jo u rn a l of F inancial Econom ics, 
p p . 105-137, J u n e , 1980.
3H. Levy and  M. S a rn a t, "D iv ersifica tio n , Portfolio  A nalysis 
an d  th e  U neasy  Case fo r  C onglom erate M erg e rs ,"  Jo u rn a l of 
F in a n c e , p p . 795-802, S ep tem ber, 1970.
3
T he main p u rp o se  of th is  s tu d y  is to exam ine th e  e ffec ts  of 
m ultina tionality  of a firm on its  va lue  and  on sh a re h o ld e r 's  w ealth . 
More sp ec ifica lly , th e  following is su e s  a re  d isc u sse d .
(1 ) T he o p era tio n a l d iv e rs ifica tio n  of MNCs h as  p ro v id ed  
sh a reh o ld e rs  w ith u n iq u e  b e n e fits  (d iv e rs ific a tio n  
s e rv ic e )  th a t  a re  n o t availab le from dom estic firm s.
(2 ) T he sh a re h o ld e r’s r is k  red u c tio n  b en e fits  by  d iv e rs if ic a ­
tion  se rv ice  can be  a m otive fo r  firm s to d iv e rs ify  
in te rn a tio n a lly .
In  C h a p te r  2, th e  notion of r is k  re d u c tio n  b en e fits  from 
in te rn a tio n a l po rtfo lio  in v estm en t is p re s e n te d  u s in g  mean v a rian ce  
portfo lio  th e o ry . Ex an te  th e o ry  shows th a t  to th e  e x te n t th a t 
economic ac tiv itie s  in  d iffe re n t n a tio n a l u n its  a re  le ss  th an  p e rfe c tly  
c o rre la te d , in te rn a tio n a l d iv e rs ifica tio n  will im prove in v e s to rs '
r i s k - r e tu r n  o p p o rtu n itie s . Ex p o s t ,  an e ffic ien t f ro n tie r  sh ifts  
u p w ard ly  an d  to th e  le f t  a f te r  b a r r ie r s  to in te rn a tio n a l portfo lio  
in v estm en t h ave  been  lif te d . Some em pirical te s ts  on th e  r isk  
re d u c tio n  b e n e f its  from in te rn a tio n a l po rtfo lio  in v estm en ts  a re
s u rv e y e d . Major b a r r ie r s  an d  im pedim ents of in te rn a tio n a l portfo lio  
in v estm en ts  a re  d e sc rib e d  an d  d iscu ssed . T hese  n eg a tiv e  a sp e c ts  
su g g e s t th a t  in v estm en t in  th e  sh a re s  of MNCs m ight be  an
a lte rn a tiv e  way of rea liz in g  r is k  re d u c tio n  b e n e fits  which o therw ise  
can n o t be o b ta in ed  due to re s tr ic t io n s  an d  add itiona l co sts  in
in te rn a tio n a l po rtfo lio  in v estm en t.
C h ap te r  3 d iscu sses  th e  com plem entary re la tio n sh ip  betw een 
in te rn a tio n a l po rtfo lio  in v estm en t an d  fo re ig n  d ire c t in v estm en t. An
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overview  of th e  l i te ra tu re  re g a rd in g  th is  is su e  is p re s e n te d . Some 
te s tab le  s ta tem en ts  a re  d e riv ed  and  m odified. More spec ifica lly , th e  
tra d itio n a l deb a te  o v e r th e  p o ssib ility  of h ig h e r  r is k -a d ju s te d  
r e tu r n s  from p u rc h a s in g  sh a re s  of MNCs th an  from those of 
dom estic firm s is  d iscu ssed . T h is p ro p o sitio n  is  re la ted  to th e  
re q u ire d  cost of eq u ity  of MNCs and  th e  motive fo r fo re ign  d ire c t 
in v estm en ts . F inally  a b asic  te s tab le  p ro p o sitio n  of m ark e t reco g n i­
tion of and  rew ard  fo r th e  d ivers ifica tio n  se rv ice  by  MNCs is 
d e riv e d .
In  C h ap te r 4 , sev e ra l h y p o th ese s  a re  s ta te d  and  major 
te s t in g  m ethodologies a re  ex p la in ed . Also co vered  in  th is  c h a p te r  
is a d iscu ssio n  of some problem s invo lved  in  p rev io u s  em pirical 
t e s t s . C h ap te r 5 in tro d u ces  m ore de tailed  te s t  m ethodologies fo r 
five te s ts  an d  re p o r ts  the  em pirical ev idence  and  im plica tions. In 
C h ap te r  6 th e  re s u lts  of th e  re se a rc h  a re  sum m arized, and  con­
c lusions an d  im plications a re  p re s e n te d .
CHAPTER 2
SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE
T he e ffec ts  of d iv e rs ifica tio n  on portfo lio  effic iency  have 
been  exam ined ex ten s iv e ly  o v e r th e  p a s t  th re e  decades since  the  
seminal w ork of M arkowitz.* In th is  c h a p te r , the  e ffec ts  of an 
in te rn a tio n a l expansion  of in v estm en t o p p o rtu n itie s  on th e  r is k -  
r e tu rn  re la tio n sh ip  a re  exam ined. B enefits  from in te rn a tio n a l 
portfo lio  in v estm en ts  a re  em phasized since  th ey  form th e  basic  
economic ra tio n a le  su p p o rtin g  th e  d iv e rs ifica tio n  se rv ice  h y p o th e s is . 
F i r s t ,  some th e o re tic a l im plications of in te rn a tio n a l portfo lio  in v e s t­
m ents a re  exam ined in ex  an te  and  ex p o s t te rm s. A su rv e y  of the  
l i te ra tu re  re g a rd in g  perfo rm ance of in te rn a tio n a l portfo lio  in v e s t­
m ents follows.
B enefits  from In te rn a tio n a l Portfolio  In vestm en t:
An Ex A nte A pproach
A ccord ing  to th e  M arkowitz portfo lio  th e o ry , to  th e  e x te n t 
th a t  economic ac tiv itie s  in  d iffe re n t na tional u n its  a re  less th an  
p e rfe c tly  c o rre la te d , d iv e rs ifica tio n  a c ro ss  in te rn a tio n a l bo u n d aries  
will im prove in v e s to rs ’ r i s k - r e tu r n  o p p o rtu n itie s . F o reign  a sse ts  
in c rease  th e  o p p o rtu n ity  to re d u c e  r is k  becau se  th e  co rre la tio n  of
*H. M. M arkow itz, "Portfolio  S e lec tio n ,"  Jo u rn a l of F in a n c e , 
p p . 77-91, M arch, 1952.
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r e tu r n s  among dom estic an d  fo re ig n  a sse ts  te n d s  to  be sm aller th an  
th a t  am ong dom estic a s s e ts  a lone. T his low er co rre la tio n  ex is ts  
b ecau se  b u s in e ss  cycles a re  n o t sy n ch ro n ized  p e rfe c tly  an d  g o v e rn ­
m en ts  have  d if fe re n t ab ilitie s  to  deal w ith economic in s ta b ility . 
T h u s , fo r  a g iv en  level of ex p ec ted  r e tu r n ,  an in v e s to r  who 
d iv e rs if ie s  a c ro ss  c o u n trie s  will face le ss  r is k  th a n  an in v e s to r  w ith 
only  dom estic in v e s tm en ts .
A lthough th e re  h a s  n o t b een  a conclusive s tu d y  on in te r ­
n a tio n a l cap ita l m ark e t s t r u c tu r e ,  m ost e a r lie r  s tu d ie s  a re  b ased  on 
th e  segm en ted  in te rn a tio n a l cap ita l m arke t s t r u c tu r e  ap p ro ach . 
T h is  ap p ro ach  t r e a ts  d if fe re n t n a tio n a l cap ita l m arke ts  as sep a ra te d  
u n its  th a t  a re  n o t closely  re la te d  to one a n o th e r . In  such  a 
m a rk e t, m ost in v e s to rs  u su a lly  limit in v estm en ts  to a domestic 
s u b se t of th e  whole space  of in te rn a tio n a l a s s e t claim s. In  con­
t r a s t ,  w hen th e  whole o p p o rtu n ity  se t of in v estm en ts  is  available to 
e v e ry  in v e s to r ,  th e  in te rn a tio n a l cap ita l m arke t is in te g ra te d  
in te rn a tio n a lly . To see th e  e ffec ts  of in te rn a tio n a l d iv e rs ific a tio n , 
assum e th a t  some b a r r ie r s  to in te rn a tio n a l d iv e rs ifica tio n  th a t  have
e x is ted  among na tionally  segm ented  m ark e ts  a re  elim inated . In
2
th is  c a se , Cohn an d  P rin g le  a rg u e  th a t  a t f i r s t ,  th e  system atic  
r is k  of each  s e c u r ity  in dom estic r e tu r n - r i s k  space  will decline 
as th e  m ark e t po rtfo lio  is  augm ented  w ith  le ss  c o rre la te d  fo re ig n
2
R. H . C ohn , an d  J .  J .  P r in g le , "Im perfec tions in I n te r ­
n a tio n a l F inancia l M arkets: Im plications fo r  R isk  Prem ia and  the
C ost of C apital to  F irm s,"  Jo u rn a l of F in a n c e , p p . 59-66, Septem ­
b e r ,  1973.
se c u ritie s . Second, fo r  two c lasses  of u tility  fu n c tio n s , logarithm ic
and  ex p o n en tia l, th e  slope of th e  C apital M arket Line (CML) also
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d eclines. To th o se  in v e s to rs  w ith su ch  u tility  fu n c tio n s , the  
above two e ffec ts  ten d  to re d u c e  th e  re q u ire d  r e tu r n  an d  in c rease  
th e  p ric e  of in d iv id u a l s e c u r it ie s . T he in itia l red u c tio n  in  the  
system atic  r is k  term  re s u lts  from th e  fa c t th a t  in  th e  new p e rfe c tly  
in te g ra te d  m ark e t, th e  co rre la tio n  of r e tu rn s  on each sing le  r isk y  
a sse t w ith the  newly augm ented  m ark e t po rtfo lio  r e tu rn s  is likely  to 
be low er th an  th a t  w ith th e  old m ark e t portfo lio  due to th e  addition  
to  th e  old m ark e t portfo lio  of le s s -c o rre la te d  fo re ig n  se c u ritie s . 
T h is dow nw ard ad justm en t in  ex  an te  risk -p rem ia  would cau se  a 
co rre sp o n d in g  up w ard  ad ju stm en t in  p ric e s  of r isk y  a s se ts  an d  th u s  
re s u lt  in  w indfall g a in s to c u r r e n t  h o ld e rs  of r is k y  a s s e ts .
In  o rd e r  to examine th e  second  e ffe c t , all in v e s to rs  are
assum ed to have  logarithm ic o r ex p onen tia l u tility  fu n c tio n . For
th ose  in v e s to rs , th e  ex p ec ted  r a te  of r e tu rn  can be  e x p re sse d  as:
E O y  = Rf  ♦ % piw • aRi (2 .1 )
w
w here E (R p  is th e  ex p ec ted  ra te  of r e tu rn  on th e  ith  sec u rity  
Rj. is th e  r is k - f re e  r a te  of r e tu rn
o is th e  s ta n d a rd  dev iation  of w , e n d -o f-p e rio d  w ealth 
w fo r  all in v e s to rs
3
T he logarithm ic u tili ty  fu n c tio n  d isp lay s  th e  d esirab le  
p ro p e r tie s  of d ec rea s in g  ab so lu te  r is k  av ersion  an d  c o n s ta n t re la tiv e  
r is k  a v e rs io n , while th e  ex p o n en tia l u tility  fu n c tio n  d isp lays 
c o n s ta n t abso lu te  r is k  av ersio n  an d  co n s ta n t re la tiv e  r is k  av e rs io n .
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w is th e  a g g re g a te d  ex p ec ted  e n d -o f-p e rio d  w ealth  fo r  
all in v e s to rs
is  th e  s ta n d a rd  dev iation  of th e  r a te  of r e tu r n  on 
i th  se c u rity
p. is  th e  coeffic ien t of co rre la tio n  betw een  th e  total_ e n d - 
o f-p e rio d  do llar r e tu r n  on th e  ith  s e c u r ity  an d  w.
In th is  c o n te x t, uw/w  is  eq u iv a len t to lE (R m)-R ^ ]/o m ^  th e  C apital
A sse t P ric in g  Model (CAPM ), w here  R and  o a re  th e  ra te  ofm m
r e tu r n  on th e  m ark e t portfo lio  an d  th e  s ta n d a rd  dev iation  of Rm
re sp e c tiv e ly . Since re p re s e n ts  th e  slope of th e
CML, ct /w  can also be  re g a rd e d  as th e  slope of th e  CML. A fte r 
re s tr ic t io n s  have  been  l if te d , w , th e  denom inator of <*w/w  will 
in c re a se  ad d itiv e ly  as th e  o p p o rtu n ity  s e t  is  ex p an d ed  to inc lude  
new fo re ig n  economic u n its .  B u t th e  n u m e ra to r, o , will grow  less  
th an  add itiv e ly  due to th e  le ss  th an  p e rfe c t co rre la tio n s  among 
v a rio u s  na tiona l economic u n i t s . H ence th e  new in te rn a tio n a lly  
de term ined  a  /w  will be  low er th a n  th e  old dom estically  e s tab lish ed  
ra tio . C o n seq u en tly , fo r  any  c o u n try , th e  slope of th e  CML will 
decline. F o r in v e s to rs  w ith th e  ex p o n en tia l u til i ty  fu n c tio n , a 
sim ilar re s u lt  can be d e riv e d .
F or an in v e s to r  w ith they ex p o n en tia l u til i ty  fu n c tio n , the  
slope of th e  CML is g iven  by  CTw/ir ( l/A , ) w^ e re  *s “ lv e s to r  ^ ' s 
P ra tt-A rro w  r is k - a v e r s io n  co effic ien t. Like th e  logarithm ic case , 
th e  denom inato r, , 1/A, will in c re a se  ad d itiv e ly  as fo re ig n  in v e s to rs  
join while th e  n u m e ra to r , ct , will grow  le ss  th an  ad d itiv e ly . Note 
th a t  th e  coeffic ien ts  of absoK ite r is k  av ersio n  a re  assum ed to  b e  th e  
same ac ro ss  c o u n tr ie s . F o r the  d e riv a tio n  o f eq u a tio n  (2 -1 ) and  
th e  slope of th e  CML w ith th e  ex p o n en tia l u tility  fu n c tio n , see Cohn 
an d  P rin g le , ib id , an d  R. H. L itz e n b e rg e r  an d  A. P . B u d d , "A 
Note on Geom etric Mean Portfolio  Selection an d  th e  M arket P rices  of 
E q u itie s ,"  Jo u rn a l of F inancial an d  Q u an tita tiv e  A n a ly s is , p p . 1277- 
1282, D ecem ber, 1971.
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From an ex  a n te  v iew po in t, th e  above two e ffec ts  can be 
exp la in ed  g rap h ica lly  in  m e an -s ta n d a rd  dev iation  sp ace . The 
c u rv e d  line  in  F ig u re  1 re p re s e n ts  th e  e ffic ien t s e t of po rtfo lio s. 
When len d in g  an d  borrow ing  a re  allowed a t th e  r is k - f re e  ra te  and  
s h o r t  sa les  a re  p e rm itte d , th e  ta n g e n t line  to th e  c u rv e d  line will 
dom inate all o th e r  o p p o rtu n itie s . T h is line  is called th e  "C apital 
M arket Line" and  is  a lin e a r  re la tio n sh ip  betw een  th e  ra te  of re tu rn  
and  th e  to ta l r is k  of a p o rtfo lio . F o r a typ ica l c o u n try , th e  to tal 
r is k  of th e  newly c re a te d  in te rn a tio n a l m ark e t po rtfo lio , <jj is less 
th a n  th a t  of th e  old dom estic p o rtfo lio , a ^ .  T h u s , u n d e r  the  
assum ption  of an u n ch an g ed  r is k - f r e e  r a te ,  R^, th e  slope of the  
dom estic CML declines to th e  d o tted  line in  F ig u re  1. F o r most 
c o u n tr ie s , th e  new m arke t p o rtfo lio , I ,  will lie below th e  old 
dom estic m ark e t p o rtfo lio , D.
A C hange in th e  R isk -F ree  R ate
In  th e  p e rfe c tly  in te g ra te d  cap ita l m a rk e t, a common 
r is k - f r e e  ra te  is  de term ined  a f te r  a rb i tra g e  p ro c e sse s . We will 
exam ine th e  e ffec ts  of lif tin g  re s tr ic tio n s  on some exogeneous 
v a ria b le s  th a t  de term ine  th e  r is k - f re e  ra te .
In  tim e -s ta te  p re fe re n c e  th e o ry , th e  concep t of a r is k - f re e  
ra te  is a sso c ia ted  w ith  th e  value  of a u n it r isk le ss  claim on fu tu re  
incom e. A r is k - f re e  a s s e t  claim is  defined  as a p a r tic u la r  sec u rity  
com posed of e lem en tary  tim e -s ta te  claim s. T he p rice  of th is  
s e c u r i ty ,  <)>£, w hich h as  C^ = (1 , 1, 1, . . . )  m ust be ^  = <t>ja + ^  





THE CML WITH BARRIERS VERSUS THE 
CML WITHOUT BARRIERS
(A sim ilar f ig u re  is  shown by  Cohn and  
P rin g le , "Im perfection  in In te rn a tio n a l,"  
p . 6 4 .)
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H ere <J>ja , c|>jc . . .  a re  the  p ric e s  of elem entary  tim e -s ta te  claims
th a t  pay  $1 only w hen s ta te ,  a , b ,  c , . . .  o c c u rs . So, a r is k - f re e  
r a te  can be w ritten  as:
1 1  1 1  
<t>f = ---------  =   +   +------- ---------
1 + Rf 1 + Rla 1 + Rlb 1 + Rlc
= h A  + ‘•’lb  + ^ lc  +
w h e re , ••• a re  tim e -s ta te  d isco u n t ra te s  th a t  red u ce
tim e-s ta te  claims to  p re s e n t  c e r ta in  consum ption . U nder th e  
assum ption  of s ta te  and  time in d e p en d e n t u tility  fu n c tio n s , th e  
p r ic e s  of e lem entary  tim e -s ta te  claims a re  g iven  b y  H irsh le ife r .^
I
n . v - .
 — fo r i = a , b ,  c . . .  (2 .2 )
11 vo (1+0
I
w here is  th e  p ro b ab ility  of o ccu rren ce  of s ta te  i ,  is the  
d e riv a tiv e  of th e  ca rd in a l u tility  fu n c tio n  of consum ption endow ­
m ents w hen s ta te  i o c c u rs , is  th a t  of p re s e n t  consum ption
endow m ents and  £ is a c o n s ta n t d isco u n t ra te  fo r  fu tu re  u tili ty . 
So, th e  r is k - f re e  r a te  dep en d s on ch an g es  in  p re s e n t  an d  fu tu re  
consum ption endow m ents th a t  d is tr ib u te  among in d iv idua ls  o v e r
times an d  s ta te s .  F u rth e rm o re , th e  r is k - f re e  ra te  re lie s  on changes 
in  th e  e lem en tary  u tility  fu n c tio n s  , Vqj and  th e  p ro b ab ility
b e lie fs , In  th is  c o n te x t, th e  e ffec ts  of lif tin g  re s tr ic tio n s  on
J .  H irsh le ife r , In v es tm en t, I n te re s t  an d  C apital (New 
J e r s e y :  P ren tice -H a ll, 1970X C h ap te r  9~. F o r t h i  d e riv a tio n  of
equation  (2 -2 ) ,  also  see H irsh le ife r , ib id .
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th e se  v a riab le s  a re  exam ined. As m entioned e a r lie r , s ince the  
ex p ec ted  ra te  of r e tu r n  on any  s e c u rity  will d eclin e , in v e s to rs  a re  
ex p ec ted  to  be w ea lth ie r th an  b e fo re . If in v e s to rs  sell and  p u t  th e  
p ro c e ed s  in to  th e  r is k - f re e  a s s e t ,  th e ir  fu tu re  consum ption endow ­
m ents will in c re a se  fo r  any  s ta te .  S ince in v e s to rs  a re  assum ed to 
have  c o n s ta n t re la tiv e  r is k  av ersio n  u tility  fu n c tio n s , th e re  will be 
no ch an g e  in  th e  m arg inal e lem entary  u tility  fu n c tio n s . T h u s , 
in v e s to rs  will have  th e  same p re fe re n c e s  tow ard  poorly -endow ed 
s ta te s  an d  w ell-endow ed s ta te s  as th ey  d id  b e fo re  re s tr ic tio n s  w ere 
lif te d . A t th e  same tim e, th e  lif tin g  of re s tr ic tio n s  is n o t ex p ec ted  
to have  a s ig n ifican t im pact on th e  su b jec tiv e  p ro b ab ility  of th e  
o ccu rren ce  of any  s ta te .  In  conclusion , th e  o v era ll e ffe c ts  on the  
r is k - f re e  ra te  come th ro u g h  in c re ase d  fu tu r e  consum ption endow ­
m en ts . H irsh le ife r n o te s  th a t a p ro p o rtio n a te  com bined in c re a se  in 
fu tu re  consum ption endowm ent would red u ce  th e  p ric e  of fu tu re  
e lem en tary  tim e -s ta te  claims and  lead to an in c rease  in th e  r is k - f re e  
r a te .  T he in c re a se  in th e  r is k - f r e e  ra te  f u r th e r  d ec rea se s  the  
slope of th e  CML an d  th u s  a g g ra v a te s  th e  e ffe c ts  of re d u c in g  
ex p ec ted  ra te s  o f r e tu r n .
T his a rg u m en t, how ever, is b a se d  on th e  assum ption  
th a t  th e  coeffic ien t of co rre la tio n  betw een a fo re ig n  m ark e t p o r t ­
folio an d  th e  dom estic m arke t po rtfo lio , , is le ss  th an  one.
O
Subrahm anyam  p o in ts  o u t th a t  w ithou t su ch  an assum ption  th e re
®M. G. Subram anyam , "On th e  O ptim ality of In te rn a tio n a l 
C apital M arket In te g ra tio n ,"  Jo u rn a l o f F inancia l Econom ics, 
p p . 3 -28 , M arch, 1975.
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a re  two e ffe c ts  of in te rn a tio n a l d iv e rs ific a tio n . One is  changes in 
w ealth  due to  ch an g es  in  m acro -p aram ete rs  of th e  r i s k - r e tu r n  
p r ic in g  re la tio n sh ip . T he o th e r  is th e  en largem ent of the  in v e s t­
m ent o p p o rtu n ity  s e t .  T hese  two e ffec ts  will determ ine ch an g es  in 
th e  w elfare  of in d iv id u a l in v e s to rs . A ccord ing  to Subrahm anyam 's 
m odel, it  may be possib le  th a t  th e  in d iv id u a l's  w ealth declines 
to g e th e r  w ith a re d u c tio n  in the  slope of th e  CML. T h e re fo re , 
w ithou t know ing th e  u tility  fu n c tio n s  of in d iv idua l in v e s to rs  of 
d iffe re n t co u n trie s  an d  th e  v a rian ce -co v a rian ce  s t ru c tu re  of r e tu rn s  
in  th e  in te g ra te d  cap ita l m ark e t, ch an g es  in th e  w elfare of 
ind iv id u a l in v e s to rs  a re  in d e te rm in a te . H ow ever, fo r  q u a d ra tic , 
ex p o nen tia l and  logarithm ic u tility  fu n c tio n s  and  fo r  the  case of a 
two m ark e t m e rg e r , Subrahm anyam  shows th a t  the  in te g ra te d  cap ita l 
m arke t is p a re to  optim al—th e  w elfare of in v e s to rs  in each c o u n try  
will im prove while none will s u ffe r  lo sse s . In  th e  w o rst case of 
p e rfe c tly  p o sitiv e  c o rre la tio n , in v e s to rs  will be  no b e t te r  off since 
th e  e ffec ts  of lo sses  in w ealth  nu llify  th e  e ffec ts  of an  en la rg ed  
o p p o rtu n ity  s e t .  In  conclusion , re g a rd le s s  of p ^ ,  th e  w elfare of 
all p a r tic ip a tin g  in d iv id u a ls  will be im proved , o r  will be th e  same as 
th e  c u r r e n t  level of w elfare  w ith only a dom estic m ark e t po rtfo lio .
B en efits  from In te rn a tio n a l Portfo lio  In v estm en t:
An Ex P ost A pproach
From an ex  p o s t v iew poin t, th e  sh o r t- te rm  im pact of lif tin g  
re s tr ic tio n s  is  th e  movem ent of th e  ex  p o s t e ffic ien t f ro n tie r  
u pw ard ly  and  to  th e  le f t .  In v e s to rs  ho ld ing  th e  in te rn a tio n a l 
m ark e t portfo lio  to g e th e r  w ith  the  r is k - f r e e  a sse t can achieve the
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same level av e rag e  rea lized  r e tu r n  w ith  le ss  s ta n d a rd  dev iation  of 
r e tu r n .  At th e  same tim e, in v e s to rs  in v e s tin g  in te rn a tio n a lly  can 
ach ieve h ig h e r  av e rag e  rea lized  r e tu r n ,  w ith th e  same s ta n d a rd  
dev ia tion  of r e tu r n ,  th a n  th o se  in v e s tin g  dom estically . In
F ig u re  2, i t  is shown th a t  th e  new ex  p o s t CMLj dom inates th e  
dom estic CMLs of c o u n trie s  A, B , an d  C.
T h e re  is  a lim itation in  th e  red u c tio n  of to ta l r is k  of a
dom estic po rtfo lio . A p o rtio n  of to ta l r is k  s till rem ains as a form of 
sy stem atic  r i s k .  H ow ever, w hen d iv e rs ifica tio n  is  e x ten d ed  a c ro ss  
na tiona l b o u n d a rie s , a s u b s ta n tia l p o rtio n  of th e  r is k  th a t  is 
sy stem atic  w ith in  each  c o u n try  will be av e rag e d  o u t. The reaso n  
fo r th is  ad d itiona l d iv e rs ifica tio n  is th a t  r e tu r n s  on m arke t p o r t ­
folios of v a rio u s  c o u n trie s  d isp lay  co n sid e rab le  in d ep en d en ce . Jo y ,
7
P an to n , Reilly an d  M artin re p o r t  th e  co rre la tio n  betw een th e  
common sto ck  m ark e ts  of 12 developed  co u n trie s  fo r  th e  pe rio d
1963-1972. T hese  co rre la tio n  coeffic ien ts  a re  com puted u s in g  w eekly 
re tu rn s  on m ark e t in d e x . While th e  a v e rag e  co rre la tio n  coeffic ien t 
be tw een  a p a ir  of U. S .  s e c u ritie s  is ab o u t 0 .40 an d  th a t  be tw een  an 
in d ex  of New Y ork S tock  E xchange an d  th e  Am erican S tock 
E xchange is well above 0 .9 0 , th e  co rre la tio n s  betw een th e  U. S .  
m ark e t in d ex  an d  o th e r  c o u n try  in d ices  o r  among them selves a re  
ex trem ely  low ex ce p t fo r  th e  case  of U. S .  an d  C anada (0 .6 3 4 ) .
^M. Jo y , D . P an to n , F . R eilly an d  S. M artin , "Co-M ove­
m ents of In te rn a tio n a l E q u ity  M a rk e ts ,"  T he F inancial R ev iew , 
p p . 1-10, 1976.
FIGURE 2




More re c e n tly , Ib b o tso n , C a rr  and  R obinson exam ine th e  
c ro ss -c o rre la tio n s  of common s to ck  m ark e t r e tu rn s  ac ro ss  18 
co u n trie s  from 1960 th ro u g h  1980. A lthough many of th e  co u n trie s  
ex h ib it s tro n g  p o sitiv e  co-m ovem ent in  common s to ck  r e tu r n s ,  U .S . 
s tocks a re  n eg a tiv e ly  co rre la ted  w ith th ose  of two co u n trie s  and  
h av e  low p o sitiv e  co rre la tio n s  (below 0 .4 )  w ith those  of n ine 
c o u n tr ie s .
F ina lly , th e  m agnitude o f in te rn a tio n a l d iv e rs ifica tio n  gains 
d ep en d s on th e  d eg ree  of segm entation  of in te rn a tio n a l cap ita l 
m a rk e ts . In th e  co n tex t of a p e rfe c tly  in te g ra te d  m ark e t, th e  e x ­
p ec ted  ra te  of r e tu r n  on a r isk y  a s s e t  is  determ ined  by  a world 
m ark e t po rtfo lio . S pecifically , th e  ex p ec ted  r e tu rn  on a s e c u rity  is 
re la te d  to its  r i s k ,  w here  r is k  is  de term ined  by  i ts  sen s itiv ity  to a 
w orld m ark e t po rtfo lio . In  th is  c a se , in v e s to rs  ho ld ing  only 
dom estic sec u ritie s  would be su b jec tin g  them selves to  h ig h  r isk  
w ithou t c o rre sp o n d in g  r e tu rn  sim ply because  th ey  a re  b ea rin g  
d iv e rs ifiab le  r is k . T h u s , in te rn a tio n a l d iv e rs ifica tio n  p ro v id es  a 
p u re  d iv e rs ifica tio n  se rv ice  to  d o m estic -o rien ted  in v e s to rs . On the  
o th e r  h a n d , assum e th a t  th e  ex p ec ted  ra te  of r e tu r n  on a risk y  
a s s e t  is de term ined  in i ts  own dom estic m ark e t. T h is would o ccu r 
if in v e s to rs  could  n o t o r h ad  n o t d iv e rs ified  in te rn a tio n a lly  in  seg ­
m ented  cap ita l m a rk e ts . In  th is  c ase , by  d iv e rs ify in g  in te r ­
n a tio n a lly , in v e s to rs  can elim inate p a r t  of th e  r is k  in h e re n t in  the
Q
R. G. Ib b o tso n , R . C . C a rr  an d  A. W. R ob inson , " In te r ­
na tiona l E qu ity  an d  B ond R e tu rn s ,"  F inancial A nalysts  J o u rn a l, 
p p . 61-84, J u ly /A u g u s t, 1982.
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dom estic m ark e t w ithou t sac rif ic in g  ex p ec ted  r e tu r n ,  assum ing 
ex p ec ted  r e tu rn s  on fo re ig n  sec u ritie s  a re  th e  same as those of the  
U .S . m ark e t. In  add ition  to  th e  p u re  d iv ers ifica tio n  b e n e f its , 
in te rn a tio n a l d iv e rs ifica tio n  would elim inate a p o rtio n  of dom estic 
system atic  r is k .
In conclusion , th e re  ap p ea r to be  b en e fits  from in te rn a tio n a l 
d iv e rs ifica tio n  w h e th e r m arke ts  a re  fu lly  in te g ra te d  o r p e rfec tly  
seg m en ted , and  th e  g a ins would be g re a te r  if  m ark e ts  w ere fu lly  
segm ented .
Em pirical S tud ies on B enefits  from 
In te rn a tio n a l Portfo lio  Inv estm en ts
E a rlie r S tud ies in  th e  C on tex t of 
a New E ffic ien t F ro n tie r
From th e  v iew point of th e  segm ented  m ark e t p r ic in g  
a p p ro ach , G ru b e l,9 Levy and  S arn a t* 0 and  G rubel and  F a d n e r11 
employ h is to ric a l va lues of na tiona l stock  m arke t ind ices to d e riv e  a 
new effic ien t f ro n tie r  in  an a ttem pt to show the  ex p o s t b en efits  
from in te rn a tio n a l d iv e rs ific a tio n . While th ese  s tu d ie s  s tre s s  
th e  re d u c tio n  in  o v era ll portfo lio  r is k  th ro u g h  pooling of r is k s ,
Q
H. G. G ru b e l, " In te rn a tio n a lly  D iv ers ified  P ortfo lios: 
W elfare G ains a n d  C apital F low s," Am erican Economic R eview , 
p p . 1299-1314, D ecem ber, 1968.
19H. Levy an d  M. S a rn e t, " In te rn a tio n a l D iversification  of 
In v es tm en t P o rtfo lio s ,"  Am erican Economic R eview , p p . 668-675, 
S ep tem b er, 1970.
■^H. G. G rubel and  K. F a d n e r , "T he In te rd e p e n d en c e  of 
In te rn a tio n a l E q u ity  M ark e ts ,"  Jo u rn a l of F in a n c e , p p . 89-94, 
M arch , 1971.
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12B erg stro m  fin d s  even  h ig h e r  rea lized  r e tu rn s  th an  dom estic
in v estm en t would p ro v id e .
13G rubel assum es a special case  of a tw o -c o u n try , tw o -a sse t 
in v estm en t model. In  th is  w orld , he  shows th a t ,  w ith  le ss  th an  
p e rfe c tly  c o rre la ted  r e tu r n s  on two a s s e ts ,  a portfo lio  w ith two 
a sse ts  can red u ce  to ta l r is k . T h e re fo re , h is  major ob jective  is to 
fin d  th e  co rre la tio n  betw een dom estic and fo re ig n  a s s e ts . His an a ly ­
sis is b a sed  on th e  m ark e t ind ices of 11 co u n trie s  as p ro x ie s  fo r 
m ark e t p o rtfo lio s . G rubel fin d s  le ss  th an  u n it co rre la tio n s  betw een  
th e  r e tu r n s  on th e  U .S . m ark e t index  and  r e tu rn s  on 10 fo re ig n  
m arke t in d ice s , re sp e c tiv e ly . E xcep t fo r  C anada, th e  o th e r  9 coun ­
tr ie s  show v e ry  low levels of co rre la tio n . U sing  th e se  co rre la tio n  
co effic ien ts , G rubel f u r th e r  calcu la tes  th e  ex  p o s t ra te s  o f r e tu rn  
an d  r is k  of in te rn a tio n a lly  d iv e rs ified  portfo lios of v a rio u s  com bina­
tio n s . His f in d in g s  show th a t  d iv e rs ifica tio n  o v e r a sse ts  of th e se  
11 co u n trie s  in  g e n e ra l would h ave  im proved p erfo rm an ce—a h ig h e r 
ra te  of r e tu r n  a t a g iven  r is k  o r  low er r is k  fo r  a g iven  r e tu r n .
H ow ever, G ru b e l's  p o sitiv e  fin d in g s  a re  su b jec t to c r i t i ­
cism . F i r s t ,  A g m o n ^  in s is ts  th a t  an a p p ro p ria te  m easure  fo r  th e
12 G. L. B erg s tro m , "A New R oute to H igher R e tu rn s  and  
Lower R is k s ,” Jo u rn a l of Portfolio  M anagem ent, p p . 30-38, Fall, 
1975.
■^G rubel, In te rn a tio n a lly  D iversified  P o r tfo lio s ,” p p . 1299-
1314.
^ T . Agmon, "T he R elations among E qu ity  M arkets: A
S tu d y  of S h a re  P rice  Co-m ovem ents in th e  U nited  S ta te s , U nited  
K ingdom , G erm any an d  J a p a n ,"  Jo u rn a l of F in a n c e , p p . 839-855, 
S ep tem b er, 1972.
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b e n efits  from in te rn a tio n a l d iv e rs ifica tio n  shou ld  co n sid e r th e
m arginal co n trib u tio n s  of any  fo re ig n  a sse ts  to th e  red u c tio n  in the
to ta l r is k  of an in v e s to r 's  dom estic po rtfo lio . F u r th e rm o re , Agmon
a rg u e s  th a t  since  m arke t ind ices canno t c a p tu re  all p o ssib ilitie s  of
d iv e rs ifica tio n  w ithin  a dom estic m ark e t, su ch  a d v an tag es  could be
ob ta in ed  th ro u g h  f u r th e r  d iv e rs ifica tio n  w ith dom estic a s s e ts .  On
15th e  o th e r  h a n d , Guy in d ica tes  th a t  th e  omission of d iv idend
paym ents cause  th e  ad v an tag es  to be u n d e re s tim a ted . In  add ition
to th e  problem  of w h e th e r th e  time p e rio d  analy2ed is re p re se n ta tiv e  
1 fio r  n o t, G rubel does n o t inc lude  th e  r is k s  and  co sts  of in te r ­
na tio n a l portfo lio  in v es tm en ts . T he exclusion  of add itional r isk s  
an d  co sts  ev id en tly  cause  th e  ad v an tag es  to be  o v e rs ta te d . T h u s , 
only ig n o rin g  th e  add itiona l c o s ts , a re  g a in s rea lized  from in te r ­
na tio n a l d iv e rs if ic a tio n .
17Levy and  S a rn a t employ 28 common s to ck  ind ices of 
v a rio u s  co u n trie s  an d  find  a system atic  red u c tio n  of r is k  th ro u g h  
in te rn a tio n a l d iv e rs ifica tio n  as th e  in v estm en t o p p o rtu n ity  s e t  is 
b ro a d e n ed . T h e ir  te s t  is  im plicitly b ased  on th e  fa c t th a t  
th e re  is a limit in to ta l r is k  re d u c tio n  th ro u g h  dom estic d iv e rs i­
fica tio n . Even th o u g h  th is  fa c t h as  been  challenged  b y  Elton and
■ ^ J .R .F . G uy , "T he E ffect of In te rn a tio n a l D iversification  
on th e  H isto rica l P erform ance o f B ritish  M utual F u n d s ,"  U npub lished  
W orking P a p e r , U n iv e rs ity  of C alifo rn ia , B e rk e le y , No. 36, 1975.
*®The time th a t  G rubel analyzed  is 1957-1966.
17Levy an d  S a rn a t, " In te rn a tio n a l D iv e rs ific a tio n ,"  
p p . 668-675.
20
18 19G ru b e r an d  Lloyd an d  H aney , in te rn a tio n a l d iv e rs ifica tio n
shou ld  be a t le a s t one of th e  m eans of re d u c in g  to ta l po rtfo lio  r is k .
One in te re s t in g  f in d in g  of Levy and  S a rn a t is  th a t  even  th o u g h  the
portfo lio  form ed w ith m arke t in d ices  o f n in e  develop ing  co u n trie s  is
in fe r io r  to o th e r  portfo lios in  r i s k - r e tu r n  sp ace , th e  w orld  portfo lio
in c lu d in g  i t  dom inates any  su b -p o rtfo lio s . T h is  implies th a t  as long
as in v estm en ts  in develop ing  co u n trie s  can make c o n trib u tio n s  in
re d u c in g  th e  o v era ll r i s k ,  th ey  a re  b en efic ia l even  if th ey  h ave  low
ex p ec ted  r e tu r n s .
20G rubel and  F a d n e r h y p o th esize  th a t  co rre la tio n  betw een 
r e tu r n s  is an in c re a s in g  fu n c tio n  of th e  len g th  of time o v e r w hich 
s to ck s  a re  h e ld . T hey  com pare av erag e  co rre la tio n  coeffic ien ts  
among dom estic s e c u ritie s  w ith  th ose  of th e  com binations of dom estic 
an d  fo re ig n  se c u ritie s  a t  d if fe re n t ho ld in g  p e r io d s . T h e ir  fin d in g s  
show th a t  th e  ab so lu te  level of co rre la tio n s  betw een  p a irs  of 
dom estic an d  fo re ig n  se c u ritie s  is  sm aller th an  th e  level of those  
among dom estic s e c u ritie s  fo r  any  ho ld ing  p e rio d s . A no ther
18Elton and  G ru b e r a rg u e  th a t  m ore r is k  re d u c tio n  could  be 
ach ieved  by  form ing a portfo lio  w ith  even  m ore th a n  15 s e c u r itie s . 
F o r m ore d e ta ils , see E. E lton an d  M. G ru b e r , "R isk  R eduction  and  
Portfolio  Size: An A naly tical S o lu tio n ,"  Jo u rn a l of B u s in e s s ,
p p . 415-537, O c to b er, 1977,
19Lloyd an d  H aney in s is t  th a t  add itio n a l r is k  red u c tio n  
would be rea lized  from  add itiona l ho ld ing  p e rio d s  w ith  a g iven  
num ber of c o n s ti tu e n t s e c u r it ie s . F o r m ore d iscu ss io n , see  W. D. 
L loyd an d  R. L. H aney , J r . ,  "Time D ivers ifica tio n : S u re s t  R oute
to  Lower R isk ,"  p p . 5 -9 , Jo u rn a l of Portfo lio  M anagem ent, S p r in g ,
1980.
^ G r u b e l  an d  F a d n e r , "T he In te rd e p e n d e n c e ,"  p p . 89-94.
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in te re s t in g  f in d in g  is th a t ,  fo r bo th  ty p es  of c o rre la tio n , co rre la tion  
is  an in c re a s in g  fu n c tio n  of th e  ho ld ing  p e rio d . F u rth e rm o re , the  
p e rc en ta g e  in c rease  in  co rre la tio n  a ffec ted  b y  in c re a s in g  ho ld ing  
p erio d s  is  much g re a te r  fo r  th e  in te rn a tio n a l g roup  of s to ck s .
A S tu d y  B ased  on R isk  R eduction  in  Portfolios
A d ire c t way to analyze the  b en efits  from in te rn a tio n a l
d iv e rs ifica tio n  is  to com pare th e  r is k  of portfo lios of d iffe ren t size
se lec ted  from an in te rn a tio n a l g ro u p  of s tocks w ith th e  r is k  of a
21dom estic g ro u p s  of s to ck s . Solnik exam ines the  r is k  red u c tio n  in 
in te rn a tio n a l po rtfo lios w ith a co n sid era tio n  of th e  num ber of 
se c u ritie s  in  a po rtfo lio . He fin d s  th a t  fo r  any  size portfo lio ,
d iv e rs ifica tio n  ac ro ss  co u n trie s  p ro d u ces  a le ss  r is k y  portfo lio  th an
dom estic d iv e rs ific a tio n . S pecifically , th e  r is k  of an in te rn a tio n a lly  
d iv e rs if ie d  portfo lio  (w ith  20 s to c k s )  is 11.7% of th e  r is k  on a 
ty p ica l s to ck  while th e  r is k  of a dom estically d iv e rs ified  portfolio  
(w ith  20 s to ck s )  is  27% of th e  r is k  of a ty p ica l s to ck .
M ultivaria te  A nalysis fo r  C orre la tion
22In s te ad  of em ploying sto ck  m arke t in d ice s , L essa rd  p e r ­
form s fa c to r  analy sis  to find  p rin c ip a l com ponents of fo u r  South 
Am erican c o u n trie s ' s to ck s . C o rre la tions among those  co u n trie s  a re
Solnik , "Why Not D iv ers ify  In te rn a tio n a lly ,"  F inancial 
A nalysts  J o u rn a l , p p . 48-54, J u ly /A u g u s t ,  1974.
22D .R . L e ssa rd , " In te rn a tio n a l Portfolio D iversification : A
M ultivaria te  A nalysis fo r  a G roup of L atin  American C o u n trie s ,"  
Jo u rn a l of F in a n c e , p p . 619-633, J u n e , 1973.
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ca lcu la ted  b a sed  on p rin c ip a l com ponents th a t  s e rv e  as p ro x ies  fo r 
r e tu r n s  on th e  m arke t po rtfo lio . Even though  sev e ra l s ig n ifican tly  
p o s itiv e  co rre la tio n s  a re  fo u n d  in  th re e  d iffe re n t time p e rio d s , no 
system atic  p a t te rn  of p ositive  co rre la tio n s  is  fo u n d  o v e r d iffe ren t 
time p e rio d s .
F u rth e rm o re , by  ap p ly in g  th e  varim ax ro ta tio n  tech n iq u e  to 
th e  covariance  m atrix  of all sec u ritie s  of th e  fo u r  c o u n tr ie s , 
L e ssa rd  o b ta in s  e ig h t fa c to rs  w hich a re  in d ep en d en t of one a n o th e r . 
T h en  he  tr ie s  to fin d  th e  p ro p o rtio n s  of to ta l v a rian ce  of each 
c o u n try 's  s tocks exp la ined  by  th e  e ig h t fa c to rs , an d  se lec ts  th e  
fa c to r  w ith th e  la rg e s t  ex p lan a to ry  pow er fo r  each c o u n try . T his 
fa c to r  s e rv e s  as a n o th e r  p ro x y  fo r  r e tu rn s  on th e  m ark e t portfo lio . 
T h e re  is  no s ig n ifican t d iffe ren ce  in  th e  ex p lan a to ry  pow er betw een 
p rin c ip a l com ponents th a t  may be  c o rre la ted  w ith one a n o th e r and  
se lec ted  fa c to rs  w hich a re  designed  to be  in d ep en d en t of one 
a n o th e r . T h ese  fin d in g s  in d ica te  th a t  th e  m arke t fa c to rs  of fo u r
co u n trie s  a re  s ig n ifican tly  in d e p en d e n t of one a n o th e r .
23Ripley also  employs fa c to r  analysis  in o rd e r  to  m easure  
th e  e x te n t of covaria tion  am ong na tiona l s to ck  m ark e ts  an d  to 
id e n tify  th e  p a t te rn  of lin k ag es  among th e se  m a rk e ts . He fin d s  
th a t  m ore th a n  half of th e  v a rian ce  of 14 developed  c o u n trie s ' s tock  
m ark e t ind ices a re  n o t ex p la in ed  b y  fo u r common fa c to rs  th a t  a re  
o b ta in ed  from th e  pooled covariance  m atrix  of all na tional m arke t
OO
D. R ip ley , "System atic  Elem ents in th e  L inkage of 
N ational S tock  M arket In d ic e s ,"  Review of Economics an d  S ta t is t ic s , 
p p . 356-361, A u g u s t, 1973.
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in d ice s . T h is f in d in g  also implies th a t  a su b s ta n tia l p o rtio n  of the
movement of th e  m arke t in d ex  is u n iq u e  to each c o u n try .
24R obichek , Cohn and  P ring le  e x te n d  th e  s tu d y  of R ipley by
in c lu d in g  bond  m ark e t ind ices and  reach  th e  same conclusion th a t
th e re  h as  been  a su b s ta n tia l deg ree  of in d ep en d en ce  among v ario u s
25national e q u ity  an d  bond m ark e ts . F in a lly , L essa rd  employs 
fa c to r  analy sis  to  calcu la te  th e  p rin c ip a l com ponent of the  
covariance  m atrix  of 16 developed c o u n trie s ' m arke t in d ices . The 
p rin c ip a l com ponent s e rv e s  as a p ro x y  fo r a w orld m arke t in d ex . 
He h y p o th esizes  th a t  th e  a d v an tag es  of in te rn a tio n a l d iv e rs ifica tio n  
d ep en d  on th e  re la tiv e  co n trib u tio n  of th e  w orld fa c to r  and  th e  
dom estic fa c to r to th e  v a rian ce  of s e c u rity  r e tu rn s  in a specific  
c o u n try . Since L e ssa rd  fin d s  a s tro n g  c o u n try  fa c to r b u t in s ig ­
n ifican t ex p lan a to ry  pow er of th e  w orld common fa c to r  on the  
v a rian ce  of r e tu rn s  of na tional p o rtfo lio s , he  can a rg u e  th a t  th e re  
a re  p o ten tia l b en e fits  from in te rn a tio n a l d iv e rs ific a tio n .
L essa rd  also p re s e n ts  some em pirical ev idence  su p p o rtin g  
b e n e fits  from in te rn a tio n a l d iv e rs ific a tio n . He exam ines th e  
p ro p o rtio n  of th e  v a rian ce  of th e  r e tu rn  on s to ck s  in  each of 14
OA
A. A. R obichek , R . A. Cohn an d  J .  J .  P r in g le , "R e tu rn s  
on A lte rn a tiv e  In v es tm en t Media an d  Im plications fo r  Portfolio  
C o n s tru c tio n ,"  Jo u rn a l of B u s in e s s , p p . 427-443, J u ly , 1972.
OR
D. R . L e s sa rd , "W orld, N ational an d  In d u s try  F ac to rs  in 
E qu ity  R e tu rn s ,"  Jo u rn a l of F in an ce , p p . 379-391, May, 1974.
D . R . L e s sa rd , "W orld, N ational an d  In d u s try  F ac to rs  in 
E qu ity  R e tu rn s :  Im plications fo r  R isk  R eduction  T h ro u g h  I n te r ­
n a tiona l D iv e rs ific a tio n ,"  F inancial A n a ly sts  J o u rn a l , p p . 32-38, 
J a n u a ry /F e b ru a ry , 1976.
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co u n trie s  exp lained  b y  a w orld in d ex . L e ssa rd  f in d s  th a t a la rg e  
po rtion  of th e  v a rian ce  of an in d iv idua l s e c u rity  is re la ted  to a 
c o u n try  in d ex . T h is ev idence  su g g e s ts  th a t  while a w orld index  is 
im p o rtan t in  acco u n tin g  fo r r i s k ,  c o u n try  fa c to rs  a re  also 
im p o rtan t. T h u s , in v e s to rs  who hold  only dom estic sec u ritie s  b e a r  
add itiona l r is k  th a t  could  be d iv e rs ified  away in te rn a tio n a lly .
T he Perform ance of an Ex A nte In te rn a tio n a l Portfolio
To determ ine gains from in te rn a tio n a l d iv e rs ific a tio n , te s ts
d iscu ssed  p rev io u s ly  (G ru b e l, Levy an d  S a rn a t an d  G rubel and
F a d n e r)  u se  ex  p o s t in te rn a tio n a l po rtfo lios w hich re p re s e n t  the
e ffic ien t com binations of r is k  and  r e tu rn  g iven  know ledge of the
perfo rm ance  of in d iv id u a l s to c k s . In  a s t r ic t  s e n se , th ose  s tu d ie s
27a re  n o t te s ts  of ga ins from in te rn a tio n a l d iv e rs ific a tio n . L essa rd
p o in ts  ou t th a t  th e  perfo rm ance of in te rn a tio n a l portfo lios se lec ted
on an ex  p o s t b a s is  would a t le a s t eq u al th o se  of dom estic portfo lios
an d  th e se  outcom es can n o t be re p e a te d  by  in v e s to rs  w ithou t
28p e rfe c t fo re s ig h t. McDonald also w arn s  th a t  th e  ex p o s t 
dom inance of an in te rn a tio n a l po rtfo lio  m ust be in te rp re te d  w ith 
cau tio n . I t  is  ex p ec ted  th a t th e  ex  p o s t perfo rm ance of in te r ­
n a tiona l po rtfo lios would be th e  maximum perfo rm an ce .
27L e ssa rd , " In te rn a tio n a l Portfolio  D iv e rs ific a tio n ,"  p p . 619-
633.
9ftJ .  G. M cDonald, "F ren ch  M utual F u n d  Perform ance: 
E valuation of In te rn a tio n a lly -D iv e rs ified  P o rtfo lio s ,"  Jo u rn a l of 
F in a n c e , p p . 1161-1180, D ecem ber, 1973.
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29An ex  an te  t e s t  is o b ta ined  by  L essa rd  by  com paring the  
p erfo rm ances of equal w eigh ted  portfo lios of 30 stocks from each  of 
fo u r  South  Am erican co u n trie s  w ith those  of m ean -variance  e ffic ien t 
com binations of th e se  n a tiv e  p o rtfo lio s . In  th is  s tu d y , the  
ex p ec ta tio n s  fo r  the  ex  a n te  selection  a re  d e riv ed  from th e  outcomes 
from 1958 to  1963 and  th e  perform ance of th e  portfo lio  is m easured  
o v e r th e  time p e rio d  of 1963 to 1968. His fin d in g s  show th a t th e  
perfo rm ance of th e  ex an te  e ffic ien t in te rn a tio n a l portfo lio  
dom inates all th e  n a tiv e  c o u n tiy  portfo lios ex cep t fo r  B razil in 
term s of mean and  s ta n d a rd  dev iation  of r e tu r n s .  T h is s tu d y  
a p p ea rs  to show th a t in  a s t r ic te r  sen se , in te rn a tio n a l d iv e rs ific a ­
tion would have  re su lte d  in  considerab le  g a in s . I t  shou ld  be n o te d , 
ho w ev er, th a t  th e  re s u lts  of h is  s tu d y  canno t p ro v id e  a conclusive 
an sw er to w h e th er ga ins from in te rn a tio n a l d iv e rs ifica tio n  outw eigh 
add itiona l co sts  in  d iv e rs ify in g  a portfo lio  in te rn a tio n a lly .
T he Perform ance of In te rn a tio n a l M utual F u n d s 
Since i t  is d ifficu lt to m easure add itional co sts  and  to 
q u a n tify  re s tr ic tio n s  on in te rn a tio n a l portfo lio  in v es tm en ts , an 
evalua tion  of th e  perform ance of in te rn a tio n a l m utual fu n d s  may 
show th e  d e s irab ility  of in te rn a tio n a l d iv e rs ifica tio n  a f te r  tak in g  
add itiona l co sts  in to  accoun t.
29L e ssa rd , " In te rn a tio n a l Portfolio D iv e rs ific a tio n ,"  p p . 619-
633.
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30McDonald exam ines e ig h t F ren ch  m utual fu n d s  from A pril,
1964 to N ovem ber, 1969. In  term s of S h a rp 's  re tu rn - to -v a r ia b il i ty  
31ra tio , h e  fin d s  th a t  in te rn a tio n a l m utual fu n d s  a p p e a r  to y ie ld  
su p e r io r  r is k -a d ju s te d  r e t u r n s . T he  ra n k in g s  of th e  fu n d s  by 
perfo rm an ce  ro u g h ly  p a ra lle l th e  d e g re e  of in te rn a tio n a l d iv e rs if ic a ­
tio n . U n fo rtu n a te ly , h o w ev er, h is  s tu d y  may be su b jec t to e r ro r :  
th e  subop tim ality  in  selec tion  of dom estic s to ck s  may u n d erestim ate  
th e  g a in s  while a p a r t  of th e  su p e r io r ity  may r e s u l t  from th e  ab ility  
of th o se  fu n d s  to se lec t u n d e rv a lu e d  dom estic s to c k s . In  th is  c ase , 
th e  su p e r io r ity  of in te rn a tio n a l m utual fu n d s  is o v erestim ated . I t  is 
ex p ec te d  th a t  in te rn a tio n a l m utual fu n d s  which a re  u su a lly  eq u ip p ed  
w ith  b e t te r  m anagem ent can  also accom plish h ig h e r  perfo rm ance in 
th e  dom estic m ark e t th a n  dom estic m utual fu n d s  would do. F or 
th e se  p ro b lem s, McDonald dev ises  a new perfo rm ance  m easure  fo r 
in te rn a tio n a l m utual fu n d s  w hich , u n d e r  some assu m p tio n s , enab les
him to  decom pose th e  in te rn a tio n a l po rtfo lio  in to  its  na tiona l com-
32p o n e n ts . B ased  on ev idence  of U .S . m utual fu n d s ’ perfo rm ance 
in  th e  U .S . m a rk e t, McDonald assum es th a t  F ren ch  fu n d s  a re  
u n ab le  to se lec t u n d e rv a lu e d  U .S . s to ck s  (fo re ig n  s to c k s )  while 
th e y  can se lec t u n d e rv a lu e d  F ren ch  s to ck s  since th e  F ren ch  m arke t
30M cDonald, "F ren ch  M utual F u n d  P e rfo rm an ce ,"  p p . 1161-
1180.
91
F o r th e  d efin ition  of S h a rp 's  ra tio , see foo tno te  34.
®^For m ore d e ta ils , s e e , M. C. J e n s e n , "T he P erform ance of 
M utual F u n d s  in  th e  P eriod  1945-1964," J o u rn a l of F in a n c e , p p . 389- 
416, May, 1968.
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is  in e ffic ien t w ith re s p e c t to  th e  u n b ia sed n ess  and  th e  speed  of 
inform ation germ ane to in v estm en t d ecisions, McDonald shows 
f u r th e r  th a t  th e  top ra n k in g  in te rn a tio n a l-o r ie n te d  m utual fu n d  also 
m akes th e  top ra n k in g  in  se lec tin g  u n d e rv a lu ed  F ren ch  s to ck s . 
T h u s , i t  is s till u n c e r ta in  w h e th e r the  b e s t  m utual fu n d  b en efited  
from in te rn a tio n a l d iv e rs ifica tio n  o r  from its  selection  of u n d e r ­
va lued  F ren ch  s to ck s .
33Guy exam ines th e  e ffec t of fo re ig n  in v estm en t on th e
perfo rm ance of a sample of 50 B ritish  in v estm en t t r u s ts  from 1960 to
1970. W hether m easu red  b y  th e  ind ices of S h a rp , T re y n o r o r 
34J e n s e n , th e  level of in te rn a tio n a l d iv e rs ifica tio n  h as  in s ig n ifican tly  
p o sitiv e  im pacts on t r u s t  perfo rm ance: " th e re  was no evidence to
conclude th a t  th e  in te rn a tio n a l t r u s t s  s ig n ifican tly
G uy, "T he E ffect of In te rn a tio n a l D iv e rs ific a tio n ."
34 ® it"^ ftS h a rp 's  rew ard  to  v a riab ility  ra tio  = - 1--------
a.
J
R ' t ” ^ f tT re y n o r 's  perfo rm ance  in d ex  = —̂--------
Je n se n 's  abnorm al perfo rm ance  in d ex  =
w here  R.. = th e  r e tu r n  on th e  jth  m utual fu n d  in  th e  p e rio d  t  
R^t = th e  r is k  fre e  ra te
a. = th e  s ta n d a rd  deviation  of r e tu rn s  on th e  j th  m utual 
J fu n d
pj = th e  estim ated  system atic  r is k  of th e  j th  m utual fu n d .
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o u tp erfo rm ed  th e  dom estic ones" (p . 20). T h is fin d in g  implies th a t
b e n e fits  from in te rn a tio n a l d ivers ifica tio n  a re  o ffse t su b s ta n tia lly  by
add itiona l c o s ts . H ow ever, Guy does no t conclude th a t  in te rn a tio n a l
d iv e rs ifica tio n  can n o t be  b en efic ia l. In s te a d , he  a t tr ib u te s  th e
in s ig n ific an t e ffec t to  possib le  suboptim ality  o f B ritish  in vestm en t
35t r u s ts  from 1960 to  1970. " I t  rem ains to be seen  w h e th er an 
optim ally d iv e rs ified  t r u s t  would h av e  shown su p e r io r  perform ance"
(p . 20).
B ased  on th e  above em pirical ev id en ce , in te rn a tio n a l d iv e r­
sification  a p p ea rs  to have  p o ten tia l b en e fits  of r is k  red u c tio n  befo re  
acco u n tin g  fo r  ad d itiona l c o s ts . H ow ever, it  rem ains inconclusive  
w h e th e r th e  p o ten tia l ga ins a re  s till  rea lized  a f te r  allowing fo r 
add itiona l co s ts  an d  re s tr ic tio n s . In  fa c t , due to some official 
re s tr ic tio n s  an d  th e  u n d e rd ev e lo p ed  s ta te s  of fo re ig n  cap ita l 
m a rk e ts , U .S . in v e s to rs  do no t have  re a d y  access to fo re ig n  cap ita l 
m a rk e ts . T he following section  will su rv e y  m ajor re s tr ic tio n s  an d  
add itiona l c o s ts . H ow ever, th e  fa c t th a t  in te rn a tio n a l d iv e rs ifica tio n  
h a s  p o ten tia l b en e fits  ig n o rin g  add itiona l co sts  and  re s tr ic tio n s  will 
be  enough  to be a  b a sis  upon  w hich su b se q u e n t be lief in d iv e rs if i­
cation  ro le  of MNCs is  d e riv e d .
B a r r ie rs  to In te rn a tio n a l Portfo lio  In v estm en t 
Since th e  second  w orld w a r, th e re  h as  been  a ra p id  e x p an ­
sion of in te rn a tio n a l cap ita l m ovem ent in  th e  form  of fo re ig n  d ire c t
35F o r m ost fu n d s  in  h is  sam ple, th e  p e rc e n ta g e  of th e  p o r t­
folio in v e s te d  in  th e  U .K . m ark e t is more th a n  50% d u rin g  1968-1970.
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in v estm en t. H ow ever, m any b a r r ie r s  to in te rn a tio n a l portfolio  
in v estm en t as well as add itional r is k s  ten d  to p re v e n t in v e s to rs  
from d iv e rs ify in g  ac ro ss  co u n trie s .
In  th is  sec tio n , sev e ra l w ays of p u rc h a s in g  fo re ig n  se c u ri­
tie s  a re  su rv e y e d  and  major b a r r ie r s  to  in te rn a tio n a l portfo lio  
in v estm en t a re  d iscu ssed .
T he Means of Foreign  S ecu rity  In vestm en t 
A lthough th e  p rin c ip a l m arke t fo r  in d iv id u a l fo re ign  s e c u r i­
tie s  is g en era lly  in  th e ir  home c o u n tr ie s , a small num ber of fo re ign  
firm s h a s  lis te d  th e ir  s e c u ritie s  on th e  New Y ork Stock E xchange
(NYSE) o r  th e  American S tock  E xchange (AMEX).'*® A num ber of
37fo re ig n  sec u ritie s  th a t  a re  no t lis ted  is tra d e d  o v e r- th e -c o u n te r .
An in v e s to r  p u rc h a s in g  th e se  sh a re s  will norm ally p u rc h a se  an 
Am erican D eposito ry  R eceip t (A D R ). T his is a c e rtific a te  of 
ow nersh ip  is su e d  by  a U .S . b an k  on i ts  own in itia tiv e , w hich r e p r e ­
se n ts  th e  u n d e rly in g  fo re ig n  sh a re s  th e  b an k  holds in  cu sto d y . 
U .S . in v e s to rs  can  b u y  Am erican sh a re s  th a t  a re  s e c u r ity  c e r tif i­
c a te s  is su e d  in th e  U .S . by  a d is tr ib u te  ag en t o p e ra tin g  on 
b eh a lf of a fo re ig n  is s u e r .  Also, sev e ra l o p en -en d  and  c lo sed -en d
F or exam ple, B ritish  Petroleum  an d  Sony C orporation  
tra d e  on th e  NYSE.
37F or exam ple, Toyota M otors tra d e s  o v e r  th e  c o u n te r .
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in v estm en t fu n d s  a re  availab le  th a t  in v e s t p rim arily  in fo re ign  
38s e c u r i t ie s .
In v es tm en ts  in  ADRs re q u ire  some e x p e r tise  an d  add itional 
co n sid e ra tio n s . F o r exam ple, acco u n tin g  p ro c e d u re s  v a ry  from 
co u n try  to  c o u n try  and  th e  ro le  of th e  fo re ig n  governm en t in  its  
economy may be d iffe re n t from th a t  in th e  U. S.  economy. F u r th e r ­
m ore, m any financ ial ra tio s  may have d iffe re n t im plications when
applied  to  a fo re ig n  firm an d  th e  cap ita l s t ru c tu re  of a fo reign  firm
39may h ave  a d iffe re n t in d u s try  s ta n d a rd . A fu r th e r  problem
assoc iated  w ith in v estm en t th ro u g h  in vestm en t firm s is  th a t  th e ir
40portfo lios may n o t be  well d iv e rs if ie d . From th e  in v e s to r 's  po in t 
of v iew , one of th e se  fu n d s  canno t p ro v id e  su ffic ien t d ivers ifica tio n  
and  s till  m ust be  view ed as e ssen tia lly  a o n e -se c u rity  in p u t to  h is  
po rtfo lio .
F ina lly , a U . S .  in v e s to r  can p u rc h a se  se c u ritie s  lis ted  on a 
fo re ig n  s to ck  ex change  d ire c tly . H ow ever, a num ber of p o ten tia l 
problem s is invo lved  in th e  d ire c t acqu isition  of fo re ig n  se c u ritie s .
OQ
F or exam ple, fo r m utual fu n d s , th e re  a re  C anadian F u n d , 
In te rn a tio n a l In v e s to rs , S cu d d e r In te rn a tio n a l In v estm en ts  and  
Tem pleton G row th. T h e re  a re  also sev e ra l c lo sed -en d  investm en t 
fu n d s  such  as ASA Lim ited, Jap an  F u n d  an d  U .S . & F ore ign  S e c u ri­
tie s . S ou rce : In v es tm en t Companies (New Y ork: W iesenberger
S e rv ic e s , I n c . ,  1982).
39F or m ore d e ta ils , see E. M. B a r r e t t ,  L. N. P rice  and  J .  
A. G eh rk e , " Ja p a n , Some B ack g ro u n d  fo r S ecu rity  A n a ly sis ,"  
F inancial A nalysts  J o u rn a l , p p . 33-34, J a n u a ry /F e b r u a ry , 1974 and  
R. S h o h e t, " In v e s tin g  in  F oreign  S e c u r itie s ,"  F inancial A nalysts  
J o u rn a l , p p . 55-72, S ep tem b er/O cto b er, 1974.
^ F o r  exam ple, ASA Limited in v e s ts  exclu siv e ly  in South  
A frican  gold  m ining s e c u r itie s , while Jap an  F u n d  in v e s ts  in  Jap an ese  
s e c u r i t ie s .
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Major Problem s in D irec t P u rch ase
A. R es tric tio n s  on Domestic S ecu rity  
T ran sac tio n s  b y  F oreign  In v e s to rs
T hese  re s tr ic tio n s  may n o t allow fo re ig n  in v e s to rs  to have
access  to th e  dom estic cap ita l m a rk e t. In  o rd e r  to  p ro te c t th e
ow nersh ip  of dom estic firm s an d  m onetary  po licy , m any co u n trie s  do
no t open th e ir  cap ita l m ark e ts  to fo re ig n  in v e s to rs  w ithou t some
re s t r ic t io n s . T hese  re s tr ic tio n s  may involve long -term  o r  s h o r t-
41term  se c u r it ie s , lis te d  o r  u n lis te d . F o r exam ple, in  E cuador, the  
a cq u ir in g  of sh a re s  in  a na tional firm  by  fo re ig n  in v e s to rs  is no t 
allow ed. T he Sw edish se c u ritie s  m ark e ts  a re  v ir tu a lly  closed to 
fo re ig n  in v e s to rs . T he r ig h t  of fo re ig n e rs  to own sh a re s  of F inn ish  
com panies is r e s tr ic te d  to  20% of th e  cap ita l, u n le ss  perm ission to 
own a h ig h e r  p e rc e n ta g e  is g iven  by  the  M inistry  o f T rad e  and  
In d u s try .  In  M exico, sh a re s  of some com panies (M exican A irline, 
M exicana and  th e  in d u s tr ia l  ho ld ing  com panies such  as ALFA, DESC 
an d  VISA) a re  n o t availab le to fo re ig n  in v e s to rs . F u rth e rm o re , 
p u rc h a s in g  sh a re s  in  com panies w hose fo re ig n  sh areh o ld in g  is a t o r 
n e a r  th e  legal limit (49%) may be d ifficu lt fo r  fo re ig n e rs . In  J a p a n , 
u n til F e b ru a ry  1979, th e re  h ad  been  lim its (25%) on th e  to ta l am ount 
of sec u ritie s  th a t  may be p u rc h a se d  b y  fo re ig n  in v e s to rs . Such 
lim its a re  s till  app lied  to  sh a re s  of specially  d e sig n a ted  com panies 
of s tra te g ic  in d u s tr ie s . T he  co n sen t of th e  B ank  of Norway is
^*For more d e ta ils , see  L. J .  Kemp, A Guide to World 
Money and  C apital M arkets (L ondon: McGraw HiU Book ( U . K . )
Co . ,  1981), an d  In v es tm en t an d  T axation  (L ondon: T ouche Ross
In te rn a tio n a l, 1978).
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re q u ire d  fo r  c ap ita l t r a n s f e r  to Norway b y  a fo re ig n e r  fo r  portfo lio  
in v estm en t p u rp o se s . In  New Zealand and  V enezuela, no fo re ign  
in v e s to r  may a cq u ire  s h a re s  in e x is tin g  com panies w ithou t th e  
ap p ro v a l of th e  R ese rv e  b a n k  an d  th e  O ffice of F ore ign  In v es tm en t, 
re sp e c tiv e ly . In  G erm any, money m ark e t in s tru m e n t an d  fix ed - 
in te r e s t  s e c u ritie s  w ith a rem ain ing  m a tu rity  of le ss  th an  two y e a rs  
a re  n o t norm ally p e rm itted  to be  sold to fo re ig n e rs  while common 
sto ck s  a re  no t availab le  to  fo re ig n e rs  in  K uw ait. S tro n g  con tro ls  
b y  fo re ig n  governm en ts  a re  common w hen th e se  governm ents con­
s id e r  th e i r  own m ark e ts  to be  u n d e r  p re s s u re .  F or exam ple, in 
1973, G erm any im posed a ban  on th e  p u rc h a se  of dom estic sec u ritie s  
by  fo re ig n  in v e s to rs , w hich h as  now been  e n tire ly  lif te d . A sim ilar 
ban  was im posed by  th e  N ational B ank  of S w itzerland  betw een 
F e b ru a ry  1978 an d  J a n u a ry  1979.
B . R es tric tio n s  on th e  L is tin g  an d  th e  
P u rch ase  of F o re ig n  S ecu ritie s
Many c o u n trie s  do n o t allow th e ir  re s id e n t in v e s to rs  to 
p u rc h a se  u n lis te d  fo re ig n  se c u ritie s  an d  r e s t r ic t  th e ir  in s titu tio n a l 
in v e s to rs  to hold only  a  c e r ta in  p ro p o rtio n  of th e ir  po rtfo lio  in 
fo re ig n  a s s e ts .  F o r exam ple, T aiw anese in d iv id u a ls  a re  n o t allowed 
to in v e s t o u ts id e  th e  c o u n try . In  C hile, K orea, M alaysia, Ire lan d  
and  A u stra lia , fo re ig n  portfo lio  in v estm en t by  re s id e n ts  faces some 
re s tr ic tio n s  o r  re q u ire s  th e  ap p ro v a l o f a u th o r itie s . In  p rev io u s  
p e rio d s  re s tr ic tio n s  e x is ted  on o u tw ard  portfo lio  tra n sa c tio n s  by  
o th e r  c o u n tr ie s . U n til 1963, re s id e n ts  of I ta ly  w ere n o t p e r ­
m itted  to  b u y  any  fo re ig n  s e c u r it ie s . In  J a p a n , o u tw ard  portfo lio
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tra n sac tio n s  w ere no t libera lized  u n til  th e  end  of th e  1960s. T h e re  
a re  also re s tr ic t io n s  on dom estic m a rk e ts . F o r exam ple, in  o rd e r  to 
be elig ible fo r  re g is tra tio n  on th e  Indonesian  Stock E x change, a 
company m ust be located  in  Indonesia .
C . R egulations on th e  R em ittance of the  
P roceeds from F o reign  In v estm en t and  
on th e  E xchange of C u rren c ies
Some co u n trie s  re q u ire  re in v estm en t of all p ro ceed s from 
the  sale of dom estic sec u ritie s  by  fo re ig n  in v e s to rs  in  the  dom estic 
m ark e t, while o th e r co u n trie s  re q u ire  all p ro ceed s from the  sale of 
fo re ig n  se c u ritie s  by  dom estic in v e s to rs  to be  re p a tr ia te d . T h ere  
a re  lim its on the  am ount of an exch an g e  of c u rre n c y  fo r  in te r ­
national portfo lio  in v estm en t o r  p ro v is io n s  th a t  re q u ire  
d isad v an tag eo u s exch an g e  ra te  fo r  th e  p u rp o se  of fo re ig n  portfo lio  
in v estm en t. For exam ple, U nited Kingdom re s id e n ts  w ere no t 
usually  allowed to  p u rc h a se  c u rre n c y  a t  official ex change  ra te s  fo r  
in v e s tin g  in  fo re ig n  s e c u r itie s . In s te a d , th ey  w ere re q u ire d  to  u se  
" investm en t s te r lin g "  w hich o rig in a ted  m ainly from th e  sale of 
fo re ig n  c u rre n c y -se c u r it ie s  owned by  U. K.  re s id e n ts .  In v estm en t 
s te r lin g  was available only  a t a co n sid erab le  prem ium  o v e r norm al 
" re s id e n t s te r l in g ."  H ow ever, in  O ctober 1979, su ch  exchange 
con tro ls  w ere com pletely abo lished . In  Belgium and  L uxem bourg , 
th e re  s till  e x is t tw o -tie r  fo re ig n  exchange  system s in  which financial 
tra n sa c tio n s  su ch  as th e  p u rc h a se  o r sale of sec u ritie s  m ust tak e  
p lace  v ia  th e  F inancial F ran cs  m ark e t.
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D . T ax  D isadvan tages
T h e re  is  e x tra  tax atio n  on fo re ig n  portfo lio  in v estm en t,
su ch  as th e  In te re s t  E qualization T ax of th e  U . S .  w hich c h a rg e d  up
to 18.75% of add itional ta x  on th e  p u rc h a se  of fo re ig n  se c u ritie s .
O th e r im p o rtan t ta x  d isad v an tag es  a re  th e  w ithho ld ing  tax  on
d iv id en d s an d  in te re s t  income. For exam ple, in  S w itze rlan d , th e
w ithho ld ing  tax  is lev ied  a t 35% on all d is tr ib u tio n s  by  Swiss
re s id e n t firm s in c lu d in g  d iv id en d s . T his ta x  is c h a rg ed  to all
42re c ip ie n ts , in d iv id u a ls  as well as co rp o ra tio n s .
E. F o re ig n  E xchange R isks
T he fin a l p ro ceed s  from fo re ig n  portfo lio  in v estm en t a re  
a ffec ted  by  th e  fo re ig n  ex ch an g e  ra te s  p re v a ilin g  w hen th e  p ro ­
ceeds a re  co n v e rted  b ack  to dom estic c u r re n c y . T h e re fo re , in 
add ition  to th e  r is k  of fo re ig n  s e c u r i t ie s , in v e s to rs  shou ld  face 
fo re ign  ex change  r is k s .  H ow ever, exchange  ra te  flu c tu a tio n s  a re  
no t n e ce ssa rily  bad  fo r  an in v e s to r . If  exch an g e  ra te  flu c tu a tio n s  
a re  in d e p en d e n t of one a n o th e r , th ey  can be d iv e rs ified  away and  
h ave  neg lig ib le  im pact on th e  r is k  of th e  po rtfo lio . F u rth e rm o re , 
many h ed g in g  s tra te g ie s  a g a in s t fo re ig n  ex change  r is k s  a re
availab le in fu tu re  and  fo rw ard  exchange  m arke ts  and  money
43m a rk e ts . H ow ever, as  n o ted  by  Elton and  G ru b e r , v a riab ilitie s  in 
42F or m ore inform ation re g a rd in g  w ithho ld ing  tax es  of 
d iffe re n t c o u n tr ie s , see  B u sin ess  S tu d y , 2nd ed . (T ouche  R oss & 
Co . ,  1978) an d  R . S hohet, " In v e s tin g  in  F o re ig n  S e c u ritie s ,"  p . 71.
A O
E. J .  Elton an d  M. J .  G ru b e r , M odern Portfolio  T heo ry  
and  In v estm en t A nalysis (New Y ork: John  Wiley & SonsT, 1981),
p . 164.
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ex change  ra te s  in tro d u ce  an u n fav o rab le  elem ent in to  in te rn a tio n a l
d iv ers ifica tio n  as long  as one c u rre n c y  te n d s  to f lu c tu a te  uniform ly
com pared to all o th e r  c u rre n c ie s . To U . S.  in v e s to rs , w hen th e
d o llar d e te r io ra te s  re la tiv e  to  all fo re ig n  c u rre n c ie s , th is
u n fav o rab le  flu c tu a tio n  in exchange ra te s  c re a te s  add itional r is k s .
S ev era l s tu d ie s  find  some ev idence  th a t ,  ex  p o s t, fo reign
exch an g e  r is k s ,  a lthough  th ey  ten d  to red u ce  th e  b e n e f its , cannot
change  th e  p ositive  conclusion of r is k  red u c tio n  b en efits  from
44in te rn a tio n a l d iv e rs ific a tio n . Solnik finds th a t  th e  r is k  of an
in te rn a tio n a l portfo lio  u n p ro te c te d  ag a in s t fo re ig n  exchange r isk s  is
la rg e r  th an  th a t of a h ed g ed  one. H ow ever, th e  to ta l s ta n d a rd
deviation  of th e  u n p ro te c te d  in te rn a tio n a l portfo lio  is s till much
sm aller th a n  th a t  of a com parable dom estic po rtfo lio . G rubel and  
45F a d n e r  find  th a t  th e  o b se rv ed  changes in  exchange ra te s  a re  
small com pared w ith changes in  eq u ity  v a lu es . C o n seq u en tly , th e  
s ta n d a rd  dev iation  of r e tu rn s  from in te rn a tio n a l portfo lios w ith and  
w ithou t fo re ig n  exchange  ad justm en t a re  s ta tis tic a lly  no t d iffe re n t. 
In  th e  above s tu d ie s , ex change  r is k  does no t have  a m ajor im pact 
on r e s u l ts .  H ow ever, re c e n t in c re a se s  in  th e  in s ta b ility  of 
exchange  ra te s  could  modify th e se  r e s u lts .
In add ition  to  the  above m entioned  d isad v a n ta g es , 
un fam iliarity  w ith  fo re ig n  cap ita l m arke ts  an d  d iffe re n t accoun ting
^ S o ln ik ,  "Why Not D iv e rs ify ,"  p p . 48-54.
^ G r u b e l  and  F a d n e r , "The In te rd e p e n d en c e  of I n te r ­
n a tio n a l,"  p p . 89-94.
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p ro c e d u re s  may cause  add itional inform ation c o s ts . F u rth e rm o re , 
fo re ig n  in v estm en ts  u su a lly  a re  exposed  to  a v a r ie ty  of political 
r is k s .  In  th e  ex trem e , th e  ho ld ing  of fo re ig n  sec u ritie s  may be 
e x p ro p ria te d .
C oncluding Rem arks
In  th is  c h a p te r , i t  has  been  shown th a t  w ithou t co n sid erin g
re s tr ic t io n s  o r  add itiona l co s ts , in te rn a tio n a l d ivers ifica tio n  could
p ro v id e  r is k  re d u c tio n  b e n e f its . H ow ever, a su rv e y  of major
46b a r r ie r s  and  a p a s t  h is to rica l re c o rd  of U . S .  cap ita l flows ten d  to
su g g e s t th a t  in  re a li ty , it  is  s till d iff icu lt fo r  U . S .  in v e s to rs  to
47d iv e rs ify  portfo lios  in te rn a tio n a lly . C o n seq u en tly , sev e ra l people 
have  su g g es te d  p u rc h a s in g  sec u ritie s  is su e d  by  U . S .  b a sed  MNCs 
as an in d ire c t m ethod of in te rn a tio n a l d iv e rs ific a tio n . U n d er th is
46D u rin g  th e  la s t  two d ecad es , U . S .  in v estm en t in  fo reign  
s e c u ritie s  h as  been  ou tnum bered  by  fo re ig n  in v estm en t in  U.S .  
s e c u ritie s  while U . S .  fo re ig n  d ire c t in v estm en t h as  f a r  exceeded  
fo re ig n  d ire c t in v estm en t in th e  U . S .  H ow ever, 1978 U . S .  fo re ign  
portfo lio  in v estm en t (5 3 .4  billion d o lla rs) came close to th e  amount 
of fo re ig n  in v estm en t in U . S .  s e c u ritie s  (5 5 .4  billion d o lla rs ) . In  
1981 th e  ho ld ing  of U .S .  s e c u ritie s  (9 3 .8  billion d o lla rs) by  
fo re ig n e rs  exceed ed  th e  ho ld ings of fo re ig n  sec u ritie s  by  U.S .  
re s id e n ts  (62.9 billion d o lla rs ) . S ou rce : D epartm en t of Commerce,
U . S .  S u rv ey  of C u rre n t B u s in e ss , Vol. 59, No. 8 (A u g u s t 1979), 
p . 56 and  o th e r  volum es.
47Some people m ention th e  in d ire c t way of in te rn a tio n a l 
d iv e rs ific a tio n . Some re p re se n ta tiv e  s tu d ie s  a re  G. R agazzi, 
"T heo ries  of th e  D eterm inan ts of D irec t F oreign  In v e s tm en t,"  
In te rn a tio n a l M onetary F u n d  S taff P a p e rs , p p . 471-498, J u ly , 1973; 
A. M. R ugm an, "R isk  R eduction  b y  In te rn a tio n a l D iv e rs ifica tio n ,"  
Jo u rn a l of In te rn a tio n a l B u sin ess  S tu d ie s , p p . 75-80, Fall/W in ter, 
1976; R . A. S tevenson  and  E. H. J e n n in g s , F undam entals  of In v e s t­
m ents , 2nd ed . (M innesota: West P u b lish in g  C o . ,  1981), p p . 508-
510. L a te r , m any s tu d ie s  p ro v id ed  some em pirical ev idence fo r 
th is  a rg u m en t.
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in d ire c t app roach  th e  same m agn itude  of r is k  re d u c tio n  b en e fits  
could  be ach ieved  as th ro u g h  in te rn a tio n a l portfo lio  in v estm en t. 
Since th is  a rgum en t is th e  c e n tra l is su e  of th is  s t u d y ,  th is  topic 
will be  d iscu ssed  in m ore d e ta il in  th e  following c h a p te r .
CHAPTER 3
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
AND FOREIGN PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT
In  C h ap te r 2, i t  was shown th a t  by  d iv e rs ify in g  a portfo lio  
in te rn a tio n a lly , in v e s to rs  would gain r is k  re d u c tio n  b e n e f its , 
assum ing  no re s tr ic t io n s  o r  add itional c o s ts . C o n sidering  r e s t r ic ­
tions and  th e  add itiona l r is k s  invo lved  in in te rn a tio n a l d iv e rs if ic a ­
tio n , i t  is u n c lea r w h e th e r an in te rn a tio n a l portfo lio  s till  p ro v id es  
b e n e f its . C o n seq u en tly , an a lte rn a tiv e  way of ach iev in g  r isk  
red u c tio n  b en e fits  by  p u rc h a s in g  sh a re s  of MNCs has been  
s u g g e s te d . In th is  c h a p te r , the  com plem entary re la tio n sh ip  betw een 
fo re ig n  d ire c t in v estm en t and  fo re ig n  portfo lio  in v estm en t will be  
exam ined from the  U . S .  in v e s to r 's  p o in t of view .
T he Com plem entary R elationsh ip  
F oreign  d ire c t in v estm en t is  an in v estm en t by  re s id e n ts  of a 
c o u n try  in a fo re ig n  firm  o v e r which th ey  have  e ffec tiv e  co n tro l. 
On th e  o th e r  h a n d ,  in  a fo re ig n  portfo lio  in v es tm en t, in v e s to rs  
h av e  no s u b s ta n tia l co n tro l o v e r fo re ig n  firm s. T he  fo rm er is made 
m ostly  by  firm s while th e  la t te r  is ex ecu ted  b y  in d iv id u a l in v e s to rs  
an d  financ ial in s ti tu tio n s . T he l i te ra tu re  on each ty p e  of fo re ig n  
in v estm en t h as  been  developed  se p a ra te ly . Most l i te ra tu re  r e ­
g a rd in g  fo re ig n  d ire c t in v estm en t s tr e s s e s  th e  th e o ry  of in d u s tr ia l
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organ ization*  r a th e r  th an  th e  th e o ry  of in te rn a tio n a l cap ita l move- 
2
m ent. Rugm an in tro d u ce s  a m ore fundam ental m otive beh ind  
fo re ig n  d ire c t in v estm en t. He a rg u es  th a t  th e  fo re ig n  opera tio n s  of 
MNCs allow th e  firm  to  maximize its  o v era ll level of p ro f its . T he 
MNCs enjoy th e  add itiona l ad v an tag e  of le ss  r is k  in  p ro f its  th an  a 
dom estic firm  would face . D ue to th e  po ssib ility  of d iversifica tion  
in v a rio u s  n a tio n a l re a l goods m arke ts  th a t  a re  n o t p e rfe c tly  co r­
re la te d , th e  MNCs can realize  the  b en e fits  of r is k  red u c tio n  in  the
3
form of m ore s tab le  e a rn in g s . L loyd, G oldstein and  Rogow show 
le ss  th a n  p e rfe c tly  p o sitiv e  co rre la tio n s  among various national rea l 
a s s e t m a rk e ts . T h u s , if  in v e s to rs  canno t d iv e rs ify  th e ir  own 
po rtfo lio s in te rn a tio n a lly , th e  in te rn a tio n a l d iv e rs ifica tio n  of o p e ra ­
tions would re d u c e  th e  r is k  of a firm  an d  lead  to a d ecrease  in  the  
r is k  premium com ponent o f th e  cost of cap ita l. As a r e s u l t ,  a firm 
can im prove th e  effic iency  of re a l cap ita l allocation and  p resum ab ly ,
F o r more d e ta iled  d esc rip tio n s  of m otives fo r fo reign  d ire c t 
in v e s tm en t, see D . K. Eiteman an d  A. I . S toneh ill, M ultinational 
B u sin ess  F in a n c e , 2nd ed  (M assach u se tts : A ddison-W esley, 1979),
p p . 231-263 and  J .  M. G ray and  H . P . G ray , "T he M ultinational 
B ank : A F inancia l MNC," Jo u rn a l of B ank ing  and  F in an ce , p p . 33-
63, Vol. 5, 1981. 
o
R ugm an, "R isk R ed u c tio n ,"  p p . 75-80 and  "Motives fo r  
F o reign  In v estm en t: T he M arket Im perfec tions and  R isk D iversifica­
tion  H y p o th e se s ,"  Jo u rn a l of World T rad e  Law , p p . 567-573, 
S ep tem b er/O cto b er, 1975. F o r a m ore de ta iled  d e sc rip tio n , see A. 
M. R ugm an, In te rn a tio n a l D iversification  an d  th e  M ultinational E n te r­
p r is e  (M assach u se tts , L ex in g to n , 1979).
^W. P . L loyd, S . J .  G oldstein an d  R. B . Rogow, " In te r ­
n a tio n a l Portfolio  D iversification  of Real A sse ts : An U p d a te ,"
Jo u rn a l of B u sin ess  F inance an d  A ccoun ting , p p . 45-50, S p rin g ,
1981.
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in c re a se  i ts  m arke t v a lu e . T he in cen tiv e  to s tab ilize  th e  ea rn in g s  
stream  may,  h ow ever, be co n tra d ic to ry  to  th e  goal of sh a reh o ld e r 
w ealth  m axim ization. Em ploying th e  option p ric in g  th e o ry , Galai 
an d  M asulis d em onstra te  th a t  a re d u c tio n  in  th e  v a riab ility  of th e  
firm ’s e a rn in g s  and  value may in c re a se  system atic  r is k  an d  re s u lt  in 
th e  t r a n s f e r  of w ealth  from sto ck h o ld ers  to  b o n d h o ld e rs . B ased  on 
su ch  a rg u m e n ts , Amihud and  Lev^ advance  a m anageria l motive fo r 
conglom erate m e rg e rs , to  red u ce  th e  n o n d iv ers ifiab le  employment 
r is k  of m anagem ent. S ince th is  r is k  is  re la te d  to  th e  o pera tional 
r is k  of a firm , m anagem ent may ex ecu te  fo re ig n  d ire c t in v estm en t to 
red u ce  e a rn in g s  v a ria b ility , even  th o u g h  th e  fo re ig n  d ire c t in v e s t­
m ent may n o t b e n e f it s h a re h o ld e rs . F u rth e rm o re , if  a m ore s tab le  
e a rn in g s  stream  is  a p rim ary  ob jective  of o p era tio n a l d iv e rs ific a tio n , 
conglom erate m erg e r w ith in  a c o u n try  can be an a lte rn a tiv e  way.  
A ssum ing a p e r fe c t  c ap ita l m arke t w here  no tra n sac tio n  co sts  are  
in c u r re d , o p era tio n a l d iv e rs ifica tio n  does n o t p ro v id e  any  economic 
v a lue  to  sh a reh o ld e rs  once th ey  can  e s ta b lish  w e ll-d iv e rs ified  p o r t ­
fo lios. T h u s , fo re ig n  d ire c t in v estm en t seems to be  co n tra d ic to ry  
to  th e  p rin c ip a l goal of sh a re h o ld e r  w ealth  m axim ization.
^D . Galai and  R . W. M asulis, "T he O ption P ric in g  Model 
an d  th e  R isk  F a c to r of S to c k ,"  Jo u rn a l of F inancia l Econom ics, p p . 
52-82, M arch , 1976.
®Y. Amihud an d  B . L ev , "R isk  R eduction  As a M anagerial 
M otive fo r  C onglom erate M e rg e rs ,"  Bell Jo u rn a l of Econom ics, 
p p . 605-617, A utum n, 1981.
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H ow ever, in  an im perfec t cap ita l m arke t w here  homemade 
portfo lio  d iv e rs ifica tio n  in c u rs  a h igh  cost o r  faces re s tr ic tio n s , 
op era tio n a l d iv e rs ifica tio n  of a firm  may be beneficia l to i ts  s h a re ­
h o ld e rs . The ob jec tive  o f p ro v id in g  a d iv e rsifica tion  se rv ice  is 
c o n s is te n t w ith th e  sh a reh o ld e r w ealth m axim ization. F u rth e rm o re , 
assum ing e ffic ien t cap ita l m a rk e ts , such  b e n e f its , if  th ey  e x is t , 
shou ld  be reco g n ized  and  rew ard ed  by  in v e s to rs . As a r e s u l t ,  a 
firm  can red u ce  i ts  cost of e q u ity . The m agnitude  of such  b en e fits  
would depend  on th e  d eg ree  of im perfection  in  the  cap ita l m ark e t. 
F o r exam ple, d iv e rs ifica tio n  th ro u g h  conglom erate m erg er is n o t 
ex p ec ted  to p ro v id e  su b s ta n tia l b en e fits  to  sh a reh o ld e rs  since w ithin 
a dom estic cap ita l m a rk e t, in d iv id u a l in v e s to rs  can d iv e rs ify  th e ir  
po rtfo lios w ithou t su b s ta n tia l e x tra  c o s ts . H ow ever, as il lu s tra te d  
in  th e  p rev io u s  c h a p te r ,  in  im perfec tly  in te g ra te d  in te rn a tio n a l 
cap ita l m a rk e ts , in d iv id u a l in v e s to rs  face some re s tr ic tio n s  o r 
h ig h e r  r is k  an d  c o s ts . T h ese  b a r r ie r s  te n d  to p re v e n t U.S.  
in v e s to rs  from d iv e rs ify in g  in te rn a tio n a lly  d esp ite  th e  p o ten tia l of 
r is k  red u c tio n  b e n e f its . U n d er su ch  c ircu m stan ces , MNCs may 
d iv e rs ify  o p era tio n s  on behalf of sh a reh o ld e rs  a t co n sid erab ly  lower 
co sts  and  r is k s .  T h u s , in  th e  ex trem e case of a p e rfe c tly  
segm ented  in te rn a tio n a l cap ita l m a rk e t, a sh a re  of MNC is 
co n sid e red  to be  eq u iv a len t to an in te rn a tio n a l portfo lio  in  term s of 
r i s k .  By p u rc h a s in g  sh a re s  of MNCs, in d iv id u a l in v e s to rs  gain 
in d ire c t r is k  red u c tio n  b en e fits  th a t  m ight be  o ffse t by  add itional 
co sts  o r  im possible th ro u g h  in te rn a tio n a l portfo lio  in v estm en t. I t
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shou ld  be em phasized t h a t ,  h ow ever, like th e  case  of b en efits  from 
in te rn a tio n a l portfo lio  in v estm en t, the  m agn itude  of b e n e fits  depends 
on the  d eg ree  o f in te rn a tio n a l cap ita l m ark e t segm entation .
C
H u g h es, Logue an d  Sweeney p o in t o u t th a t  in a p e rfec tly  
in te g ra te d  in te rn a tio n a l cap ita l m a rk e t, th e re  a re  no d iv ers ifica tio n  
b en e fits  u n ique ly  in h e re n t to MNCs. T he value  of MNCs will be 
de term ined  by  th e  same fa c to rs  th a t  would be app lied  to the  value 
of dom estic firm s. In  su ch  an env iro n m en t, th e re  is  only one 
economic ju s tifica tio n  fo r  fo re ign  d ire c t in v estm en t: a firm with
o p era tio n a l su p e r io ritie s  would be able to  o p e ra te  its  su b s id ia rie s  to 
e a rn  a h ig h e r  ra te  of r e tu rn  th a n  com peting local firm s.
A ssum ing im perfec tly  in te g ra te d  in te rn a tio n a l cap ita l 
m a rk e ts , th e  ob jective of p ro v id in g  a d iv e rs ifica tio n  se rv ice  may be 
one of th e  m ost fundam ental economic m otives b eh in d  fo re ign  d ire c t 
in v estm en t, a motive th a t  is  co n s is te n t w ith  sh a reh o ld e r w ealth 
m axim ization.
S tud ies on th e  C om plem entary R elationsh ip  
When th e re  a re  b a r r ie r s  to in te rn a tio n a l portfo lio  in v e s t­
ment ,  i t  is ex p ec ted  th a t  r is k  a v e rse  in v e s to rs  would in v e s t le ss  in 
in te rn a tio n a l a sse ts  th an  w hen th e re  a re  no b a r r ie r s  and  no
J .  S. H u g h es, D . E. Logue and  R . J .  Sw eeney, "C or­
p o ra te  In te rn a tio n a l D iversifica tion  an d  M arket A ssigned  M easures of 
R isk an d  D iv e rs ific a tio n ,"  Jo u rn a l of F inancia l and  Q u an tita tiv e  
A n a ly s is , p p . 627-637, N ovem ber, 1975.
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add itiona l c o s ts . B lack  develops a model of cap ita l m arke t equ ili­
brium  c o n sid e rin g  b a r r ie r s  to  in te rn a tio n a l portfo lio  in v estm en t. 
His model p re d ic ts  th a t  th e re  would n o t be tw o-fund  sep ara tio n  
betw een  the  in te rn a tio n a l m ark e t po rtfo lio  and  a r is k  fre e  a s s e t . 
In s te a d , an optim al in d iv id u a l p o rtfo lio  would inc lude  th e  dom estic 
portfo lio  in  add ition  to th e  in te rn a tio n a l m arke t portfo lio  an d  the  
in te rn a tio n a l minimum v a rian ce  z e ro -b e ta  po rtfo lio . U n d er th e  same
g
c ircu m stan ces , A dler an d  Dumas fin d  th a t  an optim al fo re ig n  
acqu isition  decision  by  a firm  shou ld  re f le c t th e  inadequacy  of 
homemade d iv e rs ific a tio n . In  o th e r  w o rd s , a firm  d iv e rs ifie s  in te r ­
nationa lly  on b eh a lf  of in d iv id u a l in v e s to rs  an d  m ore im p o rtan tly , 
d iv e rs ifica tio n  by  fo re ig n  d ire c t in v estm en ts  s u b s t i tu te s  fo r 
d iv e rs ifica tio n  by  in te rn a tio n a l po rtfo lio  in v estm en t. Specifically , 
u n d e r  th e  assum ptions of segm ented  cap ita l m a rk e ts , de term in istic  
fo re ig n  exchange  ra te s  and  n eg a tiv e  ex p o n en tia l u tility  fo r 
in v e s to rs ,  th e ir  model in d ica tes  th a t  th e  d iffe ren ces  in r is k  free  
r a te s  a c ro ss  co u n trie s  do n o t have  any  d e term in is tic  e ffec ts  on th e  
decision  of a value-m axim izing firm  w ith re s p e c t to optim al e q u i­
librium  acq u is itio n s . In s te a d , th e  model im plies th a t  the  optimal
7
F . B lack , " In te rn a tio n a l C ap ita l M arket Equilibrium  w ith 
In v es tm en t B a r r ie r s ,"  Jo u rn a l of F inancia l Econom ics, p p . 337-352, 
D ecem ber, 1974. A sim ilar r e s u l t  was shown by  R. M. S tu lz , "On 
th e  E ffec ts  of B a r r ie rs  to In te rn a tio n a l In v e s tm e n t,"  Jo u rn a l of 
F in a n c e , p p . 924-934, S ep tem b er, 1981.
Q
M. A dler an d  B . D um as, "Optim al In te rn a tio n a l A cquisi­
t io n s ,"  Jo u rn a l of F in an ce , p p . 1-19, M arch, 1975.
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acq u isition  is a n eg a tiv e  fu n c tio n  of the  dom estic m ark e t p ric e  of 
r i s k ,  b u t  a p o sitiv e  fu n c tion  of th e  dom estic r is k - f re e  r a te .  
F u r th e rm o re , d iffe ren ces  in th e  r is k  av ersio n  of in v e s to rs  among 
v a rio u s  c o u n trie s  a ffec t th e  optim al equilibrium  acq u is itio n s .
H ow ever, th e  model of A dler and  Dumas is  b ased  on th e  
im plicit assum ption  th a t  a dom estic m arke t portfo lio  is th e  same w ith 
o r  w ithou t fo re ig n  acq u is itio n s . F u rth e rm o re , th e  optim al equ ili­
brium  acq u is itio n  is  fo r  a m arginal MNC, n o t fo r  th e  av erag e  MNC.
Q
T h u s , re c e n tly , Lee and  S achdeva reexam ine th e  optim al acq u is i­
tion a t th e  a g g re g a te  level. T hey  a rg u e  th a t  in  a g g re g a te , a 
fo re ig n  in v estm en t decision  of th e  ith  MNC in  c o u n try  1 d ep en d s on 
th e  p e rcep tio n  of th e  MNC ab o u t im pacts th a t  its  fo re ig n  in vestm en t 
decision  would have  on o th e r  MNCs1 fo re ig n  in v estm en t decis ions. 
In  a p e rfe c tly  com petitive fo re ig n  d ire c t in v estm en t m ark e t, a 
specific  MNC can n o t a ffec t th e  a g g re g a te  fo re ig n  in v estm en t level 
and  th u s  th e  a g g re g a te  fo re ig n  in v estm en t level is tak en  to be 
f ix ed . In  th is  c a se , Lee an d  S achdeva show th a t a m arke t 
value-m axim izing MNC in  c o u n try  1 would choose th e  same ag g re g a te  
fo re ig n  acq u is itio n  v e c to r  th a t  u tility -m axim izing  in v e s to rs  in 
c o u n try  1 would choose them selves th ro u g h  in te rn a tio n a l portfo lio  
in v estm en t w hen only dom estic borrow ings a re  allowed fo r  in ­
v e s to r s .  T hey  no te  th a t  th e  level of w e lfa re , ach ieved  by  in v e s to rs
9W. Y. Lee an d  K, S. S achdeva , "T he Role of th e  M ulti­
n a tio n a l Firm  in  th e  In te g ra tio n  of Segm ented C apital M ark e ts ,"  
J o u rn a l of F in an ce , p p . 479-491, May, 1977.
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in c o u n try  1 w hen e x e rc is in g  d ire c t co n tro l o v e r  fo re ig n  in v estm en t 
dec is io n s , is  also a tta in ed  th ro u g h  in d ire c t fo re ig n  in v estm en t by  
value-m axim izing MNCs u n d e r  conditions of p e rfe c t com petition. 
More spec ifica lly , th e ir  model shows th a t ,  re g a rd le s s  of in te re s t  
r a te  d iffe ren tia ls  among c o u n tr ie s , u n d e r  a p e rfe c tly  com petitive 
m ark e t fo r  fo re ig n  d ire c t in v estm en ts , th e  a g g re g a te  optim al 
acq u isition  of a value-m axim izing MNC is id en tica l w ith th a t  of 
ex p ec ted  u tility -m axim izing  in d iv id u a l in v e s to rs . T h is  fa c t implies 
th a t  if  th e  w elfare  of in d iv id u a l in v e s to rs  would be in c re ase d  
th ro u g h  in te rn a tio n a l po rtfo lio  in v estm en t, th e  same in c re a se s  in 
w elfare  can be a tta in e d  in d irec tly  by  th e  fo re ig n  d ire c t in v estm en ts  
of MNCs. T h u s , Lee an d  Sachdeva conclude th a t  " th e  MNC 
perfo rm s th e  u se fu l fu n c tio n  of m aking w elfare-op tim al in v estm en t 
decisions on b ehalf of in v e s to rs , an d  in  th is  ro le p ro v id es  a p u re ly  
financ ia l ra tio n a le  fo r  th e  MNC" (p . 490). F u rth e rm o re , even  when 
th e  assum ption  of de term in istic  ex change  ra te s  is  d ro p p e d , the  
above re s u lt  s till h o ld s . T he  com plem entary re la tio n sh ip  betw een 
in te rn a tio n a l po rtfo lio  in v estm en ts  and  fo re ig n  d ire c t in v estm en ts  
rem ains in ta c t as long  as we can assum e th a t  th e  coeffic ien ts  of r isk  
av ers io n  of MNCs an d  in d iv id u a l in v e s to rs  a re  th e  sam e. O th e r­
w ise, th e  ab so lu te  ch an g e  in  th e  a g g re g a te  optim al acqu isition  due 
to fo re ig n  ex change  r is k  is  in d e te rm in a te  w ithou t add itional 
a ssu m p tio n s .
Since th e re  is ev idence  th a t  m ost MNCs d isp lay  oligopolistic 
b eh av io r in  dom estic m a rk e ts , i t  is  p resu m ed  th a t  th e y  may also
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d isp lay  oligopolistic b eh av io r in th e  fo re ig n  d ire c t in vestm en t 
m ark e t. T h u s , i t  is  of in te r e s t  to exam ine w h e th e r th e  com­
p lem en tary  re la tio n sh ip  u n d e r  th e  p e r fe c t com petition condition 
will be  su s ta in e d  u n d e r  an im perfec tly  com petitive m ark e t. Lee 
an d  S achdeva exam ine th is  is su e . T hey  c lass ify  oligopolistic 
b eh av io r in to  th re e  d iffe re n t ty p e s , su ch  as C o u rn o t, S tack e lb erg  
an d  co llusion . G enera lly , u n d e r  such  im perfectly  com petitive 
con d itio n s , value-m axim izing MNCs ten d  to  have  few er fo re ig n  d ire c t 
in v estm en ts  th an  th ose  u n d e r  p e rfe c tly  com petitive cond itions and  
th e  e ffec t of a re s tr ic tio n  on th e  num ber of MNCs is  to make MNCs 
b eh av e  in  a le ss  r is k -a v e rs e  way th an  th ey  o th erw ise  would. 
C o n seq u en tly , it  is also e v id en t th a t  MNCs a re  likely  to  hold  few er 
fo re ig n  d ire c t in v estm en ts  th a n  th e  optim al fo re ig n  acqu isition  by  
in te rn a tio n a l po rtfo lio  in v e s to rs . T h u s , u n d e r  such  c ircu m stan ces , 
fo re ig n  d ire c t in v estm en t decisions b y  MNCs re s u lt  in  suboptim al 
w elfare  fo r  in d iv id u a l in v e s to rs .
H ow ever, w hen MNCs also face some re s tr ic tio n s  on
optim izing th e ir  p e rc en ta g e  ow nersh ip  in  th e ir  fo re ign  su b s id ia r ie s ,
th e  role of MNCs as an in d ire c t fa c to r fo r  ach iev ing  an in te g ra te d
11in te rn a tio n a l m arke t may be su b s ta n tia lly  re d u c e d . A dler notes 
th a t  d ecen tra liza tio n  could be optim al only  w hen the  p a re n t  firm is
"^For a d e ta iled  d iscu ssio n  on su ch  ty p e s  of o ligopolistic 
b e h av io r , see  J .  M. H enderson  an d  R . E . Q u an d t, Microeconomic 
T h eo ry  (New Y ork: M cGraw-Hill, 1971), c h . 6.
^ M . A d le r, "T he C ost of C ap ita l and  V aluation of a 
T w o-C oun try  F irm ,"  Jo u rn a l of F in a n c e , p p . 119-132, M arch, 1974.
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com pletely free  to  optimize its  p e rc en ta g e  ow nersh ip  in its  s u b ­
s id ia r ie s . In  o th e r  w o rd s , in  p e rfe c tly  segm ented  m ark e ts  w here 
MNCs also face se rio u s  b a r r ie r s  to  fo re ig n  d ire c t in v es tm en ts , MNCs 
h av e  no ro le to p lay  on behalf of in v e s to rs . In  re a lity , th is  
s itu a tio n  is too ex trem e. P rov ided  th a t  MNCs a re  n o t su b jec t to  th e
same cap ita l flow re s tr ic tio n s  as in d iv idua l in v e s to rs  (a  more
12rea lis tic  a ssu m p tio n ), G oldberg  an d  Lee a rg u e  th a t  maximizing
b eh av io r on th e  p a r t  of MNCs would p lay  a ro le th a t  in te rn a tio n a l
portfo lio  in v estm en t would o therw ise  p lay . More re c e n tly , E rru n za  
13and  S en b e t p re s e n t  a model in  which th e re  e x is t d iffe ren tia l 
b a r r ie r s  to fo re ig n  d ire c t in v estm en t, so th e  cost of the  fo reign  
d ire c t in v estm en t is  n o t th e  same fo r all firm s. In  th e ir  m odel, an 
equilibrium  is e s ta b lish e d  in  which com panies w ith re la tiv e ly  low 
co sts  will u n d e r ta k e  fo re ig n  d ire c t in v estm en ts . T h ese  firm s can 
gain  th e  b e n e fits  from fo re ig n  d ire c t in v estm en t. E rru n z a  and  
S en b e t fu r th e r  id e n tify  th re e  k in d s  of b e n e fits  ex p ec ted  from 
fo re ig n  d ire c t in v estm en t. T he f i r s t  one is b ased  on the  ex isten ce  
of im perfec tions in  re a l a s s e t  an d  fa c to r m a rk e ts . The second 
b e n e f it is  due to  d iffe ren tia l tax a tio n  by fo re ig n  governm en t. The 
th ird  b en efit is b ased  on th e  ex is ten ce  of im perfec t cap ita l m a rk e ts , 
w hich is  th e  main is su e  of th is  s tu d y .
13M. A. G oldberg  an d  W. Y. Lee, "T he C ost of C apital an d  
V aluation of a T w o-C oun try  Firm : Com m ent," Jo u rn a l of F in a n c e ,
p p . 1348-1353, S ep tem ber, 1977.
13V. E rru n z a  an d  L. S en b e t, "The E ffects of In te rn a tio n a l 
O p era tio n s  on th e  M arket V alue of th e  Firm : T heory  and
E v id en ce ,"  Jo u rn a l of F in a n c e , p p . 461-417, M ay, 1981.
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U nder some assum ptions g o v e rn in g  in te rn a tio n a l re a l goods 
and  cap ita l m a rk e ts , we have  n o ted  th a t th e re  may e x is t a com­
p lem en tary  re la tio n sh ip  betw een  fo re ig n  d ire c t in v estm en ts  and  
fo re ig n  portfo lio  in v es tm en ts . T h u s , fo r  in d iv idua l in v e s to rs  who 
face some b a r r ie r s  to  in te rn a tio n a l d iv e rs ific a tio n , p u rc h a se  of 
sh a re s  of MNCs may be an in d irec t way to achieve in te rn a tio n a l 
d iv e rs ifica tio n . A ssum ing an effic ien t dom estic cap ita l m a rk e t, 
th e se  u n iq u e  b e n e f its , availab le only from MNCs, shou ld  be 
reco g n ized  and  rew ard ed  by  in v e s to rs . H ow ever, th e  above 
a rg u m en t can be  ju s tif ie d  only when MNCs have  no d ifficu lties  in 
o p e ra tio n a l d iv e rs ifica tio n  while in d iv idua l in v e s to rs  a re  r e s tr ic te d  
in  th e ir  fo re ign  portfo lio  in v estm en ts . F u r th e rm o re , only w hen th e  
m arke t fo r  fo re ig n  d ire c t in v estm en ts  is p e rfe c tly  com petitive, can 
th e  optim al equilibrium  acqu isition  of MNCs sa tis fy  th e  d iv e rs if ic a ­
tion d e s ire s  of in v e s to rs . Due to im perfec t m ark e ts  fo r  fo reign  
d ire c t in v estm en ts  an d  o th e r fa c to rs  th a t  MNCs m ust co n sid er in 
fo re ig n  d ire c t in v es tm en ts , o p era tio n al d iv e rs ifica tio n  by  MNCs may 
no t be optim al fo r  in d iv id u a l in v e s to rs . T he m agnitude of d iv e rs i­
fication  dep en d s on th e  d eg ree  of segm entation  in in te rn a tio n a l 
c ap ita l m a rk e ts . S teh le14 g ives some ev idence  su p p o rtin g  the  
h y p o th es is  of in te g ra te d  cap ita l m a rk e ts . His em pirical te s ts  of 
dom estic an d  in te rn a tio n a l p ric in g  h y p o th e se s  in  U .S . sh a re s  
in d ica te  th a t  n e ith e r  can  be re je c ted  in fa v o r  of th e  o th e r . In th is
14R. S teh le , "An Em pirical T e s t of th e  A lte rn a te  H ypotheses 
of N ational an d  In te rn a tio n a l P ric in g  of R isky  A sse ts ,"  Jo u rn a l of 
F in a n c e , p p . 493-502, May, 1977.
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c a se , th e  d iv e rs ifica tio n  b en e fits  a tta ch e d  only  to MNCs, may be 
su b s ta n tia lly  re d u c e d  o r d isco u n ted  by  in v e s to rs . F ina lly , if  th e  
dom estic m ark e t is  in e ffic ien t, su ch  b e n e fits  may n o t be re fle c ted  in 
th e  v a lu es  of MNCs. In  add ition  to  th e  above-m entioned  n eg a tiv e  
a sp e c ts , an in c re a se  in availab ility  of fo re ig n  se c u ritie s  in  the  U .S . 
cap ita l m ark e t ( lis tin g  of fo re ig n  sh a re s  on U .S . sec u ritie s  m a rk e ts) 
is likely  to red u ce  th e  value of d iv e rs ifica tio n  se rv ice s  by  MNCs. 
F u r th e rm o re , an in tro d u c tio n  of new dom estic financial in s tru m en ts  
(o p tio n s , GNMA s e c u r it ie s , fu tu re  m arke ts  an d  o th e r  money m arke t 
s e c u r itie s )  th a t  U .S . in v e s to rs  u se  fo r  dom estic d iv e rs ifica tio n  may 
red u ce  th e  motive fo r  in te rn a tio n a l d iv e rs ific a tio n .
C o n sid erin g  all th e  p o ssib le  n eg a tiv e  fa c to rs ,  it  is im possi­
b le  to  say  w h e th e r the  d iv e rs ifica tio n  se rv ice  in  th e  form of 
ad d itiona l r is k  re d u c tio n  is  s tro n g  enough  to b e n e fit U .S . in v e s to rs  
an d  th u s  to  be  reco g n ized  and  rew ard ed  b y  them . T h e re fo re , it  is 
in te re s t in g  an d  im p o rtan t to exam ine em pirically  th e  ex is ten ce  o f th e  
d iv e rs ifica tio n  se rv ice  and  m ark e t reco g n itio n  of it .
Abnorm al P erform ance of MNCs
A cknow ledging possib le  b en e fits  from in te rn a tio n a l d iv e r ­
s ifica tio n , to g e th e r  w ith some d iff icu ltie s  faced  by  in d iv id u a l 
in v e s to rs ,  m any s tu d ie s  h av e  ra ise d  some in te re s t in g  q u estio n s  w ith 
re s p e c t to th e  sh a re s  of MNCs. From th e  in v e s to r 's  p o in t of 
v iew , some s tu d ie s  g ive  ev idence  th a t  in v e s to rs  te n d  to rea lize  
h ig h e r  r is k -a d ju s te d  perfo rm ance w ith MNCs' sh a re s  th an  th a t 
w ith dom estic firm s. T h ese  s tu d ie s  imply th a t to in v e s to rs , some
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b e n e fits  can be ga ined  from an in vestm en t in  th e  sh a re s  of MNCs 
th a t  can n o t be  rea lized  th ro u g h  a com parable in v estm en t in  the  
sh a re s  of dom estic firm s. On th e  o th e r  h a n d , o th e r  s tu d ie s  
s u g g e s t th e  opposite  view th a t  p u rc h a se  of sh a re s  of MNCs is no t a 
good a lte rn a tiv e  way of ach iev ing  r isk -re d u c tio n  b e n e fits  from
in te rn a tio n a l portfo lio  in v estm en ts . T he e x is tin g  l i te ra tu re  has
p ro v id ed  con flic ting  ev idence w ith re sp e c t to b en e fits  of in vestm en t 
in  MNCs to in d iv id u a l in v e s to rs . In  th is  sec tio n , sev e ra l r e p re ­
s e n ta tiv e  s tu d ie s  a re  s u rv e y e d , and  th e  th eo re tic a l and  em pirical
problem s involved  in  those  s tu d ie s  a re  d iscu ssed .
S tu d ies  In d ica tin g  B enefits  from MNCs 
H u g h es, Logue and  S w e e n e y ^  employ two d iffe ren t 
m easu res of system atic  r is k  an d  examine the  r is k -a d ju s te d  r e tu rn s  
fo r  MNCs an d  dom estic firm s. F i r s t ,  w hen system atic  r is k  is 
m easu red  in  association  w ith a dom estic m ark e t in d e x , th e  T re y n o r 
in d ex  of perfo rm ance of investm en t in MNCs is  su p e r io r  to th a t  of 
dom estic firm s. H ow ever, w hen system atic  r is k  is  ca lcu la ted  u s in g  
an in te rn a tio n a l m arke t in d e x , no su p e r io r ity  of perfo rm ance of 
MNCs is fo u n d . T h e ir  fin d in g s  ind ica te  th a t  u n d e r  a segm ented 
p ric in g  h y p o th e s is , MNCs p ro v id e  h ig h e r  r is k -a d ju s te d  perform ance 
to  in v e s to rs . H ow ever, sev e ra l problem s shou ld  be po in ted  ou t
^ H u g h e s ,  Logue an d  Sw eeney, "C o rp o ra te  In te rn a tio n a l 
D iv e rs ific a tio n ,"  p p . 627-637.
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1 fib efo re  accep tin g  th e ir  f in d in g s . F ir s t ,  as in d ica ted  by  B rew er
th e ir  em pirical te s ts  may be su b jec t to th e  m easurem ent problem s
17d e sc rib e d  by  Miller an d  Scholes since  th ey  employ system atic  r is k
m easu res fo r  in d iv idua l s to ck s  in s te a d  of p o rtfo lio s . F u rth e rm o re , 
18Roll q u estio n s  th e  te s tab ility  of th e  th eo re tic a l CAPM due to
problem s w ith the  id en tifica tion  o f th e  tru e  m arke t po rtfo lio .
In  ad d itio n , a q u estio n  a rise s  w ith re s p e c t to an a p p ro ­
p r ia te  m easure  of system atic  r is k  fo r  MNCs. Even in the  c o n tex t of 
th e  p e rfe c tly  segm ented  p r ic in g  h y p o th e s is , th e  system atic  r is k  
asso c ia ted  w ith a dom estic m arke t index  is no t ex p ec ted  to c a p tu re  
th e  to ta l system atic  r is k  of an MNC. T he sum of system atic  r is k s  
asso c ia ted  w ith dom estic m ark e t po rtfo lios of co u n trie s  w here th e  
MNC h as o p era tional b ases  would be re la te d  to  th e  ex p ec ted  ra te  of 
r e tu r n .  T h u s , th e  dom estic system atic  r is k  may be only  a po rtio n
of th e  to ta l sy stem atic  r is k  of an MNC. Such an e r ro r  in  m easu re ­
m ent of system atic  r is k  would b ias  th e  perform ance in d ex .
A ssum ing an effic ien t cap ita l m ark e t w here  all pub lic ly  availab le 
inform ation is  re fle c ted  in  th e  value  of r isk y  a s se ts  in s ta n tan e o u s ly  
an d  w ithou t b ia s , a g ro u p  of firm s could n o t p ro v id e  a p e rs is te n tly
1 fiH. L. B rew er, " In v e s to r  B enefits  from C o rp o ra te  I n te r ­
n a tio n a l D iv e rs ific a tio n ,"  Jo u rn a l of F inancia l and  Q u an tita tiv e  
A n a ly s is , p p . 113-126, M arch, 1981.
^ M . H. Miller an d  M. S choles, "R ates of R e tu rn  in  R elation
to  R isk : A Re-Exam ination of Some R ecen t F in d in g s ,"  In  S tu d ies  in
th e  T h eo ry  of C apital M ark e ts , M. C . J e n s e n , e d . ,  p p . 47-78 (New 
Y ork: P ra e g e r , 1972).
*®R. Roll, "A C ritiq u e  of th e  A sse t P ric in g  T h e o ry 's  T e s t ,"  
Jo u rn a l of F inancial Econom ics, p p . 129-176, M arch, 1977.
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h ig h e r  r is k -a d ju s te d  p e rfo rm an ce . T h e ir  second r e s u l t  u s in g  an 
in te rn a tio n a l m arke t in d e x , te n d s  to  show m ore reasonab le  ev idence 
on th e  n a tu re  of MNCs. S pecifically , th e  re s u lt  shows no d if­
fe re n ce s  in  r is k -a d ju s te d  perfo rm ance betw een MNCs an d  domestic 
firm s an d  s u p p o r ts  an in te g ra te d  p ric in g  h y p o th e s is . In  con­
c lu sio n , H u g h es, Logue and  Sw eeney deal w ith th e  problem  in  term s 
of two ex trem e c a se s , th e  p e rfe c tly  segm ented  p ric in g  h y p o th esis
an d  th e  p e rfe c tly  in te g ra te d  p ric in g  h y p o th e s is . M ikhail and  
19Shaw ky also  f in d  some ev idence  su p p o rtin g  th e  su p e r io r ity  of
p erfo rm ance  of in v estm en t in  MNCs to  th a t  of dom estic firm s d u rin g
th e  p e rio d  of 1968-1975. Em ploying J e n s e n 's  perfo rm ance  in d ex
to g e th e r  w ith  a sy stem atic  r is k  m easu red  re la tiv e  to  a dom estic
m ark e t in d e x , th e y  show th a t  MNCs e a rn  a  h ig h e r  r e tu r n  th an
would be  ex p ec ted  fo r  th e ir  system atic  r is k  level. In  o th e r  w ords,
MNCs o u tp erfo rm ed  the  a v e rag e  m ark e t (S&P 500 in d ex ) a t le a s t
20d u rin g  th e  p e rio d  of 1968-1975. A ggarw al a rg u e s  th a t  u se  of the  
S ta n d a rd  an d  P oor's  500 in d ex  as a p ro x y  fo r dom estic av erag e  
firm s m akes M ikhail and  Shaw ky d e te c t only a  p o rtio n  of th e  ac tu a l 
d iffe ren ces  in  perfo rm ance  betw een  MNCs and  dom estic firm s. 
A ggarw al f u r th e r  p ro v id es  some fin d in g s  th a t  system atic  r is k  w hen
19A. D. M ikhail an d  H . A. S haw ky, " In v estm en t P e r­
form ance of U .S .-b a s e d  M ultinational C o rp o ra tio n s ,"  Jo u rn a l of 
In te rn a tio n a l B u sin ess  S tu d ie s , p p . 53-66, S p rin g /S u m m er, 1979.
20R . A ggarw al, " In v estm en t Perform ance of U .S .-b a s e d  
M ultinational C om panies: Comments an d  a P e rsp e c tiv e  on I n te r ­
n a tio n a l D iversifica tion  on Real A s s e ts ,"  Jo u rn a l of In te rn a tio n a l 
B u sin e ss  S tu d ie s , p p . 98-104, S p rin g /S u m m er, 1980.
m easu red  re la tiv e  to th e  U .S . m arke t index  declines w ith an
in c rease  in  th e  m ultina tionality  of a  firm  (fo re ig n  incom e, sales o r
a s s e ts ) .  T hese  fin d in g s  a re  in  some re s p e c ts ,  co n s is te n t w ith  th e
21fin d in g s  of Rugm an th a t  the  p e rc en ta g e  of fo re ig n  sales a re  
in v e rse ly  re la ted  to  th e  v a rian ce  of th e  p ro f its  fo r  th e se  firm s. 
A ggarw al a t tr ib u te s  th e  g en e ra l low level of dom estic sy stem atic  r isk  
of MNCs to th e  fac t th a t  U .S . in v e s to rs  do n o t believe in fu lly  
in te g ra te d  in te rn a tio n a l cap ita l m ark e ts  o r  th a t  MNCs o ffe r  o p p o r­
tu n itie s  fo r  r is k  red u c tio n  n o t availab le to ind iv id u a l in v e s to rs . In 
conclusion , A ggarw al fin d s  i t  n a tu ra l  th a t  MNCs should  have lower 
system atic  r is k s  since  m ultinationality  of MNCs implies less  
d ependence  on a dom estic cap ita l m arke t and  economy. A ccording  
to  h is  in te rp re ta tio n , u n d e r  th e  p e rfe c tly  segm ented  cap ita l m ark e t, 
o th e r  sy stem atic  r is k s  of an MNC a re  ig n o red  b y  dom estic 
in v e s to rs . H ow ever, i t  is  no t accep tab le  to u se  only th e  dom estic 
p o rtio n  of th e  to ta l system atic  r is k  of an MNC to  ju d g e  if the  
r e tu r n  is  ex cess iv e . If su ch  a low level of system atic  r isk s  is 
re g a rd e d  as r is k  red u c tio n  b e n e f its , in v e s to rs  may be w illing to  pay  
a premium fo r  th e  sh a re s  of MNCs, and  th u s  in equ ilib rium , th e  
ex p ec ted  r e tu rn  on th e  sh a re s  of MNC also is re d u c ed .
In  conclusion , fo r MNCs, system atic  r is k  re la tiv e  to a 
dom estic m arke t in d e x  is no t an a p p ro p ria te  m easu re . T h e re fo re , 
e r ro r s  in  m easurem ent of system atic  r is k  of MNCs may re s u lt  in  b ias
21 A. M. R ugm an, " In te rn a tio n a l D iversification  by  F inancial 
and  D irec t In v e s tm en t,"  Jo u rn a l of Economics and  B u s in e s s , 
p p . 31-37, F a ll, 1977.
54
in  fa v o r of abnorm al perform ance of MNCs. R ecognizing th e  special
22p ric in g  problem  fo r MNCs, Agmon and  L e ssa rd  employ the  follow­
in g  tw o -fac to r p r ic in g  model:
R. = or. + B.R + y.R + e.] 1 H] us '] w j
w here  R  ̂ is th e  r e tu rn  on a sh a re  of th e  j th  firm w ith n o n -U .S .
sa le s , Ru s  is  the  r e tu rn  of th e  New Y ork Stock E xchange in d ex  and
RTr is th e  r e tu rn  of the  r e s t  of the  w orld  in d e x , d esig n ed  to  be w
4V
o rth o g o n a l to  R . Agmon an d  L e ssa rd  h y p o th esize  th a t if  th e
U b
m ovem ents of sh a re  p ric e s  in d ica te  th a t  the  m arke t p e rce iv e s  in te r ­
n a tio n a l co rp o ra tio n s  as d iffe re n t from th o se  le ss  in te rn a tio n a lly  
in v o lv ed , th is  ev id en ce , to g e th e r  w ith some ev idence  of b a r r ie r s  to 
homemade d iv e rs ific a tio n , lends su p p o r t to th e  a rgum en t th a t  the  
M NCs ab ility  to d iv e rs ify  in te rn a tio n a lly  is an ad v an tag e  to 
in v e s to rs . T h e ir re s u lts  show th a t po rtfo lios w ith a h igh  d eg ree  of 
m u ltin a tio n a lity , m easured  b y  th e  p ro p o rtio n  of n o n -U .S . sa le s , 
have  re la tiv e ly  h ig h  coeffic ien ts re la tin g  to th e  r e s t  of th e  w orld 
in d ex . C o n v erse ly , th e  coeffic ien ts in  association  w ith th e  U .S . 
m ark e t in d ex  a re  much h ig h e r  fo r  th ose  po rtfo lio s  w ith little  in te r ­
n a tio n a l in v estm en t. T h e ir  fin d in g s  in d ica te  s ig n ific an t d iffe ren ces  
betw een  th e  m a rk e t-a ss ig n e d  system atic  r is k  m easu res fo r  MNCs 
an d  dom estic firm s, w hich s u p p o rts  th e  a rg u m en t th a t  U .S . 
in v e s to rs  recogn ize  th e  m ultina tionality  of U .S .-b a s e d  firm s. Agmon
00
T . Agmon and  D. R . L e s sa rd , " In v e s to r  R ecognition of 
C o rp o ra te  In te rn a tio n a l D iv e rs ific a tio n ,"  Jo u rn a l of F in an ce , 
p p . 1049-1055, S ep tem ber, 1977.
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and  L essa rd  fu r th e r  a rg u e  th a t  th e  m ark e t recogn ition  of m ulti­
n a tio n a lity  o f a firm  com bined w ith th e  ex is ten ce  of some b a r r ie r s  to 
homemade d iv ers ifica tio n  su p p o rt th e  d iv e rs ifica tio n  m otive of 
fo re ign  d ire c t in v estm en ts  by  MNCs. H ow ever, i t  is questionab le  
w h e th e r th e se  two conditions a re  su ffic ien t fo r  th e  d iversifica tion  
se rv ice  m otive. E v id en tly , th e se  a re  n e c e ssa ry  cond itions. T h e ir 
s tu d y  p ro v id es  ev idence  th a t  the  m ark e t recogn izes th e  m ulti­
n a tio n a lity  of a firm , b u t i t  is s ilen t on th e  qu estio n  of w h e th er a 
d iv e rs ifica tio n  se rv ice  is  p ro v id ed  by  MNCs.
T he  h y p o th es is  of m ark e t recogn ition  of m ultinationality  is
23also su p p o rte d  by  th e  re c e n t s tu d y  of B rew er an d  Miller. T hey 
exam ine w h e th e r th e  change  in  th e  ex change  ra te  system  in 1971 
a ffec ted  m arke t p e rc ep tio n s  of th e  r is k  and  re tu rn  c h a ra c te r is tic s  of 
dom estic firm s as opposed  to MNCs. Em ploying a re s id u a l analysis 
m ethod w ith  a sample of dom estic firm s and  MNCs, B rew er and 
M iller f in d  th a t  the  in te rn a tio n a l economic e v en t th a t  is ex p ec ted  to 
a ffec t firm s w ith h ig h e r  m u ltina tionality  actua lly  in c rease s  th e  
system atic  r is k  of MNCs m easu red  dom estically re la tiv e  to dom estic 
firm s.
OO
H . L. B rew er an d  R. R . M iller, "E valuating  th e  P robab le  
Im pacts of In te rn a tio n a l Economic E v en ts  on Common S tock  R e tu rn s : 
An Em pirical S tu d y ,"  Jo u rn a l of In te rn a tio n a l B u sin ess  S tu d ie s , 
p p . 53-65, W inter, 1979.
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S tu d ies  In d ica tin g 1 No B enefits  from MNCs 
24Jacq u illa t and  Solnik reach  th e  opposite  conclusion th a t 
in v e s t in g  in  U .S .-b a s e d  MNCs canno t be  re g a rd e d  as a d irec t 
s u b s t i tu te  fo r  in te rn a tio n a l po rtfo lio  d iv e rs ifica tio n . T hey  h y p o th e ­
size th a t ,  p ro v id ed  a sh a re  of an MNC is indeed  eq u iv a len t to an 
in te rn a tio n a l portfo lio  in  te rm s of r is k  red u c tio n  b e n e f its , its  p rice  
should  be a ffec ted  by  fo re ig n  fa c to rs  to  th e  e x te n t of th e  M NCs 
d e g re e  of fo re ig n  involvem ent. Jacq u illa t and  Solnik employ a 
m u lti-re g re ss io n  analysis  in  w hich a dom estic m ark e t fa c to r  and  
sev e ra l o th e r  fo re ig n  m arke t fa c to rs  a re  em ployed as in d ep en d en t 
v a ria b le s . T h e ir  te s t  leads to th e  re jec tion  of th e  h y p o th esis  w ith 
a few ex cep tions a n d  te n d s  to show th a t  only th e  coeffic ien t of 
dom estic b e ta  is s ig n ifican t w hereas th e  coeffic ien ts  of fo re ig n  b e ta s  
a re  in s ig n ific an t and  small. T h e ir  re s u lts  a p p ea r to  be co n trad ic ­
to ry  to  th e  re s u lts  of Agmon and  L e ssa rd . A p lausib le  reason  fo r 
the  d iffe re n t re s u lts  may be th e  d iffe re n t m ethods em ployed to 
c re a te  th e  fo re ig n  m arke t fa c to r . While th e  fo re ign  m arke t fa c to r 
em ployed by  Agmon and  L e ssa rd  is  o rth o g o n a l to th e  dom estic 
m ark e t fa c to r  by  d e s ig n , th e  ones u sed  by  Jacq u illa t an d  Solnik a re  
som ewhat c o rre la te d  b ecau se  n a tiona l m arke t ind ices a re  n o t p e r ­
fec tly  in d e p en d e n t of one a n o th e r . T h e re fo re , th e  coeffic ien t of 
fo re ig n  b e ta s  may be  b ia se d  dow nw ard s in ce  th e  fo re ig n  m arket 
fa c to r  in c ludes any  fa c to rs  th a t  a re  su p p o sed ly  re la te d  to  the
04
B . Jacq u illa t an d  B . H . Solnik , "M ultinationals A re Poor 
Tools fo r  D iv e rs ific a tio n ,"  Jo u rn a l of P ortfo lio  M anagem ent, p p . 8- 
12, W inter 1978.
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dom estic com ponent of to ta l r e tu r n s .  More re c e n tly , S enchack  and  
25B eedles exam ine th e  e x te n t a n d  sp eed  of d iv e rs ifica tio n  b en efits  
of U .S .-b a s e d  MNCs an d  com parable dom estic firm s. To m easure  
th e  ra te  of re d u c tio n  in portfo lio  r i s k ,  th e  following1 le a s t-s q u a re  
re g re ss io n  eq uation  is f i t te d :
GpN = a + b S  + e
w here den o tes  th e  av e rag e  s ta n d a rd  dev iation  of a portfo lio
w ith N s h a re s .  S enchack  and  B eed les h y p o th esize  th a t  in c re a se s  in 
the  num ber of s h a re s ,  N, in  a portfo lio  cause  Gpjj to  d ecrease  and  
th a t th e  e x te n t an d  sp eed  of a re d u c tio n  in G p^ fo r  a portfo lio  w ith 
MNCs' sh a re s  will b e  la rg e r  an d  f a s te r  th an  fo r  a portfo lio  c o n s is t­
in g  of dom estic firm s. S u rp r is in g ly , th e ir  te s t  re s u l ts  in d ica te  th a t 
MNCs do n o t a p p e a r  to  p ro v id e  d iv e rs ifica tio n  b e n e fits  th a t  a re  as 
e x ten s iv e  as th e  ty p ic a l s h a re s . More sp ec ifica lly , random ly 
se lec ted  dom estic sh a re s  d iv e rs ify  away u n sy stem a tic  r is k  more 
qu ick ly  th a n  do th e  portfo lio  of MNCs. F in n e r ty , Hill and
Off
Schneew eis p ro v id e  sim ilar ev id en ce  th a t  in th e  portfo lio  selection  
p ro c e d u re , th e re  a re  no s ig n ific an t d iffe ren ces  in th e  am ount of 
r is k  red u c tio n  re g a rd le s s  of w h e th e r th e  new sh a re s  ad d ed  to a 
portfo lio  a re  MNCs, dom estic firm s o r  a com bined g ro u p  of firm s. 
T hey  a rg u e  th a t  MNCs s til l  con tain  su b s ta n tia l n o n -sy stem a tic  r is k
oc
A. J .  S enchak  an d  W. L . B eed les, "Is In d ire c t I n te r ­
n a tiona l D iversifica tion  D e s irab le ,"  Jo u rn a l of Portfolio  M anagem ent, 
p p . 49-57, W inter, 1980.
9  R
J .  F in n e r ty , J .  Hill an d  T . Schneew eis, " In te rn a tio n a l, 
M ultinational o r  Domestic S e c u rity  In v estm en t: A R ea p p ra isa l,"
U n p u b lish ed  W orking P a p e r , U n iv e rs ity  of M assach u se tts , 1980.
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th a t  can  be d iv e rs if ie d  aw ay. C o n seq u en tly , th e  r is k  a d ju s ted  
perfo rm an ce  of a portfo lio  w ith  MNCs is n o t su p e r io r  to th a t of 
dom estic firm s.
T he e x te n t an d  sp eed  of r is k  red u c tio n  an d  r isk -a d ju s te d  
perfo rm ance  of a portfo lio  g en era lly  d epend  on th e  co rre la tio n s  
among c o n s ti tu e n t s h a re s . One does n o t ex p ec t th e  co rre la tio n s  of 
r e tu r n s  among MNCs to be low er th an  those  of dom estic firm s. The 
c e n tra l is su e  lies in  th e  fa c t th a t  each sh a re  of MNCs m ight have  a 
d iv e rs ifica tio n  fu n c tio n  like  a portfo lio  its e lf  would h av e  in  th e  
sen se  th a t  dom estic system atic  r is k  could be d iv e rs ified  away in te r ­
n a tio n a lly . T h e re fo re , a d esirab le  te s t  is to exam ine th e  
r i s k - r e tu r n  re la tio n sh ip  of MNCs' s h a re s . If th e re  a re  s ig n ifican t
b e n e fits  w hich a re  reco g n ized  and  rew ard ed  by  th e  m ark e t, th ey
27shou ld  be  re f le c te d  in  th e  r i s k - r e tu r n  re la tio n sh ip . B rew er
28employs a v e rs io n  of th e  B lack , Jen se n  an d  Scholes p ro c e d u re s  to 
exam ine th e  r i s k - r e tu r n  re la tio n sh ip  of MNCs. He u ses  a single 
dom estic b e ta  as an in d e p en d e n t v a riab le  in  an ex  an te  lin ea r 
p ric in g  re la tio n sh ip . B rew er fin d s  no s ig n ific an t d iffe ren ces  in th e  
coeffic ien t of th e  slope term  w hich re p re s e n ts  a risk -p rem ium  at a 
g iv en  am ount of system atic  r is k  betw een  MNCs and  dom estic 
firm s. His f in d in g  in d ica tes  th a t  MNCs te n d  to have  the  same
se c u r ity  m ark e t line as dom estic firm  h av e . His h y p o th esis  is th a t
9 7 B re w er, " In v e s to r  B e n e f its ,"  p p . 113-126.
B lack , M. Jen se n  and  M. Scho les, "T he C apital A sset 
P ric in g  Model: Some Em pirical T e s ts ,"  In  S tu d ies  in  th e  T h eo ry  of
C apital M a rk e ts , M. C. J e n se n , e d . ,  p p . 79-124 (New Y ork:
P ra e g e r , 1972).
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if MNCs have  a la rg e r  risk -p rem ium  a t a g iven  level of system atic  
r is k ,  in v e s to rs  will be  b en efited  p e rm anen tly  th ro u g h  b u y in g  sh a res  
of MNCs. H ow ever, if  d iv e rs ifica tio n  se rv ice  e x is ts  an d  is 
re co g n ized , th e  risk -p rem ium  of a MNC should  be le ss  th a n  th a t  of 
a dom estic firm . In  o th e r  w o rd s , MNCs can red u ce  a re q u ire d  
risk -p rem ium  due to th e ir  valuable  se rv ice .
C oncluding Rem arks 
A su rv e y  of p rev io u s  s tu d ie s  in d ica tes  th a t  te s tin g  th e  
p o ssib le  ex is ten ce  of d iversifica tion  se rv ice  is  n o t sim ple. One 
d ifficu lty  is th a t  one needs to exam ine n o t only th e  ex isten ce  of 
d iv e rs ifica tio n  se rv ice  b u t also m arke t recogn ition  of i t  and  rew ard  
fo r i t .  F u rth e rm o re , one canno t depend  on a cap ita l a sse t p ric in g  
model th a t  canno t be  app lied  commonly to b o th  MNCs and  dom estic 
firm s. In  the  following c h a p te r , sev e ra l h y p o th e se s  re la ted  to  the  
c e n tra l h y p o th esis  will be  d e riv ed  and  te s te d .
CHAPTER 4
SEVERAL HYPOTHESES AND A SAMPLE DESCRIPTION
A ssum ing an e ffic ien t U .S . cap ita l m ark e t, any b en efits  
p ro v id ed  by  MNCs shou ld  be reco g n ized  and  rew ard ed  by  in v e s to rs . 
Most p rev io u s  s tu d ie s  seem ingly fail to realize  th a t  even  if a 
d iv e rs ifica tio n  se rv ice  e x is ts ,  i t  may no t re s u lt  in  r is k -a d ju s te d  
abnorm al perfo rm ance of MNCs. In s te a d , if th e re  a re  d iversifica tion  
se rv ice s  w hich tran sfo rm  a p o rtio n  of dom estic system atic  r is k  in to  
in te rn a tio n a l u n sy stem atic  r is k ,  th e  ex p ec ted  ra te  of r e tu rn  on th e  
sh a re  of a MNC shou ld  be ad ju s ted  dow nw ard. In  o th e r  w ords, 
p ro v id ed  th a t  MNCs can d iv e rs ify  away a po rtion  o f dom estic 
system atic  r is k  su cc e ss fu lly , a r is k  premium assoc iated  w ith such  
in te rn a tio n a lly  d iv e rs ifiab le  r is k  shou ld  be  zero . T hus th e  re q u ire d  
ra te  of r e tu rn  (c o s t of e q u ity )  of MNCs shou ld  be re d u c ed .
Some evidence* su p p o rtin g  abnorm al perfo rm ance of MNCs' 
sh a re s  is b a sed  on th e  f in d in g  th a t  MNCs te n d  to  have  lower 
dom estic system atic  r is k  th an  com parable dom estic firm s. A ccording
F or m ore d e ta ils , see  th e  s tu d ie s  by  H u g h es, Logue and  
Sw eeney, "C o rp o ra te  In te rn a tio n a l D iv e rs ific a tio n ,"  p p . 627-637, 
Mikhail an d  Shaw ky, "In v estm en t P erfo rm an ce ,"  p p . 53-66 and  




to A ggarw al1 s in te rp re ta tio n , such  a f in d in g  may be due to th e  
m ark e t recogn ition  of th e  in te rn a tio n a l o p era tio n s  of a U .S . firm , 
w hich m akes th e  firm  le ss  d ep en d en t on U .S . economic f lu c tu a tio n s . 
T h u s , s to ck  p ric e s  of MNCs a re  le ss  likely  to  move w ith th e  r e s t  of 
th e  U .S . s to ck  m ark e t. H ow ever, a firm  w ith in te rn a tio n a l invo lve­
m ent dep en d s more on fo re ig n  economic flu c tu a tio n s . As Agmon and
3
L e ssa rd  a rg u e , th e  to ta l system atic  r is k  of a MNC is th e  sum of 
th e  dom estic system atic  r is k s  assoc ia ted  w ith m ark e t portfo lios of 
co u n trie s  w here th e  MNC h as  an o p era tio n al b a se . T h u s , th e  
dom estic system atic  r is k s  of MNCs em ployed in th e  p rev io u s  s tu d ie s  
r e p re s e n t  only a p o rtio n  of to ta l system atic  r is k s .  C onsequen tly  
th is  dow nw ard b ia sed n ess  of th e  system atic  r is k  re s u lts  in  the  
ap p ea ran ce  of abnorm al perfo rm ance of MNCs. T he em pirical f in d -
4
in g s  by  H u g h es, Logue and  Sw eeney show th a t w hen the  
system atic  r is k  of a firm  is m easured  u s in g  a dom estic m arke t 
in d e x , T re y n o r 's  perfo rm ance in d ex  of MNCs is h ig h e r  th an  th a t  of 
dom estic firm s. H ow ever, when system atic  r is k  is  m easured  in 
association  w ith an in te rn a tio n a l m ark e t in d e x , th e  su p e r io r  
perfo rm ance of MNCs d isap p e a rs . In  equ ilib rium , any  r is k  a d ju s ted  
ex cess  r e tu r n  will be  a rb itra g e d  aw ay. T h u s , if  th e  r is k  of a firm
2Ib id .
3
Agmon an d  D. L e ssa rd , " In v e s to r  R eco g n itio n ,"  p .  1050.
4H u g h es, Logue and  Sw eeney, "C o rp o ra te  In te rn a tio n a l 
D iv e rs ific a tio n ,"  p p . 627-637.
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is  m easu red  an d  em ployed a p p ro p ria te ly , no p e rs is te n t  abnorm al 
perfo rm ance is  e x p ec ted .
In s te ad  of exam ining th e  is su e  of w h e th e r p o ten tia l b en efits  
a re  rea lized  b y  in v e s to rs  w ith MNCs' s h a re s ,  th is  s tu d y  deals w ith 
th e  ex is ten ce  of a d iv e rs ifica tio n  se rv ice  and  th e  co rre sp o n d in g  
red u c tio n  in  a r is k  premium fo r  MNCs. Since a n e c e ssa ry  condition 
fo r th e  ex is ten ce  of a d iv e rs ifica tio n  se rv ice  is th a t  th e  m arke t 
shou ld  recogn ize  th e  m u ltina tionality  of a firm , th is  s tu d y  also 
exam ines w h e th e r th e  m arke t co n sid e rs  in te rn a tio n a l fa c to rs  of a 
firm in d e term in ing  s h a re  p r ic e s . S ev era l h y p o th e se s  a re  de riv ed  
w ith re s p e c t to  th e  above c e n tra l is su e . A d e sc rip tio n  of th e  
sam ples em ployed in  th is  s tu d y  is in tro d u ce d  and  is followed by  a 
simple financial p ro file  of MNCs an d  dom estic firm s in  th e  sam ple.
H ypo theses
F ir s t ,  th e  re la tio n sh ip  betw een dom estic system atic  r is k  of a 
firm  an d  th e  s tab ility  of e a rn in g s  stream  is exam ined to  see if 
m u ltina tionality  of a firm  re d u c es  th e  v a ria b ility  of e a rn in g s  and  has 
e ffec ts  on th e  system atic  r is k .  T he h y p o th esis  is  th a t  MNCs have 
low er ea rn in g s  v a riab ility  th an  dom estic firm s due to th e  m ulti­
na tio n a lity  of o p e ra tio n s . F u r th e rm o re , su ch  low ea rn in g s  
v a riab ility  may exp lain  low dom estic system atic  r is k  of MNCs. 
More d e ta ils  a re  d iscu ssed  la te r .
S econd , if  th e  m u ltina tionality  of a firm 's  o p era tio n s  is 
recogn ized  by  in v e s to rs ,  th e  dom estic C apital A sset P ric in g  Model 
(CAPM) would b e  an im proper p r ic in g  model fo r  MNCs. As
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m entioned e a r l ie r , any em pirical ev idence  on MNCs found  b y  em­
p loy ing  th e  dom estic CAPM may be b iased  due to th e  in a p p ro p ria te  
specifica tion  of th e  r i s k - r e tu r n  re la tio n sh ip . Only th e  dom estic 
p o rtio n  of to ta l sy stem atic  r i s k  is  c a p tu re d  and  in c o rp o ra te d  in 
ex p la in ing  th e  v a ria tio n  of r e tu r n s .  F o r MNCs, th e  r is k  premium 
asso c ia ted  w ith dom estic sy stem atic  r is k  does no t c a p tu re  all 
com pensation fo r  to ta l system ic r is k .  C o n seq u en tly , th e  h y p o th esis  
is th a t  if  in v e s to rs  recogn ize  th e  m ultina tionality  of a firm , th e  
ex p lan a to ry  pow er of th e  dom estic CAPM will be  p o o re r th an  w hen 
th e  dom estic CAPM is app lied  to  dom estic firm s. F u rth e rm o re , th e  
r is k  prem ium  term  ( th e  slope of th e  em pirical s e c u rity  m arke t line) 
of MNCs is e x p ec ted  to  be low er th an  th a t  of dom estic firm s since 
th is  r is k  premium only re p re s e n ts  a p a r tia l com pensation.
T h ird , if U .S . in v e s to rs  recogn ize  th e  m ultina tionality  of a 
firm , i t  is e x p ec te d  th a t  a firm  w ith a h ig h  d eg ree  of m ulti­
n a tio n a lity  would d ep en d  le ss  on a p u re  U .S . m arke t fa c to r and  
m ore on a w orld m ark e t fa c to r . T he h y p o th esis  is th a t  MNCs have 
h ig h e r  system atic  r is k  re la tiv e  to  th e  w orld  m arke t fa c to r  and  low er 
system atic  r is k  a sso c ia ted  w ith th e  p u re  dom estic m arke t fa c to r th an  
dom estic f irm s . T h is  h y p o th es is  is im p o rtan t b ecau se  th e  reco g n i­
tion  of th e  m ultina tiona lity  of a firm  b y  in v e s to rs  is  a n e ce ssa ry  
condition  fo r  th e  e x is ten c e  of d iv e rs ifica tio n  se rv ice .
F in a lly , if  in v e s to rs  recogn ize  th e  m ultina tionality  of a firm , 
th en  a ch ange  in policy d ire c te d  specifically  a t  MNCs o r dom estic 
firm s is ex p ec ted  to  a ffec t MNCs an d  dom estic firm s d iffe re n tly . 
F u rth e rm o re , if  th e re  is a d iv e rs ifica tio n  s e rv ic e , m ark e t reac tio n  to
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an  economic e v e n t th a t  is ex p ec ted  to a ffec t the  d iv ers ifica tio n  
se rv ice  shou ld  show th e  u n b ia sed  im plication of th e  e v e n t. The 
h y p o th e s is  is th a t  th e  p r ic e  movement of MNCs' sh a re s  should 
in c o rp o ra te  in v e s to r 's  p e rc ep tio n s  of th e  im pact of e v en ts  on MNCs 
in an u n b ia sed  w ay. In  o th e r  w o rd s , any ev en ts  th a t  h ave  e ffec ts  
only  on MNCs shou ld  a ffec t th e  MNCs and  dom estic firm s 
d iffe re n tly .
Sample and  D ata D escrip tion  
F o r th e  following fo u r  em pirical te s t s ,  a sample of 135 U .S . 
b a sed  MNCs is  se lec ted  b a sed  on two p rev io u s  s tu d ie s . F ir s t ,  187
5
U .S . b ased  MNCs a re  id en tified  by  V aupel an d  C urhan  th ro u g h  the  
follow ing c r i te r ia :
1. Each firm  m ust be on F o r tu n e 's  l is t  of the  500 L a rg es t 
U .S . In d u s tr ia l  C orpo ra tions fo r  the  y ear 1963 o r 1964.
2. By th e  en d  of 1963, each firm  holds eq u ity  in te re s ts  in 
m an u fac tu rin g  firm s located  in 6 o r  more co u n trie s  o u t­
side  th e  U nited  S ta te s . In  each c ase , th e  eq u ity  
in te r e s t  am ounts to 25% o r m ore of to ta l e q u ity .
3. A firm  is  n o t a su b s id ia ry  of a n o th e r  firm .
T h ese  187 MNCs a re  m atched  a g a in s t 187 MNCs su g g e s te d  by  B ru ck
e
an d  L ees, who c lass ify  firm s in th e  1965 F o rtu n e  500 D irec to ry  on
*\l. W. V aupel an d  J .  P . C u rh a n , T he W orld's M ultinational 
E n te rp r ise s  (B o sto n : H a rv a rd  U n iv e rs ity , 1973).
£
N. K. B ru c k  an d  F . A. L ees, "F ore ign  In v es tm en t, C apital 
C on tro ls an d  th e  B alance of P ay m en ts ,"  T he  B u lle tin , A pril, 1968.
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th e  b a s is  of fo re ig n  o p e ra tio n s . B ased  on th e  s ta tis tic s  with 
re s p e c t to  th e  e x te n t of fo re ig n  involvem ent (sa le s , e a rn in g s , 
a s s e ts  an d  em ploym ent) from 281 firm s, B ru ck  and  Lees id en tify  187 
MNCs w ith m ore th a n  10% of fo re ig n  invo lvem ent. T he da ta  on the  
e x te n t of fo re ig n  involvem ent ( th e  ra tio  of fo re ig n  ea rn in g s  to to ta l 
e a rn in g s )  a re  o b ta in ed  fo r MNCs from th is  s tu d y . From th e se  187 
MNCs, a sam ple of 135 MNCs a re  se lec ted  which m eet following 
c r i te r ia :
1. Each firm  m ust h ave  con tinuous d a ta  availab le on the  
C e n te r  fo r  R esearch  in  S ecu rity  P rices  (C R SP) daily 
an d  m onthly  file an d  on th e  COMPUSTAT in d u s tr ia l 
an n u al file from 1962 to 1979.^
2. Each firm  m ust h ave  been  id en tified  by b o th  V aupel and
g
C u rh an  an d  B ru c k  an d  L e e s .
A sam ple of dom estic firm s is o b ta in ed  from th e  1963 
F o r tu n e 's  l is t  of th e  500 L a rg e s t U .S . In d u s tr ia l  C orpora tions a f te r  
e lim inating  th e  187 MNCs su g g e s te d  b y  B ru c k  and  L ees. From 
th e se  f irm s , 135 dom estic firm s w ith le ss  th a n  10% of fo re ig n
involvem ent a re  se lec ted  a rb itra r i ly  a f te r  elim inating firm s w ithout 
co n tin u o u sly  availab le  d a ta  o r  which h av e  in c re a se d  th e  e x te n t of
n
Since th e  daily r e tu rn s  file co n ta in s  daily  r e tu rn s  fo r 
NYSE an d  AMEX common s to ck s  s ta r t in g  on Ju ly  2, 1962, firm s th a t  
have  enough  m onthly  r e tu r n  d a ta  b u t  do n o t h av e  con tinuous daily 
r e tu r n  d a ta  from  J u n e , 1962 to  D ecem ber 1978 a re  also elim inated.
g
Note th a t  firm s w ith  m ore th an  10% o f fo re ig n  involvem ent 
a re  se le c ted .
66
fo re ign  involvem ent su b s ta n tia lly  from 1965 to 1979. T he s ta tis tic a l
d a ta  fo r  th is  sc ree n  a re  o b ta ined  from th e  pub lica tion  b y  F o rb es  in  
q
1979. M onthly d iv id e n d -a d ju s te d  ra te s  of r e tu rn  and  daily
d iv id e n d -a d ju s ted  ra te s  of r e tu r n  a re  ob ta in ed  from th e  CRSP
m onthly file and  th e  CRSP daily  file re sp ec tiv e ly  fo r  th e  time p eriod
10of J a n u a ry  1963 to  D ecem ber 1978. T he m onthly and  daily m arke t 
ind ices a re  draw n from th e  m ark e t-v a lu e  w eighed index  and  eq ual- 
w eigh ted  in d ex  of the  CRSP in d ex  file . F or th e  w orld m arket 
in d e x , th e  m onthly m ark e t index  p u b lish ed  b y  In te rn a tio n a l C apital 
P e rsp ec tiv e  is em ployed. ^  F o r o th e r  financ ial p ro file s , all d a ta  a re  
o b ta ined  from the  A nnual C om pustat In d u s tr ia l  file . Note th a t  two 
sam ples a re  ac tua lly  o b ta ined  from la rg e  U .S . firm s lis te d  on th e  
NYSE since th e  CRSP m onthly  da ta  file only con tains firm s lis ted  on 
th e  NYSE.
Financial Profile  of MNCs and 
Domestic Firm s
A s u b s ta n tia l am ount of ev idence  has shown th e  n eed  to 
co n sid e r ex p lic itly  siae e ffec ts  an d  d iv id en d  e ffec ts  w hen com­
p a r in g  th e  r is k -a d ju s te d  perfo rm ance of s to ck s . R ecen t s tu d ie s  by
q
F or exam ple, X erox  an d  Sun Oil Company th a t  w ere n o t 
in c luded  in  th e  sam ple of MNCs b a sed  on 1965 d a ta  h av e  in c reased  
fo re ig n  involvem ent su b s ta n tia lly  d u rin g  th is  time p e rio d . S ource: 
"T he 150 L a rg e s t U .S . M u ltina tiona ls,"  F o rb e s , Ju n e  25, 1979.
*^Daily r e tu rn s  d a ta  sp an  Ju ly  1962 - D ecem ber 1978.
11T he w orld  m arke t in d ex  is an av erag e  of 18 developed 
c o u n trie s  s to ck  m ark e t ind ices w eigh ted  by  GNP. T he S tan d a rd  
and  P oor's  400 s to ck  in d ex  is u se d  as th e  U .S . s to ck  m arke t 
in d ex .
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12 13B anz an d  Reinganum  have shown th a t small firm s rea lize  h ig h e r
av erag e  ra te s  of r e tu r n  th an  la rg e  firm s, even  a f te r  accoun ting  fo r 
d iffe ren ces  in  estim ated  b e ta s  of firm s. B anz only  co n jec tu res  th a t 
s ince inform ation is  more read ily  availab le fo r  la rg e  firm s, in v e s to rs  
may te n d  to avoid small firm s. C o n seq u en tly , th is  lack  o f inform a­
tion ab o u t small firm s, in tu r n ,  leads to lim ited d iv e rs ifica tio n  and
14th e re fo re  to h ig h e r  r e tu rn s  fo r  th e  sh a re  of small firm s. Roll,
how ever, s u g g e s ts  th a t  th e  size e ffec t m igh t be a ttr ib u te d  to
in a p p ro p ria te  estim ation of se c u rity  b e ta s  fo r  small firm s, an
underestim ation  th a t  is in d u ced  b y  a u to co rre la te d  r e tu r n s ,  which is
p ro b ab ly  due to  in fre q u e n t tra d in g  of th e  sh a re s  of small firm s.
15More re c e n tly , h ow ever, Reinganum  shows ev idence  th a t ,  while 
th e  d irec tio n  of th e  b ias  in  b e ta  estim ation is  c o n s is te n t w ith Roll's 
c o n jec tu re , th e  m agnitude of th e  b ias is  n o t la rg e  enough to  explain  
th e  firm  size e ffec t. While th e  tra d itio n a l estim ation  (o rd in a ry  leas t 
s q u a re s )  seems to u n d e restim ate  b e ta  of small firm s, th e  excess 
r e tu rn s  of small firm s canno t be fu lly  exp la ined  b y  th e  b ias in th e  
estim ation of b e ta .
1 O
R . W. B anz , "T he R elationsh ip  B etw een R e tu rn  and  
M arket Value of Common S to c k s ,"  Jo u rn a l of F inancial Econom ics, 
p p . 3-18 , M arch, 1981.
1 O
M. R . R einganum , "M isspecification of C ap ita l A sset 
P ric in g : Em pirical Anomalies B ased  on E a rn in g s ' Y ields an d  M arket
V a lu es ,"  Jo u rn a l of F inancial Econom ics, p p . 19-46, M arch, 1981.
1^R . Roll, "A Possib le E xplanation  of th e  Small Firm 
E ffe c t,"  U npub lished  W orking P a p e r , UCLA, O c to b er, 1980.
*^M. R . R einganum , "A D irec t T e s t of R oll's C on jectu re  on 
th e  Firm  Size E ffe c t,"  Jo u rn a l of F in a n c e , p p . 27-35, M arch, 1981.
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A su b s ta n tia l  num ber of s tu d ie s  h as  shown the  e ffec ts  of
1 C
d iv id en d  y ield  on common s to ck  r e tu r n s .  B re n n an , Elton and
17 18 19G ru b e r , P e ttit  an d  L itze n b e rg e r and  Ramaswamy show a
p o sitiv e  an d  s ig n ific an t re la tio n sh ip  betw een d iv idend  yield  and  
common s to ck  r e tu r n s ,  which is  m ainly a ttr ib u te d  to  th e  d is ­
a d v an tag e  of d iv id en d s w ith re s p e c t to  p e rso n a l ta x e s . H ow ever,
th e  exp lanation  fo r  the  d iv id en d  y ield  e ffec t is c o n tro v e rs ia l. Miller 
20an d  Scholes a t tr ib u te  th e  d iv idend  y ie ld  e ffec ts  to th e  inform a-
21tional e ffec ts  of d iv id en d s while H es- a rg u e s  th a t  d iv idends a re  
p ro x y in g  fo r  ch an g es  in ex p ec ted  r e tu r n s .
1 M. J .  B re n n a n , "T ax es , M arket V aluation and  C orpo ra te  
F inancia l P o licy ,"  N ational T ax  J o u rn a l , p p . 417-427, D ecem ber, 
1970.
1^E. J .  Elton an d  M. J .  G ru b e r , "M arginal S to ck h o ld ers ' 
T ax  R ates and  th e  C lientele E ffe c t,"  Review of Economics and  
S ta t is t ic s , p p . 68-74, F e b ru a ry , 1970.
1 ftR . R . P e tt i t ,  "T ax es , T ran sac tio n  C osts an d  C lientele 
E ffect of D iv id e n d s ,"  Jo u rn a l of F inancia l Econom ics, p p . 419-436, 
D ecem ber, 1977.
*^R. H. L itze n b e rg e r and  K. Ramaswamy, "T he E ffects  of 
P e rso n a l T ax es  an d  D ividends on C apital A sse t P rice s : T h eo ry  and
Em pirical E v id en ce ,"  Jo u rn a l of F inancial Econom ics, p p . 163-195,
J u n e , 1979, p p . 163-195.  , "The E ffects of D iv idends on
Common S tock  P r ic e s ,"  Jo u rn a l of F in a n c e , p p . 429-443, May, 1982.
^ M . H . Miller an d  M. S choles, "D ividends and  T ax es: 
Some Em pirical E v id en ce ,"  U npub lished  W orking P a p e r , U n iv e rs ity  
of C hicago, 1981.
^*P. J .  H ess , "T he E x-D iv idend  Day B ehav io r of S tock 
R e tu rn s : F u r th e r  E vidence on T ax  E ffe c ts ,"  Jo u rn a l of F in a n c e ,
p p . 445-456, M ay, 1981.
22 23Hamada and  R u b in ste in  show th a t  th e  system atic  r is k  of
a firm  is positive ly  re la te d  to its  financ ia l le v e rag e . A firm  with
low er financ ia l lev erag e  is ex p ec ted  to  have  less  sy stem atic  r isk
th a n  a n o th e r firm  w ith a h ig h e r  financ ial le v e ra g e , assum ing  the
two firm s a re  id en tica l in  e v e ry  o th e r  re s p e c t .  If th e  two sam ples
a re  d if fe re n t from one a n o th e r w ith re s p e c t to th e se  financial
v a ria b le s , any  em pirical re s u lts  m ight be b ia se d . T able 1
shows some financ ia l d a ta  of th e  sam ple of MNCs and  dom estic
firm s. A lso, ANOVA te s t  s ta t is tic s  fo r  d iffe ren ces  in such
d a ta  betw een th e  sam ples a re  re p o r te d . A lthough all firm s in bo th
sam ples a re  d e riv ed  from th e  1963 F o r tu n e 's  l is t  of th e  500 L a rg e s t
U .S . In d u s tr ia l  C o rp o ra tio n , th e  av e rag e  m ark e t value of MNCs is
sig n ifican tly  la rg e r  th an  th a t  of dom estic firm s d u rin g  1963 to 1978.
On th e  o th e r  h a n d , th e  system atic  r is k  of MNCs m easu red  in
association  w ith th e  dom estic m onthly m ark e t index  ( th e  CRSP
d iv id e n d -a d ju s ted  v a lu e-w eig h ted  m arke t in d e x ) is s ig n ifican tly
R. S. Ham ada, "T he E ffect of th e  F irm 's C apital 
S tru c tu re  on th e  System atic  R isk  of Common S to c k s ,"  Jo u rn a l of 
F in a n c e , p p . 435-452, May, 1972.
23M. R u b in s te in , "A M ean-V ariance S y n th e s is  of C orpo ra te  
F inancia l T h e o ry ,"  Jo u rn a l of F in a n c e , p p . 167-181, M arch, 1973.
TABLE 1
FINANCIAL PROFILE OF MNCs AND DOMESTIC FIRMS1
SIZE2 LV3 DP4 BETA5 RETURN6 CV7 DY6
MNC DC9 MNC DC MNC DC MNC DC MNC DC MNC DC MNC DC
Mean 1077.69 375.30 0.47 0.55 0.52 0.48 1.07 1.33 0.0161 0.0175 0.37 0.53 0.031 0.033
Std 1469.03 635.90 0.93 0.75 0.16 0.22 0.23 0.31 0.0097 0.0116 0.24 0.42 0.02 0.03
ANOVA 
F-value 23.57** 0.61 1.94 35.50** 1.23 14.58** 0.42
1A11 data are calculated employing observations from 1963 to 1978.
^Market value of equity  (closing stock price multiplied by number of shares outstanding) is employed as a proxy 
for firm size ( J  mil).
■*LV (leverage ratio ) is measured by  long-term debt/common equity.
4DP (dividend payout ratio) is m easured by dividends p e r share /earn ings p e r share .
'’BETA is measured in association with the CRSP dividend-adjusted value weighted monthly market index.
RETURN is the  average of monthly re tu rn s .
7CV (coefficient of earnings variation) is measured by the standard  deviation of annual earn ings/average earnings.O
DY (dividend yield) is measured by dividends/previous closing stock price .
q
DC denotes domestic firms.
♦♦Significant a t the 0.01 level.
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24sm aller th an  th e  av e rag e  b e ta  o f dom estic firm s. T he ea rn in g s
v a ria b ility , m easu red  by  th e  coeffic ien t of v a ria tio n , of MNCs is
also s ig n ifican tly  sm aller th an  th a t  of dom estic firm s, which is
25co n sis te n t w ith  fin d in g s  b y  Rugm an. O th e r financial da ta  
(fin an c ia l lev erag e  ra tio , m onthly r e tu r n s ,  d iv idend  p ay o u t ra tio  
and  d iv idend  y ie ld ) show no sig n ifican t d ifference  betw een th e  
sample of MNCs and  th e  sample of dom estic firm s. T h u s , as f a r  as 
T re y n o r 's  perfo rm ance  in d ex  is co n ce rn ed , MNCs ten d  to have  
h ig h e r  r is k -a d ju s te d  perform ance th an  dom estic firm s, which is
OC
c o n s is te n t w ith  p rev io u s  fin d in g s .
Even th o u g h  th e  sample of dom estic firm s shows s ig n ific an t­
ly sm aller m ark e t value th an  th a t  of MNCs, the  small firm  size
e ffec t is  n o t ex p ec ted  to  a ffec t ex cess  r e tu rn s  of th e  dom estic
27firm s sig n ifican tly  since  th e  dom estic firm s a re  re la tiv e ly  la rg e .
24T his re la tio n sh ip  is ro b u s t w hen th e  eq u al-w eig h ted  CRSP 
m arke t in d ex  is em ployed. F u rth e rm o re , even  w hen b e ta s  a re  
m easu red  by th e  o rd in a ry  le a s t sq u a re  m ethod and  th e  m ethod su g ­
g e s te d  b y  Scholes and  Williams em ploying daily  r e tu rn s  an d  daily  
CRSP m ark e t ind ices (v a lu e -w eig h ted  an d  eq u a l-w e ig h te d ), th is  
re la tio n sh ip  s till rem ains. F o r m ore details  ab o u t th e  m ethod s u g ­
g e s te d  b y  Scholes an d  Williams, see , M. Scholes an d  J .  Williams, 
"E stim ating  B etas from N onsynchronous D a ta ,"  Jo u rn a l of F inancial 
Econom ics, p p . 309-327, D ecem ber, 1977.
0'iR ugm an, "R isk  R ed u c tio n ,"  p p . 75-80.
S ee, H u g h es, Logue and  Sw eeney, "C o rp o ra te  I n te r ­
na tiona l D iv e rs ific a tio n ,"  p .  634.
27T he dom estic firm s a re  re la tiv e ly  la rg e  firm s w hen com­
p a re d  w ith all firm s lis te d  on th e  AMEX and  th e  NYSE (o v e r 2500 
f irm s) , w hich w ere em ployed by  R einganum . The dom estic firm s 
a re  ex p ec ted  to  be ra n k e d  a t  le a s t w ith in  th e  th ir d  la rg e s t  m arke t 
va lue  p o rtfo lio  o u t of ten  portfo lios em ployed by  R einganum , T h u s , 
we can n o t conclude w ith confidence th a t  th e  small firm  e ffec t is  s till
F u rth e rm o re , th e  firm  size e ffec t is re d u c ed  by  em ploying m onthly
28d a ta  in s te a d  of daily d a ta . Each sample is  f u r th e r  c lass ified  in to
29two g ro u p s  acco rd in g  to  th e  d eg ree  of m ultina tiona lity . From the  
sam ple of MNCs, firm s w ith m ore th an  25% of fo re ig n  involvem ent 
a re  g ro u p ed  in to  G1 and  th e  o th e rs  a re  g ro u p ed  in to  G2. From th e  
sample of dom estic firm s, firm s w ith more th an  zero  fo re ign  invo lve­
m ent a re  g ro u p ed  in to  G3 and  th e  o th e rs  a re  g ro u p ed  in to  G4. 
Table 2 re p o r ts  some d a ta  fo r  each g ro u p . E xcep t fo r  th e  coef­
fic ien ts  of v a ria tio n  of e a rn in g s  (C V s) betw een G1 and  G2, th e re  is 
a m onotonic o rd e r in g  of m arke t value s ize , b e ta  and  ea rn in g s  
v a ria b ility  among th e  fo u r  g ro u p s . Note th a t  G4 h as  a much
sm aller firm  size th a n  th e  o th e r  g ro u p s . T able 3 re p o r ts  re s u lts  of
30th re e  te s ts  (ANOVA, Median te s t  and  K ruskal-W allis te s t )  fo r the  
n u ll h y p o th esis  of th e  eq u a lity  of th e se  v a riab les  among g ro u p s . 
All te s ts  can re je c t th e  n u ll h y p o th e sis  a t th e  0.01 level. T h is 
fo u r-w ay  c lassification  fa ils  to p ro d u ce  s ta tis tic a lly  id en tica l g ro u p s  
w ith re s p e c t to th e  m arke t va lue  of a firm . H ow ever, the  la rg e
s ig n ific an t among firm s on th e  l is t  of th e  500 la rg e s t  firm s. For 
more d e ta ils , see R einganum , "A D irec t T e s t of R oll's C o n jec tu re ,"  
p . 29.
28F or more d e ta ils , see R einganum , ib id , 1982.
29T h is  g ro u p in g  p ro c e d u re  is b a sed  on th e  av erag e  ra tio  of 
fo re ig n  ea rn in g s  to to ta l e a rn in g s  re p o r te d  in  1965 by  B ru ck  and  
Lees and  d a ta  re p o r te d  in  1979 by  F o rb e s . F o u r g ro u p s  a re  
d e riv e d  b a se d  on only the 1965 d a ta  fo r  th e  re s id u a l an a ly se s .
30F or a de tailed  d iscu ssio n  of th e se  two n o n -p a ra m e tn c  
te s t s ,  see , W. D aniel, A pplied N onparam etric  T e s ts  (B oston : 
H oughton  Mifflin C o ., 1978).
TABLE 2
FOUR-WAY CLASSIFICATION AND FINANCIAL 
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(0 .3 2 )
0.55
(0 .40)
T he f ig u re s  in b ra c k e ts  denote av erage  deg ree  of m ultina tiona lity . 
The fig u re s  in  p a ren th ese s  denote s ta n d a rd  dev iations.
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TABLE 3
RESULTS OF TEST STATISTICS 
AMONG GROUPS
ANOVA K-W MEDIAN
Size F=10.33** CHISQ=85.24** CHISQ=72.59**
B eta F=7.49** CHISQ=18.35*°* CHISQ=15.09**
CV F=5.38** CHISQ=18.98** CHISQ=15.08**
♦♦Significant a t th e  0.01 level.
K-W deno tes  K ruskal-W allis te s t .
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te s t  s ta t is t ic s  a re  mainly due to  th e  ex trem ely  small size of G4.
Once G4 is  ex c lu d ed , th e re  is  no s ig n ifican t d iffe ren ce  in  size 
31among g ro u p s .
31F -v a lu e  is only 0 .3 3 . F u r th e rm o re , th e re  is no s ig ­
n ifican t d iffe ren ce  in  size betw een  G1 and  G3 (F  = 0 .7 5 ).
CHAPTER 5
EMPIRICAL TESTS
A. T he V ariab ility  of E arn in g s  and  
System atic  R isk of a Firm
T he in te rn a tio n a l d iv e rs ifica tio n  of o p e ra tio n s  may have two 
e ffec ts  on th e  r is k  of a firm . F ir s t ,  to th e  e x te n t th a t  fo re ig n  
e a rn in g s  a re  no t p e rfe c tly  c o rre la ted  w ith th ose  from th e  dom estic 
o p e ra tio n , th e  v a riab ility  of e a rn in g s  s tream  may be re d u c e d . 
S econd, th e  in te rn a tio n a l d iv e rs ifica tio n  allows a firm  to depend  on 
th e  dom estic economy less  th an  w ithou t th e  fo re ig n  d iv e rs ifica tio n . 
If  m ultina tionality  of th e  firm  is reco g n ized  in th e  m ark e t, th en  
sh a re s  of th e  firm  shou ld  be less  d ep en d en t on a dom estic cap ita l 
m ark e t th an  a dom estic firm  would b e . T h e re fo re , as re p o r te d  in 
th e  p rev io u s  sec tio n , th e  system atic  r is k  of MNCs asso c ia ted  w ith 
th e  dom estic m arke t is s ig n ifican tly  sm aller th an  dom estic firm s 
would h av e . R ugm an1 em phasizes th e  f i r s t  re d u c tio n  in th e  to ta l 
r is k  of e a rn in g s  as an im p o rtan t economic m otive b eh in d  fo reign  
d ire c t in v estm en ts  by  MNCs. He shows th a t  th e  v a rian ce  of p ro f its  
is in v e rse ly  re la te d  to th e  p e rc e n ta g e  of fo re ig n  sa le s . H ow ever, 
as n o ted  e a r lie r , th e  in cen tiv e  to  s tab ilize  e a rn in g s  stream  may 
be  benefic ia l to m anagem ent r a th e r  th an  sh a reh o ld e rs  th ro u g h  the
1R ugm an, "R isk R ed u c tio n ,"  p p . 75-80.
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2 3red u c tio n  of m anagem ent's unem ploym ent r is k . S hap iro  conjec­
tu re s  th a t  su ch  a red u c tio n  in  th e  to ta l e a rn in g s  v a riab ility  could 
allow MNCs to ach ieve h ig h e r  financ ial le v e ra g e , lead in g  to a re d u c ­
tion in  th e ir  m arg inal co st of cap ita l s ince  th e  r is k  of b a n k ru p tc y  
fo r  a firm  is d e p en d e n t on to ta l ea rn in g s  v a riab ility  in s te ad  of 
system atic  e a rn in g s  v a ria b ility .
T he s tu d ie s  su p p o rtin g  abnorm al perfo rm ance of MNCs 
em phasize and  re ly  on th e  re d u c tio n  in  th e  system atic  r is k  of e a rn ­
in g s  and  m arke t system atic  r is k . A lthough it  is  questionab le  
w h e th e r a  red u c tio n  in  th e  system atic  r is k  in  association  w ith a 
dom estic m arke t n ecessa rily  b en e fits  sh a re h o ld e rs , m ultinationality  
of a firm  can p ro v id e  a red u c tio n  in  th e  system atic  r is k  of e a rn in g s  
as well as a re d u c tio n  in  th e  v a rian ce  of th e  ea rn in g s  s tream . The 
m ultina tionality  of a firm  can tran sfo rm  a p o rtio n  of domestic
system atic  r is k  in to  nonsystem atic  r is k  th a t  can be  d iv e rs ified  away
4
b y  o p era tio n a l d iv e rs ifica tio n . Em pirically , S evern  fin d s  th a t  the  
g re a te r  th e  fo re ig n  involvem ent of a firm , th e  low er th e  covariance 
of its  e a rn in g s  p e r  sh a re  w ith th e  ea rn in g s  p e r  sh a re  of S tan d a rd
5
a n d  P oo r 's  Composite In d e x . M oreover, Gordon and  H alpern  
9T he f i r s t  section  of C h ap te r  3 d iscu sses  th e  argum en t in
d e ta i l .
O
A. C. S h ap iro , "F inancial S tru c tu re  a n d  C ost of C apital in 
th e  M ultinational C o rp o ra tio n ,"  Jo u rn a l of F inancial and  Q u an tita ­
tiv e  A n a ly s is , p p . 211-226, J u n e , 1978.
^A. K. S e v e rn , " In v e s to r  E valuation  of F oreign  and  
Domestic R isk ,"  Jo u rn a l of F in a n c e , p p . 545-550, May, 1974.
^M. J .  Gordon an d  P. J .  H a lp ern , "C ost of C apital fo r the  
D ivision of a F irm ,"  Jo u rn a l of F in an ce , p p . 1153-1173, S ep tem ber, 
1974.
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dem onstra te  a close p o sitiv e  co rre la tio n  betw een  th e  system atic  r isk  
of a firm 's  e a rn in g s  and  its  m ark e t system atic  r i s k ,  which implies 
th a t  th e  m arke t reco gn izes o p era tio n a l c h a ra c te r is tic s  of a firm . If 
th e  m ark e t does recogn ize  th e  m ultina tionality  of a firm  and  MNCs 
ac tua lly  achieve re d u c tio n s  in to ta l and  system atic  r is k  of e a rn in g s , 
th e  re s u lt  may be  low er system atic  r is k  fo r  MNCs re la tiv e  to 
dom estic com panies.
g
Bowman show s th a t  th e  ea rn in g s  v a riab ility  does n o t have 
a d ire c t re la tio n sh ip  w ith m arke t system atic  r is k .  In s te a d , th e  
sy stem atic  r is k  of e a rn in g s  (acco u n tin g  b e ta )  shou ld  be re la ted  to 
m a rk e t system atic  r i s k .  T h e re  h a s  been  no d ire c t em pirical 
ev idence  re g a rd in g  th e  re la tio n sh ip  of a firm 's  m arke t system atic  
r is k  w ith  i ts  d e g re e  of e a rn in g s  v a riab ility  a d ju s ted  fo r  th e  size of 
e a rn in g s . A s ig n ifican tly  p o sitiv e  re la tio n sh ip  m ight imply th a t  
m ultina tiona lity  of a firm  also re d u c es  th e  system atic  r is k  of
7
e a rn in g s , w hich is c o n s is te n t w ith th e  fin d in g s  by S ev e rn . Such 
a f in d in g  may imply th a t  th e  m arke t reco g n izes  m ultinationality  of a 
firm . In  th is  in s ta n c e , we can exp lain  a t le a s t why MNCs have 
dom estic system atic  r is k  th a t  is s ig n ifican tly  sm aller th an  dom estic 
firm s would h av e .
C
R. G. Bowman, "T he T h eo re tica l R elationsh ip  betw een 
S ystem atic  R isk  an d  F inancial (A cco u n tin g ) V a ria b le s ,"  Jo u rn a l of 
F in a n c e , p p . 617-631, Ju n e , 1979.
*7
He fin d s  th a t  MNCs have  low acco u n tin g  b e ta s  in  re la tion  
to  a dom estic m a rk e t. F o r m ore d e ta ils , see S e v e rn , " In v e s to r 
E v a lu a tio n ,"  p p . 545-550.
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Model and  P ro ced u re  
T he m arke t system atic  r is k  of a firm is o b ta ined  from th e  
dom estic m arke t model g iven  b y :
Rjt = ♦ Uj Rdt + 6jt
w here = the  ra te  of r e tu r n  on sto ck  j a t time t .
R , ,  = th e  ra te  of r e tu r n  on a dom estic m arke t in d ex  ( th e
CRSP value w eigh ted  m onthly m arke t in d ex )
p. = COV (R ., R d ) /o 2(R d )
6j t  = a random  term  w ith th e  following s to ch astic  p ro p e r tie s , 
E (6j t ) = 0,
E (6 . , 6 ..)  = 6 .. fo r  all s=t and
13 Jt 1J fo r  a l i i  and  j .
= 0 , o therw ise
Note th a t  fo r  MNCs, p̂  r e p re s e n ts  th e  dom estic p o rtio n  of th e  to ta l 
system atic  r is k .  M onthly da ta  from 1963 to  1978 a re  em ployed to 
m easure  th e  dom estic system atic  r is k  of a firm . The coeffic ien t of
v a ria tio n  of e a rn in g s  (C V ) is em ployed as a p ro x y  fo r s ize -a d ju s ted
e a rn in g s  v a ria b ility . T he an n u al d a ta  from 1963 to 1978 a re  u sed  
fo r CV.
In  o rd e r  to  exam ine th e  re la tio n sh ip  betw een a firm 's  m arke t 
system atic  r is k  and  its  d eg ree  of e a rn in g s  v a ria b ility , th e  following 
two lin e a r  re g re ss io n s  a re  estim ated  an d  te s te d .
p. = aQ + SIZEj + (5 .1 )
h  = a0 + ai CVi + ei (5 ,2 )
T h ese  re g re ss io n s  a re  f i t te d  b o th  fo r  all sample firm s as well as fo r 
th e  sample of MNCs an d  th e  sam ple of dom estic firm s sep a ra te ly .
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Em pirical R esu lts  and  Im plications
T he re s u lts  of th e  re g re ss io n  an a ly ses  a re  re p o r te d  in
O
T able  4 . T he f i r s t  re g re ss io n  line is o b ta ined  by  re g re s s in g  th e
dom estic system atic  r is k  of a firm  (p p  on th e  size (m ark e t v a lu e ) of
a firm . The h y p o th es is  o f zero  slope of th e  re g re ss io n  line is
re jec ted  a t th e  0.01% sign ificance  level. T he s ig n  of th e  coffic ien t
of th e  slope term  (O j) is  n eg a tiv e  (-0 .0 6 5 3 ) and  sig n ifican t a t the
0.01 level. T h is  re s u lt  im plies th a t  la rg e r  sy stem atic  r is k  te n d s  to
be asso c ia ted  w ith  sm aller firm  s ize , w hich is c o n s is te n t w ith the
g
re la tio n sh ip  shown by  R einganum . T his re s u lt  is in ta c t when the  
re g re ss io n  line  is f it te d  fo r  th e  sample of MNCs and  th e  sample of 
dom estic firm s re sp ec tiv e ly  a t th e  0.05 level. T he  second  r e g re s ­
sion line is c o n s tru c te d  by  re g re s s in g  c ro ss-se c tio n a lly  p  ̂ on the  
coeffic ien t o f v a ria tio n  of th e  annual e a rn in g s  (e a rn in g s  b efo re  
in te r e s t  ex p en ses  and  ta x e s ) .  T he second  b lock  in  T able 4 
in d ica tes  th a t  th e  slope an d  its  te s t  s ta t is t ic  a re  la rg e  enough  to 
show sign ificance  a t th e  0.01 level w hen all firm s a re  em ployed. 
The sign  of the  slope term  is p ositive  (0 .2358) an d  i t  is s ig ­
n ifican tly  d iffe re n t from zero . T h is re s u lt  does n o t su p p o rt the  
a rg u m en t by  B ow m an^  th a t  th e  ea rn in g s  v a riab ility  is n o t d ire c t­
ly  asso c ia ted  w ith  m ark e t system atic  r is k .  T h is f in d in g  rem ains
®This te s t  em ploys th e  v a lu e-w eig h ted  CRSP m onthly  m arke t 
in d e x . Sim ilar re s u lts  a re  fo u n d  u s in g  th e  eq u a l-w eig h ted  CRSP 
m onthly m arke t in d ex .
^R einganum , "A D irec t T e s t of R oll's C o n je c tu re ,"  p . 34.
■^Bowman, "The T h eo re tica l R e la tio n sh ip ,"  p p . 617-631.
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♦♦Significant at the 0.01 level.
♦Significant at the 0.05 level.
The figu res in paren theses indicate t-va lues.
This te s t employs the value-w eighted CRSP monthly m arket index. 
Size (average m arket value of equ ity ) in eq . (5.1) is divided by 
1,000 million before runn ing  the  reg ression .
u n ch an g ed  w hen th e  second re g re ss io n  line  is  f it te d  fo r th e  sample 
of MNCs an d  th e  sam ple of dom estic firm s. T he coeffic ien t of th e  
slope term  (0 .2641) of MNCs is  m ore th an  th re e  s ta n d a rd  e r ro r s  
away from z e ro , A sim ilar re s u l t  is  found  fo r dom estic firm s. A 
firm  w ith a re la tiv e ly  s tab le  e a rn in g s  stream  te n d s  to h ave  a low 
level of system atic  r is k . T h is f in d in g , ho w ev er, does n o t n e c e s ­
sa r ily  c o n tra d ic t th e  a rg u m en ts  by  Bowman. At a g iven  level of 
e a rn in g s  v a ria b ility  fo r  th e  m ark e t po rtfo lio , a firm  w ith a s tab le  
e a rn in g s  s tream  is also  e x p ec ted  to h ave  also a low level of co v aria ­
b ility  w ith th e  v a riab ility  of th e  ea rn in g s  of th e  m ark e t po rtfo lio . 
B ased  on th e  re s u lts  from th e  two re g re ss io n  a n a ly se s , i t  is  s till 
u n c lea r w h e th er e a rn in g s  v a riab ility  can add  to th e  ex p lan a to ry  
pow er of th e  size e ffec t in  exp la in ing  th e  v a ria tio n  of dom estic 
system atic  r is k s .  T h u s , two new re g re ss io n s  a re  f i t te d  b a sed  on 
th e  following m odels:
Pi = Y0 + Yj SIZE. + y2 CV. + I  (5 .3 )
Pi = Yq + Y{ Ri + (5 .4 )
w here  is th e  p u re  ea rn in g s  v a riab ility  of th e  ith  firm  m easured  
by  a re s id u a l from re g re s s in g  CV.. on SIZE^. The re s u lts  of th e se  
re g re ss io n  an a ly ses  a re  re p o r te d  in Table 5. The f i r s t  re g re ss io n  
line seems to  s u f fe r  from econom etric problem s due to a h ig h  d eg ree  
of m u ltico llin ea rity . T he estim ates of th e  re g re ss io n  coef­
fic ien ts  may be im precise  b ecau se  of th e  la rg e  v a rian ces  of th e  le a s t
^*The co rre la tio n  coeffic ien t betw een SIZE, an d  CVj is 0 .18 .
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2
sq u a re s  es tim ato rs . H ow ever, s ince th e  d iffe ren ce  betw een  R
(0 .1 6 ) and  th e  h ig h e s t of th e  "R^ d e le tes"  (0 .0 8 ) is n o t sm all, the
12d eg ree  of m ultico llinearity  is n o t harm fu l. T he in tro d u c tio n  of
CVj in to  th e  re g re ss io n  equation  (5 .1 )  leads to a su b s ta n tia l
2
in c re a se  in  th e  value  of R (from  0.03 to  0 .1 6 ) . All re g re ss io n
coeffic ien ts  a re  s ig n ifican tly  d iffe re n t from zero  a t th e  0 .05 level
A A
an d  th e  s ig n s  of and  a re  c o n s is te n t w ith re s u lts  shown in 
T ab le  4 . In  p a r t ic u la r ,  th e  coeffic ien ts of CV a re  s till  p o sitiv e  and  
s ig n ifican tly  d iffe re n t from zero  a t  th e  0.01 level fo r all c a se s . T he
a
in  th e  second  re g re ss io n  lin e , w hich re p re s e n ts  th e  e ffec ts  of 
p u re  e a rn in g s  v a riab ility  on th e  v a ria tio n  of p a re  s ig n ifican tly  p o s i­
tiv e  a t th e  0 .05  level fo r  all c a se s . T h u s , even  a f te r  a d ju s tin g  fo r 
firm  s ize , a firm  w ith low er e a rn in g s  v a ria b ility  te n d s  to have low er 
dom estic sy stem atic  r i s k .  I t  can be  p resu m ed  th a t th e  m arke t 
seems to  in te r p r e t  a s tab le  e a rn in g s  stream  of a firm  as a less
d ep en d en ce  on th e  U .S . economy an d  th u s  enab les its  s tock  p rice
le ss  likely  to move w ith the  r e s t  of th e  U .S . s to ck  m ark e t.
We have  shown th a t  MNCs te n d  to  have  ea rn in g s  stream s 
th a t  a re  s ig n ifican tly  more s tab le  th an  those  of dom estic firm , and  
th a t  th e re  is  a s ig n ifican tly  p o sitiv e  re la tio n sh ip  betw een th e  e a rn ­
in g s  v a ria b ility  an d  th e  system atic  r is k  of a firm . As h y p o th es ized , 
s tab le  e a rn in g s  s tream s of MNCs can exp la in  why MNCs ten d  to 
h av e  a low level of dom estic system atic  r i s k .  T h is  is  also  ev idence
12F o r a de tailed  d iscu ssio n  on th e  m easure  of m ulti­
c o llin ea rity , see  J .  K m enta, E lem ents of Econom etrics (New Y ork: 
Macmillan P u b lish in g  C o ., 1971).
TABLE 5
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SYSTEMATIC RISK AND SIZE-ADJUSTED 
EARNINGS VARIABILITY






































♦Significant at the 0.05 level. 
♦♦Significant at the 0.01 level.
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th a t  th e  m arke t recogn izes th e  m ultina tionality  of a firm . H ow ever,
i t  is  s till u n c lea r w h e th e r s tab le  ea rn in g s  s tream s due to opera tional
d ivers ifica tio n  b en efit sh a re h o ld e rs . In s te a d , m anagers may be
b e n e fitin g  th ro u g h  th e  red u c tio n  of th e ir  unem ploym ent r is k .  
13S hapiro  p ro p o ses  th a t  a red u c tio n  in  to ta l e a rn in g s  v a riab ility
could allow MNCs to  lev erag e  them selves more h ig h ly , lead ing  to  a
red u c tio n  in  th e ir  m arg inal co st of cap ita l. H ow ever, i t  is s till
u n c lea r w h e th er an in c rease  in  lev erag e  a t  an y  s tag e  n ecessa rily
re d u c es  th e  co st of cap ita l. F u rth e rm o re , Table 1 shows th a t
MNCs, on a v e ra g e , te n d  to have  num erically  low er lev erag e  th an
14dom estic firm s in  th is  sam ple.
B . T he Domestic CAPM A nalysis
In  the  p rev io u s  sec tio n , i t  was shown th a t  MNCs, when 
com pared to dom estic firm s h av e , on a v e ra g e , s ig n ifican tly  lower 
system atic  r is k  assoc ia ted  w ith th e  U .S . s to ck  m ark e t. T his fin d ­
in g  is n o t s u rp r is in g  since th e  system atic  r is k  re la tiv e  to the  U .S .
sto ck  m arke t is only a p a r t  of th e  to ta l system atic  r is k  fo r  which
15th e  ex p ec ted  ra te  of r e tu rn  is com pensation . Agmon an d  L essa rd  
su g g e s t th a t  r e tu rn s  to  MNCs follow th e  following m u lti-fac to r 
m arke t model.
13S h ap iro , "F inancial S t r u c tu r e ,"  p p . 211-226. Galai and 
M asulis also su g g e s t th a t  an in c re a se  in  le v e rag e  may be th e  
economic ra tiona le  b eh in d  conglom erate m e rg e rs . F o r more d e ta ils , 
see  D. Galai an d  R . W. M asulis, "T he O ption P ric in g  M odel," 
p p . 52-82.
^W hen  lev erag e  is m easu red  b y  lo n g -te rm  debt/com m on 
e q u ity , MNCs have  0 .47  while dom estic firm s have  0 .55 .
*^Agmon and  L e ssa rd , " In v e s to r  R eco g n itio n ,"  p . 1050.
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E(Rj t ) a. + pjd  R d t + pjk  Rk t + £jt 
w h e re , R. = r a te  of r e tu r n  on th e  s to ck  of MNC. a t time t .
J ^ 1
■V
Rd t = ra te  of r e tu r n  on th e  U .S . m ark e t portfo lio  a t time
R ,.  = ra te  of r e tu rn  on a fo re ig n  m ark e t po rtfo lio , k  a t
time t  w here  th e  MNC has o p e ra tio n s .
p.d = COV(R. Rd ) / a 2(R d )
pjk  = c o v < r .  Rk )/cr2(R k )
£.. -  a random  term
Nj = num b er of co u n trie s  w here MNC^ has opera tio n s
Agmon and  L e ssa rd  p ro v id e  ev idence th a t  as th e  fo re ig n  invo lve­
m ent of a firm  in c re a s e s , th e  in te rn a tio n a l p o rtio n  of system atic  r is k  
in c rease s  while th e  dom estic p o rtio n  d e c re a se s . I t  is ex p ec ted  th a t 
a risk -p rem ium  asso c ia ted  w ith a p a r tia l system atic  r is k  would be 
low er th an  would b e  th e  case w ith to ta l sy stem atic  r is k .  Con­
se q u e n tly , th e  o v era ll e x p lan a to ry  pow er of th e  dom estic CAPM is 
ex p ec ted  to decline su b s ta n tia lly  w hen it  is  app lied  to a sample of 
MNCs. A m ore d e ta iled  d iscu ssio n  w ith re s p e c t- to  some econom etric 
problem s in th e  app lication  of th e  dom estic CAPM to  a sample of 
MNCs is  p re s e n te d  in  A ppendix  A.
In  th is  sec tio n , i t  is h y p o th e sized  th a t  if  th e  m ark e t 
reco gn izes m ultina tiona lity  of a firm , th e  ex p lan a to ry  pow er of th e  
dom estic CAPM will be  low er w hen i t  is app lied  to MNCs th an  to 
dom estic firm s. F u r th e rm o re , th e  dom estic CAPM g ives a sm aller
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risk -p rem ium  asso c ia ted  w ith dom estic system atic  r is k  fo r MNCs th an  
fo r  dom estic firm s. T h u s , th is  h y p o th es is  s ta te s  th a t  any  abnorm al 
perfo rm ance m easu red  by  th e  rea lized  ra te  of r e tu rn  and  dom estic 
system atic  r is k  of an MNC would be b ia se d .
Model an d  M ethodology 
T he dom estic CAPM p o s tu la te s  a lin e a r  re la tio n sh ip  betw een 
th e  ex p ec ted  ra te  of r e tu r n  on a r is k y  a s s e t  and  i ts  system atic  r is k  
asso c ia ted  w ith a dom estic m arke t po rtfo lio . B lack 's  v e rs io n  of the  
CAPM i s : 16
E (R .) = E (R q ) + EE(Rm) -  E (R q )] (5 .5 )
(V
w h ere , Rj = ra te  of r e tu r n  on a s s e t  j.
Rq = ra te  of r e tu rn  on a z e ro -b e ta  portfo lio
Rm = ra te  of r e tu rn  on a dom estic m ark e t portfo lio
Pj = COV(R“ , R~mV a 2(R~m>
F or em pirical u se  of th e  CAPM, equation  (5 .5 )  can be tran sfo rm ed
from th e  ex an te  form in to  an ex p o s t form th a t  employs ob serv ab le
d a ta  by  assum ing th a t  th e  ra te  of r e tu r n  on a r is k y  a s se t h as  a
17fa ir  game p ro p e r ty . T he  ex  p o s t CAPM is g iven  by :
Rj t  = %  + %  + zj t  (5 6)
16F . B lack , "C ap ita l M arket E quilibrium  w ith R es tr ic te d  
B o rro w in g ,"  Jo u rn a l of B u s in e s s , p p . 444-455, J u ly , 1972.
17The fa ir  game h y p o th es is  s ta te s  th a t  on a v e rag e , the  
ex p ec ted  ra te  of r e tu r n  on an  a s s e t  is eq u a l to  th e  rea lized  ra te  of 
r e tu r n .  For more d e ta ils , see E. F . Fam a, "E fficien t C apital
M arkets: A Review of T h eo ry  an d  Em pirical W ork," Jo u rn a l of
F in an ce , p p . 383-417, May, 1970.
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w here  Ygt , Yjt  = m ark e t-d e te rm in ed  v a riab les  d en o tin g  th e  ex  p o s t 
re la tio n sh ip  betw een r is k  and  r e tu rn  a t t .
Zj = a d is tu rb a n c e  term .
Em pirical e stim ates , Ygt and  Yl t  fo r  an d  Yjt  a re  ob ta ined  by 
f i t t in g  th e  em pirical m ark e t line  g iven  b y :
Bn = % * *n Pj+ zjt (5-7>
A  A ,
w here  0  ̂ is th e  estim ate of p^, w hich can be m easured  from th e  
m ark e t model defined  as:
Rj t  = “j + Pj Rmt + £j t  ( 5 ' 8)
In  o rd e r  to re d u c e  b ias in re s u l ts  due to m easurem ent e r ro r s  in  the
u se  of equation  (5 .7 )  fo r  th e  c ro ss -se c tio n a l te s t  of equation
18( 5 .5 ) ,  th e  g ro u p in g  p ro c e d u re  su g g e s te d  b y  B lack , Jen se n  and 
19Scholes is ad o p ted  fo r th e  sample of MNCs an d  fo r th e  sample of 
dom estic firm s. For each sam ple, th e  p ro c e d u re  invo lves the  
following s te p s :
1) Estim ate th e  b e ta  of each  s to ck  o v e r th e  p e rio d  of
Ja n u a ry  1963 to  D ecem ber 1969 em ploying CRSP m onthly
r e tu r n  da ta  b a sed  on equation  (5 .8 ) .
18F or an ex ce llen t d iscu ssio n  of th e  econom etric problem s 
invo lved  in  te s t in g  th e  CAPM, see  M. Miller and  M. S choles, "R ates 
of R e tu rn  in  Relation to R isk ,"  p p . 47-78.
19F . B lack , M. C. J en se n  and  M. S cho les, "T he C apital 
A sse t P ric in g  M odel," p p . 79-124. A sim ilar g ro u p in g  p ro c e d u re  is 
su g g e s te d  by  Fama and  M acBeth. F o r more d e ta ils , see E. F . Fama 
an d  J .  M acBeth, "R isk , R e tu rn  and  E quilibrium : Em pirical T e s t ,"
Jo u rn a l of Political Econom y, p p . 607-636, M ay /Ju n e , 1973.
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2) R ank th e  s to ck s  by  b e ta  an d  p lace in to  27 portfo lios 
(each  portfo lio  h as  5 s to c k s ) .
3) C alculate  th e  m onthly r e tu rn s  fo r th e se  portfo lios  fo r  
Ja n u a ry  1970 to D ecem ber 1970.
4) O btain  th e  m onthly r e tu rn s  fo r  1971 by  re p e a tin g  the  
above s te p s  u s in g  y e a rs  from 1964 to 1970 fo r  form ing 
p o rtfo lio s , an d  so on . T his p ro c e d u re  p ro d u ces  a time 
se r ie s  of 96 m onthly  r e tu r n s  fo r  each of th e  54 p o r t ­
folios o v e r th e  p e rio d  of J a n u a ry  1970 to D ecem ber 
1978.
A pply ing  th e se  96 m onthly  r e tu rn s  to th e  portfo lio  v e rs io n  of the
A
m ark e t model p ro d u c e s  estim ate  of b e ta  fo r  each po rtfo lio , Pp . 
F in a lly , in  o rd e r  to  estim ate  and  y^, a sec o n d -s ta g e  pooled
c ro ss -se c tio n a l re g re s s io n  is  c o n s tru c te d  b a se d  on th e  following 
e q u a tio n :
T he g ro u p in g  p ro c e d u re  is ex p ec ted  to red u ce  th e  m easurem ent
20e r ro r s  in  estim ating  th e  b e ta  of a s to ck . H ow ever, in th e  
sec o n d -s ta g e  re g re ss io n  analysis  no p ro c e d u re  is em ployed to
A
red u ce  b ias in  th e  y j of MNCs due to  th e  om ission of possib ly  
re le v a n t ex p lan a to ry  v a ria b le s  (fo re ig n  system atic  r i s k s ) .  If th e
20A ppendix  B d isc u sse s  th e  g ro u p in g  p ro c e d u re  in  d e ta il.
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m arket recogn izes m ultina tionality  of a firm , th e  fo re ig n  system atic
r is k s  (o r  th e  in te rn a tio n a l system atic  r i s k )  may be re lev an t
ex p lan a to ry  v a ria b le s . In th is  case , th e  omission of su ch  variab les
will red u ce  th e  ex p lan a to ry  pow er of the  dom estic CAPM.
Since th e  main p u rp o se  of th e  te s t  is n o t to  in v e s tig a te  the
va lid ity  of the  dom estic CAPM, no more dev ices a re  adop ted .
In s te a d , the  ob jective  is to com pare th e  ex p lan a to ry  pow er of the
dom estic CAPM w hen it  is app lied  to MNCs and  dom estic f irm s . Any
te s t  re s u lts  w ith re s p e c t to se c u rity  perform ance should  be in te r -
21p re te d  ca re fu lly . Roll w arns th a t as long  as th e  tru e  m arket
portfo lio  is n o t id en tified  and  em ployed, an y  te s t  re s u lts  m ust be
22in te rp re te d  w ith cau tio n . F inally , to te s t  fo r  a firm  size e ffec t, 
th e  following re g re ss io n  is ru n  in each of th e  96 m onths from 1970 
th ro u g h  1978.
Rp t  = *0 + *1 Ppt + v2 SPt-l * 2p t ( 5 1 0 )
w here  Spt  = logarithm  of av erag e  firm size (m ark e t value of eq u ity )
in  portfo lio  P a t th e  end  of y e a r t .  A log tran sfo rm ation  is applied
to  th e  m ark e t v a lue  v a riab les  since  th e  o b se rv ed  re la tionsh ip
23betw een  those  and  r e tu rn s  is n o n lin ea r. If th e  av erag e  value  of
^ R o l l ,  "A C ritiq u e  of th e  A sse t,"  p p . 129-176.
22N ote th a t  all firm s a re  la rg e  enough  n o t to be a ffec ted  by 
th e  small firm  size e ffe c t.
23F or m ore d e ta ils , see B anz , "The R elationsh ip  Between 
R e tu rn  and  M ark e t,"  p p . 3-18 and  R einganum , "A D irec t T es t of
R oll's C o n je c tu re ,"  p . 32, 1982.
Yg is s ta tis tic a lly  d iffe re n t from zero , th en  any  conclusions draw n 
from Eq. (5 .9 )  may be b iased  b y  a firm  size e ffe c t. On the  o th e r
A
h a n d , if  th e  av e rag e  value  of Y2 is n o t s ta tis tic a lly  d iffe re n t from 
z e ro , th en  an y  d iffe ren ces  in th e  estim ated  coeffic ien ts  in Eq. (5 .9 )  
betw een  MNCs an d  dom estic firm s may be a ttr ib u ta b le  to the  m ulti­
na tio n a lity  of a firm .
Em pirical R esu lts  and  Im plications 
T e s t re s u lts  from th e  seco n d -s tag e  c ro ss-sec tio n a l r e g r e s ­
sion fo r th e  sam ple of MNCs and  th e  sample of dom estic firm s a re  
re p o r te d  in  T able 6. T he coeffic ien t of th e  in te rc e p t term  of MNCs 
is la rg e r  th an  th a t  o f dom estic firm s while the  coefficien t of the  
slope term  of MNCs is sm aller th an  th a t  of dom estic firm s re g a rd le ss  
of th e  m ark e t index  em ployed fo r  estim ating  Pp. When all firm s a re
■A. A
em ployed, Yq an d  Yj a re  s ig n ifican tly  d iffe re n t from zero  a t th e  0.01
2
level an d  R is  0 .26  w ith th e  eq u al-w eig h ted  CRSP m arket in d ex .
A
H ow ever, w hen only MNCs a re  em ployed, Yj is  s ig n ifican t a t only
2 A th e  0 .05 level and  R is 0 .19 . On th e  o th e r  h a n d , Yj of dom estic
A
firm s is  s ig n ific an t a t 0 .01 level b u t  Yq is in s ig n ificn a tly  d iffe re n t
A
from zero . With th e  v a lu e-w eig h ted  CRSP m ark e t in d e x , Yj of
2MNCs is n o t s ig n ifican tly  d iffe re n t from zero  and  R is  0.13 while
2Yj of dom estic firm s is s ig n ific an t a t 0.01 level. The R s p ro v id e  
ev idence  th a t  th e  dom estic CAPM loses ex p lan a to ry  pow er when 
ap p lied  to  MNCs, w hich implies th a t  th e  dom estic sy stem atic  r is k  
can n o t exp la in  as m uch of th e  v a ria tio n  of ra te  of r e tu rn  of 
MNCs as th a t  of dom estic firm s. F u rth e rm o re , as h y p o th esized
TABLE 6








(4.28) 0.0099 0.85 0.0001 0.26
MNC 0.0061**(3.41)
0.0052^
(2.45) 0.0094 0.77 0.0217 0.19
DC 0.0038(1.54)
0.0078=**
(3.17) 0.0104 0.94 0.0040 0.29
ALL 0.0045#(2.35)
0.0058** 











0.0107 1.19 0.0081 0.25
Rp = average monthly portfolio re tu rn , 
pp = average monthly portfolio beta.
DEWR = equal-weighted CRSP monthly market index. 
DVWR = value-weighted CRSP monthly market index. 
The figures in parentheses are t-value.
♦♦Significant at the 0.01 level.
♦Significant a t the 0.05 level.
th e  risk -p rem ium  (y^) of MNCs ap p ea rs  to be sm aller th an  th a t of
dom estic firm s would p ro v id e .
In conclusion , MNCs a p p ea r to have a d iffe re n t sec u rity
m ark e t line (SM L), w hich has a sm aller slope b u t  a la rg e r  in te rc e p t
th an  dom estic firm s would h av e . In  o rd e r  to  examine th e  equality
24of SMLs betw een  MNCs and  dom estic firm , Chow 's pooling te s t  is 
em ployed. T he te s t  s ta tis tic s  re p o r te d  in Table 7 show th a t  the  
n u ll h y p o th esis  of eq u a lity  can n o t be  re jec ted  a t 0.05 level. This 
re s u lt  implies th a t  s ta tis tic a lly  MNCs and  dom estic firm s have homo­
geneous s e c u rity  m ark e t lin e s . The risk -p rem ium  p ro v id ed  by  
MNCs a p p ea rs  to  be  sm aller b u t  s ta tis tic a lly  i t  is  n o t s ig n ifican tly
sm aller th an  th a t  of dom estic firm s. H ow ever, to g e th e r  w ith th e
2
ev idence  of re la tiv e ly  poor R of th e  dom estic CAPM fo r MNCs, 
num erically  small risk -p rem ia  of MNCs imply th a t  dom estic system atic  
r is k  can n o t c a p tu re  all th e  sy stem atic  r is k  of MNCs. T h u s , any 
em pirical fin d in g s  re g a rd in g  th e  perfo rm ance of MNCs b ased  on the  
dom estic CAPM o r  th e  dom estic system atic  r is k  m ust be accep ted  
w ith  g re a t cau tion . F o r exam ple, even  if one found  s ta tis tic a lly  
s ig n ifican t small r isk -p rem ia  fo r  MNCs, one canno t conclude th a t 
MNCs have a re d u c ed  risk -p rem ium  due to  th e  d iv ers ifica tio n  
se rv ice  becau se  a mis specification  of th e  p r ic in g  model fo r  MNCs 
may re s u lt  in  a s ig n ifican tly  small risk -p rem ium  term .
For m ore de ta ils  see  G. C. Chow, "T e s t of th e  E quality  
betw een S e ts  of C oeffic ien ts in  Two L inear R e g re ss io n s ,"  Econo­
m e tric s , p p . 591-605, Ju ly , 1960.
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T he re s u l t  from a pooled c ro ss -se c tio n a l m ultiple re g re ss io n  
an aly sis  b a sed  on E q. (5 .1 0 ) is  re p o r te d  in  T able 8. T he coef­
fic ie n ts  of th e  size term  in  all th re e  cases a re  in s ig n ifican tly  
d if fe re n t from zero . E x cep t fo r  th e  coeffic ien t of the  size term  fo r 
only MNCs, o th e rs  a re  p o s itiv e . The av erag e  premium on th e  size
term  fo r all sam ple firm s is 0.00009, which is le ss  th an  0 .2  s ta n d a rd
25e r ro r s  away from zero . F u rth e rm o re , th e  s igns of th e se  coef­
fic ien ts  a re  d iffe re n t betw een  MNCs and  dom estic firm s. On the
o th e r  h a n d , th e  ev idence in d ica tes  th a t  d u r in g  th is  time p e rio d  the
9  fi
a v e rag e  r is k  prem ia asso c ia ted  w ith dom estic b e ta s  a re  all s ig ­
n ifican tly  g re a te r  th an  zero  fo r  all c a se s . T he system atic  o rd e rin g
2
of r is k  prem ia a sso c ia ted  w ith dom estic b e ta s  and  R s of the  
dom estic CAPM fo r  th re e  cases rem ains. To e lab o ra te , th e  
dom estic firm s seem to p ro v id e  la rg e r  r is k  prem ia assoc ia ted  w ith 
dom estic b e ta  and  h ave  la rg e r  ex p lan a to ry  pow er w ith th e  domestic 
CAPM th an  MNCs do. D ifferences in  firm sizes can explain  little  of 
th e  d iffe ren ces  in  av erag e  portfo lio  r e tu rn s  fo r  sample firm s d u rin g  
th is  time p e rio d . T h e re fo re , th e  overa ll conclusion draw n from 
T able  6 can be a ttr ib u ta b le  to th e  d iffe ren ce  in  th e  d eg ree  of 
m ultina tiona lity  of a firm .
25When th e  ab so lu te  value of size is em ployed w ithou t a log 
tran sfo rm a tio n , th e  a v e rag e  premium on it  fo r  all sam ple firm s is 
-0 .00002 , w hich is  n o t s ig n ifican tly  d iffe re n t from zero .
9 f i The r is k  p rem ia re p o r te d  in  Table 6 a re  re la ted  to b e ta s  
m easu red  in  association  w ith th e  DVWR. T he o v era ll conclusion 
rem ains u n ch an g ed  w hen b e ta s  a re  calcu la ted  re la tiv e  to th e  DEWR.
TABLE 7 
STA TISTICS FOR POOLING TEST
DEWR DVWR
COINCIDENCE F=0.286 F=0.778
(4 .0 3 ) (4 .0 3 )
PARALLEL F=0.571 F=1.222
(3 .1 8 ) (3 .1 8 )
T he f ig u re s  in  p a re n th e se s  a re  c ritic a l F -v a lu e s  a t the  
0 .05  level.
C oincidence deno tes  th e  n u ll h y p o th esis  of eq u ality  in 
th e  in te rc e p t and  th e  slope of two re g re s s io n  lin e s .
P ara lle l den o tes  th e  nu ll h y p o th e s is  of eq u a lity  in  th e  
slope of two re g re ss io n  lin es .
TABLE 8










(0 .17 ) 0.0049 0.20




(-0 .2 4 ) 0.0735 0.19




(0 .5 3 ) 0.0638 0.23
^ S ig n if ic a n t  a t th e  0.01 level.
^S ign ifican t a t th e  0.05 level.
B etas a re  m easured  in association w ith the  DVWR. 
T he f ig u res  in  p a ren th ese s  a re  t-v a lu e s .
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In  th is  sec tio n , we h ave  shown th a t  th e  dom estic CAPM is 
n o t a p ro p e r  p ric in g  model fo r MNCs. The dom estic system atic  r isk  
of a MNC can n o t exp lain  as m uch of th e  v a ria tio n  in  ra te s  of r e tu rn  
as can th e  system atic  r is k  of a  dom estic firm . T his fin d in g  is 
in d ire c t ev idence  of m arke t recogn ition  of m ultina tionality  of a firm . 
H ow ever, no  d ire c t s ta tis tic a l te s t  was perfo rm ed  to show w h e th er 
th e  m ark e t reco gn izes th e  m ultina tionality  of a firm  o r n o t. 
F u r th e rm o re , th e  ex is ten ce  of th e  d iv ers ifica tio n  se rv ice  was no t 
exam ined.
C. T he T w o-F acto r In te rn a tio n a l 
CAPM A nalysis
In  th e  p rev io u s  sec tio n , we saw th a t  th e  segm ented  p ric in g
h y p o th e sis  is  im proper fo r  exp la in ing  th e  ra te  of r e tu r n  on s tocks
of MNCs. In d ire c t ev idence  of m arke t recogn ition  of m ultina tionality
of a firm  is su g g e s te d  b y  th e  fa c t th a t  th e  dom estic CAPM shows
poor ex p lan a to ry  pow er w hen app lied  to MNCs. H ow ever, a d ire c t
te s t  w ith r e s p e c t  to th e  is su e  of m arke t recogn ition  re q u ire s  a
model w hich in c o rp o ra te s  fo re ig n  fa c to rs .
T h e re  h as  been  a su b s ta n tia l num ber of s tu d ie s  which
co n sid e r in te rn a tio n a l fa c to rs  in  th e  r i s k - r e tu r n  re la tio n sh ip  of
27risk y  a s s e ts .  Solnik p re s e n ts  an equ ilibrium  model of the
in te rn a tio n a l cap ita l m ark e t w here  ex ch an g e  r is k  stem s from
0 7
H. Soln ik , "An Equilibrium  Model of th e  In te rn a tio n a l
C apital M ark e t,"  Jo u rn a l of Economic T h e o ry , p p . 500-524, A u g u st,
1974.
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d iffe ren ces  in consum ption ta s te s  betw een  c o u n trie s . U n d er th e
assum ption  th a t  fo re ig n  ex ch an g e  r is k  re s u lts  from p u re  m onetary
28u n c e r ta in ty , G ra u e r , L itz e n b e rg e r  an d  S tehle  su g g e s t an eq u ili­
brium  model of an in te rn a tio n a l c ap ita l m arke t in  w hich an in v e s to r 's
portfo lio  decision d ep en d s on th e  n o n -d iv e rs ifia b le  flu c tu a tio n s  of
29re la tiv e  p r ic e s . S teh le  advances th e  equilibrium  model su g g es te d
b y  G ra u e r , L itz e n b e rg e r and  S teh le  to a tw o -fac to r te s tab le  p ric in g  
30 31model. B lack and  S tu lz  p re s e n t  equilibrium  models which
in co rp o ra te  add itional co sts  ( b a r r ie r s )  fo r  dom estic in v e s to rs  to hold
32fo re ig n  a s s e ts .  R ecen tly , S tu lz p re s e n ts  a more advanced  model 
th a t  adm its d iffe ren ces  in  consum ption o p p o rtu n ity  se ts  acro ss  
c o u n trie s . T he S teh le 's  tw o -fac to r in te rn a tio n a l m arke t model is 
em ployed to exam ine w h e th e r th e  m ark e t recogn izes m ultinationality  
of a firm . In th is  sec tio n , the  h y p o th esis  of th e  m arke t recognition  
of m u ltina tionality  of a firm will be  exam ined em ploying a tw o -fac to r 
in te rn a tio n a l m arke t model.
op
F . L. A. G ra u e r , R . H. L itz e n b e rg e r  and  R . E . S teh le , 
"S h arin g  R ules an d  Equilibrium  in  an In te rn a tio n a l C ap ita l M arket 
U n d er U n c e r ta in ty ,"  Jo u rn a l of F inancial Econom ics, p p . 223-256, 
J u n e , 1976.
^ S te h le ,  "An Em pirical T e s t of th e  A lte rn a tiv e  H ypoth­
e s e s ,"  p p . 493-502.
^ B la c k ,  " In te rn a tio n a l C ap ita l M ark e t,"  p p . 337-352.
^^S tu lz , "On th e  E ffec ts  of B a r r ie r s ,"  p p . 924-934.
*^R. M. S tu lz , "A Model of In te rn a tio n a l A sse t P r ic in g ,"  
Jo u rn a l of F inancial Econom ics, p p . 383-406, S ep tem ber, 1981.
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Model
A ssum ing th e  ra te s  of r e tu r n  on r isk y  a sse ts  a re  s ta tio n a ry
w ith a m u ltiv a ria te  norm al d is tr ib u tio n  an d  se ria lly  u n c o rre la te d ,
S teh le  specifies th e  following tw o -fac to r in te rn a tio n a l m arke t model 
as g iven  b y :
R]t = °j + Pjw Rwt + Pjd  Rd t + ej t  ( 5 -U )
w here  o/j, P-w and  p ^  a re  re g re ss io n  p a ram ete rs  re sp ec tiv e ly  and
R. = ra te  of r e tu r n  on a s se t j a t time t
R . = ra te  of r e tu r n  on th e  w orld 's  m ark e t portfo lio  a t
Wl time t
R ^t  = th e  p o rtio n  of th e  ra te  of r e tu rn  of a dom estic m arket
portfo lio  (R m t) th a t is u n c o rre la ted  w ith Rwt a t t ;  
i t  is  defined  as
Rd t “ Rmt ” amw " Pmw Rw t (5 .1 2 )
e .. = a d is tu rb a n c e  term .Jt
Note th a t  p. is th e  sy stem atic  r is k  of a r is k y  a s s e t  in  associationJW
w ith th e  w orld 's  m ark e t portfo lio  an d  pj^ den o tes  an o th e r com ponent 
of system atic  r is k  th a t  is d iv e rs ifiab le  in te rn a tio n a lly  b u t u n d iv e rs -  
ifiab le  dom estically. T h is model tak es  th e  m ultina tionality  of a firm  
in to  co n sidera tion  th ro u g h  p^w th a t is m issed in  th e  dom estic m arke t 
m odel. F u r th e rm o re , b y  d e s ig n , th is  model avoids th e  m ulticol-
ru ~
lin e a rity  problem  in  a m ultiple re g re ss io n  since  Rw t an d  R ^  a re  
in d e p en d e n t of each o th e r . T h is model will be  em ployed to 
te s t  w h e th er th e  m arke t recogn izes m ultina tionality  of a firm . The
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h y p o th esis  is th a t  th e  g re a te r  th e  fo re ig n  involvem ent of a firm , 
th e  low er th e  dependence  on th e  p u re  U .S . m ark e t fa c to r  (P j^ )- In  
r e tu r n ,  th e  w orld m ark e t shou ld  become m ore im p o rtan t to a firm 
w ith fo re ig n  involvem ent.
M ethodology
In o rd e r  to te s t  th e  h y p o th e s is  th a t  th e  m ark e t recogn izes 
m ultina tionality  of a firm , th e  following p ro c e d u re  is em ployed.
1) T he following re g re ss io n  line is o b ta in ed  by  re g re s s in g  
th e  v a lu e-w eig h ted  CRSP m onthly m arke t in d ex  ( Rm t) on th e  w orld 
m arke t index  (R w t) fo r th e  time p e rio d  of J a n u a ry  1965 to  Decem ber 
1978.
R . = a + 8  R . + z .mt mw pmw wt t
w here a d is tu rb a n ce  te rm , z t is  u sed  as a p ro x y  fo r  th e  p u re
IV
dom estic m arke t fa c to r ( R ^ )  in E q. (5 .1 2 ) .
2) Following th e  m ethod su g g e s te d  by  Agmon and
q q
L e ssa rd , Pw and  in  Eq. (5 .1 1 ) fo r  th e  two sam ples (MNCs
an d  dom estic firm s) and  th e  fo u r  g ro u p s  (G l, G2, G3 an d  G4) a re
q q
Agmon an d  L e ssa rd , " In v e s to r  R eco g n itio n ,"  p p . 1049- 
1055. In  th e ir  s tu d y , m onthly r e tu rn s  fo r  168 m onths from J a n u a ry  
1959 to  O ctober 1972 of a sample of 217 U .S . firm s a re  em ployed. 
T he 217 firm s a re  ra n k e d  acco rd in g  to  th e i r  d e g re e  of m ulti­
n a tio n a lity  ( ra tio  of fo re ig n  sales to to ta l sales re p o r te d  in 1973 by  
S ta n d a rd  and  P oor's  "T he O utlook") an d  th e n  c lass ified  in to  ten  
g ro u p s . F u rth e rm o re , th e ir  model is
Rjt = “j + Pjm Rmt + Pjk Rkt + zjt
M M JV
w here  R, . = R . - of - R „ t .k t  w t wm wm mt
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estim ated , re sp ec tiv e ly  b y  re g re s s in g  time se rie s  of 168 m onthly 
r e tu rn s  on th e  CRSP v a lu e-w eig h ted  m onthly m ark e t in d ex  and  th e  
w orld  m ark e t in d ex  o v e r th e  p e rio d  of Ja n u a ry  1965 to  Decem ber 
1978. S im ilarly , p̂ w an d  fo r each firm a re  also estim ated . To
AS A
te s t  d iffe ren ces  in p an d  p .  among g ro u p s , fo u r  te s ts  a re  p e r -W Q
form ed: th e  ANOVA, th e  W ilcoxon-signed ra n k  te s t ,  the  m edian te s t  
and  th e  K ruskal-W allis te s t .  F u rth e rm o re , seco n d -s tag e  c ro s s -s e c ­
tiona l re g re ss io n s  on th e  r is k  p a ram e te rs  of all firm s a re  perform ed  
to  te s t  th e  re la tio n sh ip  betw een  a firm 's  dom estic ( P ^ )  and  in te r ­
n a tio n a l (P^w) dep en d en ce  and  its  d eg ree  of m ultinationality  (M j). 
T he following re g re ss io n s  a re  f it te d :
Piw = aj + b j Mi + pi ( 5 1 3 )
h d  "  aj + b j Mi + Mi ( 5 -14)
Em pirical R esu lts  and  Im plications
A A
T able  9 p re s e n ts  th e  va lues fo r  Pw and  p^ b a sed  on th e  fu ll
2
168-m onth p e rio d  fo r  each  g ro u p . F -v a lu e s  and  R a re  also
re p o r te d . When all firm s a re  b ro k en  down in to  two sam ples, p^ of
dom estic firm s ten d s  to be la rg e r  th an  th a t of MNCs. F u rth e rm o re ,
2 2 R of MNCs is la rg e r  th an  R of dom estic firm s, w hich in d ica tes
th a t  th e  tw o -fac to r m ark e t model has more ex p lan a to ry  pow er fo r
MNCs th an  fo r  dom estic firm s. T h is  re la tio n sh ip  holds co n sis ten tly
w hen all firm s a re  c lass ified  in to  fo u r  g ro u p s  in w hich th e  f i r s t
g ro u p  h as  th e  h ig h e s t d eg ree  of fo re ig n  involvem ent: T he g re a te r
fo re ig n  involvem ent of a firm , th e  m ore dependence  on in te rn a tio n a l
fa c to rs  an d  th e  le ss  re lian ce  on p u re  dom estic fa c to rs . A lso, the
TABLE 9




a Pw Pd PR>F R2






























T his te s t  employs the  value-w eigh ted  m onthly CRSP m arket in d ex . Similar re su lts  
a re  found  w ith the  equal-w eigh ted  m onthly CRSP m arket in d ex .
The fig u re s  in p a ren th ese s  a re  t-v a lu e s .
^ S ig n if ic a n t  a t th e  0.01 level. 102
TABLE 10




MEAN ANOVA WILCOXON MEDIAN K-W
MNC DC
A
p-K1W 135 1.21 1.08 F=16. 74*=* Z=3.88*^ CHISQ=11.27** CH ISQ =12.53^
A
Pid 135 0.98 1.23 F=17.21** Z=-3.78** CHISQ=12.08*=* CHISQ=15.21**
♦♦Significant a t th e  0.01 level. 
K-W denotes K ruskal-W allis te s t .
TABLE 11
MEAN VALUE OF RISK PARAMETERS AND TEST STATISTICS
BY GROUPS
MEAN
No. of G1 G2 G3 G4 ANOVA WILCOXON MEDIAN K-W




CO. 1.24 1.19 1.12 1.07 F=7.49** N/A CHISQ=14.21** CHISQ=18.39**
Pid 0.94 1.00 1.19 1.240 F=8.27** N/A CHISQ=15.33** CHISQ=19.27**
^ S ig n if ic a n t  a t th e  0.01 level. 
K-W deno tes K ruskal-W allis te s t .
h1O
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ex p lan a to ry  pow er of th e  model is  th e  la rg e s t  w hen app lied  to the  
g ro u p  w ith th e  g re a te s t  fo re ig n  involvem ent and  th e  low est w hen it  
app lied  to the  g ro u p  w ith  th e  low est fo re ig n  involvem ent. S ig ­
n ificance  te s ts  a re  p erfo rm ed  b y  ap p ly in g  th e  th re e  te s ts  on the  
estim ates of th e  r is k  p a ram ete r of each firm . Table 10 and  11 
re p o r t  te s t  s ta t is t ic s  fo r th e  tw o-classifica tion  case and  th e  fo u r-  
c lassification  case , re sp e c tiv e ly . All te s t  s ta t is t ic s  can re jec t th e  
n u ll h y p o th esis  of no s ig n ifican t d iffe ren ces  in  r is k  p a ram ete rs  
among g ro u p s  a t th e  0.01 level. T h is re s u lt  is com pared w ith the  
re s u l t  of a s ign ificance  te s t  em ploying Eq. (5 .1 3 ) and  (5 .1 4 ) . The 
estim ates of p a ram ete rs  a re  re p o r te d  in  T able 12 fo r two sep a ra te
a
re g re ss io n  lin e s , re sp e c tiv e ly . As h y p o th esized , th e  b is positive  
(0 .295 ) and  s ig n ifican tly  d if fe re n t from zero  while th e  b is 
n eg a tiv e  (-0 .2 1 3 ) an d  s ig n ifican tly  le ss  th an  zero .
T he o v era ll r e s u lt  is c o n s is te n t w ith th e  em pirical fin d in g s  
o f Agmon and L e s sa rd , who employ a d iffe re n t tw o -fac to r m arket 
model and  a d iffe re n t time p e rio d . F u rth e rm o re , th e  o v era ll re s u lt  
ho lds co n s is ten tly  w ith th e  eq u al-w eig h ted  CRSP m onthly m arke t 
in d e x . T he re s u lts  su p p o r t th e  h y p o th esis  th a t  th e  m arket 
recogn izes the  m u ltina tionality  of a firm  as well as th e  d eg ree  of its  
fo re ig n  involvem ent. F u rth e rm o re , th e se  re s u lts  also in d ica te  th a t  
a  firm  w ithout in te rn a tio n a l d ivers ifica tio n  of o p e ra tio n s  is  re la ted  to 
th e  in te rn a tio n a l fa c to r  s ig n ifican tly  in  add ition  to th e  p u re  dom estic
TABLE 12
RELATIONSHIP OF FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT AND RISK PARAMETERS
Num ber of A O




(4 .9 2 )
0.0001 0.091
N um ber of A * O
Model Firms a b ' PR>F R2





** S ign ifican t a t th e  0.01 level.
T he fig u res  in  p a re n th ese s  denote t-v a lu e s .
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34fa c to r . A fa irly  s tro n g  co-m ovem ent of th e  U .S . m ark e t index  
an d  th e  w orld m ark e t in d ex  may explain  th e  s ig n ifican t dependence  
of dom estic firm s on th e  in te rn a tio n a l fa c to r.
D . E ven t A nalyses
In  th is  sec tio n , re s id u a l an alyses a re  employed to m easure  
th e  e ffec ts  of ch an g es  in governm en ta l policies th a t  a re  su p p o sed  to 
h ave  im pacts on MNCs. Specifically , reac tio n s  of th e  U .S . stock  
m ark e t to two ty p e s  of re g u la to ry  decisions by  the  U .S . governm ent 
a re  exam ined to in fe r  w h e th e r th e  m arke t recogn izes m ultinationality  
of a firm  and  rew ard s  th e  d iv ers ifica tio n  se rv ice s  by  MNCs. The 
f i r s t  e v en t is  th e  im position of th e  in te re s t  equalization  ta x  on 
p u rc h a se  of fo re ig n  se c u ritie s  th a t  took place in Ju ly , 1963. The 
second  is th e  m andato ry  co n tro l on fo re ig n  d ire c t in vestm en t by 
U .S . firm s in J a n u a ry , 1968.
E v en t D escrip tion
(1 ) T he In te re s t  E qualization  T ax
On Ju ly  18, 1963, P re s id e n t K ennedy in  a specia l m essage 
to C o n g re ss , re q u e s te d  a spec ia l ta x  on th e  p u rc h a se  of fo re ign  
s e c u ritie s  b y  U .S . in v e s to rs  from fo re ig n e rs  an d  on long-term  
len d in g  to  fo re ig n e rs . T h is re q u e s t  sp ec ified  a 15% ta x  on 
th e  value  of fo re ig n  s to ck s  p u rc h a se d  by  U .S . in v e s to rs  from
34T he co rre la tio n  coeffic ien t be tw een  th e  va lu e-w eig h ted  
CRSP m ark e t in d ex  an d  th e  w orld m ark e t in d ex  is  0.922 d u rin g  the  
time p e rio d  of 1965 to 1978. With th e  eq u al w eigh ted  CRSP 
m ark e t in d e x , th e  w orld  m arke t in d e x  has th e  co rre la tio n  coffic ien t 
of 0.787 d u r in g  th e  same p e rio d .
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fo re ig n e rs  an d  a s lid in g -sca le  ta x , ra n g in g  from 2.75% to  15% on
Am erican p u rc h a se s  of fo re ig n  d eb t sec u ritie s  w ith a t le a s t a
th re e -y e a r  te rm . T he 15% ta x  was in c re ase d  to  18.5% in  A u g u st 
351967. T he p u rp o se  of th e  ta x  was to  c u rb  th e  outflow  of long­
term  p r iv a te  cap ita l in  o rd e r  to  red u ce  th e  co n tinu ing  balance of 
paym ents  d e fic its  th a t  th e  U .S . had  ex p erien ced  from th e  early  
1960s. T he tax  was in ten d ed  to equalize th e  d iffe ren tia l betw een 
bo rro w in g  costs  in  fo re ig n  co u n trie s  and  th o se  in  th e  U .S . th ro u g h  
flo ta tion  of bond  o r s to ck  in  th e  U .S . c ap ita l m ark e t, th e re b y  
d isco u rag in g  fo re ig n e rs  from is su in g  se c u ritie s  in th e  U .S . cap ita l 
m ark e t. As a r e s u l t ,  tra d e s  in fo re ig n  s to ck s  and  bonds in the  
U .S . cap ita l m ark e t w ere sh a rp ly  re d u c e d . T he ta x  was ex p ec ted  
to be harm fu l to  in te rn a tio n a lly  o r ie n te d  in d iv id u a l in v e s to rs  and  
in s titu tio n s  u n le ss  fo re ig n  b o rro w ers  w ere w illing to  pay  h ig h e r 
r e tu r n s  to  com pensate fo r  th e  ta x . F or exam ple, E dw ard A. 
M erkle, P re s id e n t of th e  M adison F u n d  c h a rg ed  th e  law "sto p s  the
35T he following tab le  tra c e s  th e  evolu tion  of th e  tax  ra te :
From To Tax ra te
7/19/63  1/25/67  15%
8/26 /67  8 /29 /67  22.5%
8/30 /67  4 /04 /69  18.75%
4 /0 5 /6 9  12/31/73 11.25%
1/01/74  1 /28 /74  3.75%
1/29/74  Elim inated
S o u rce : R . S h o h e t, " In v e s tin g  in  F ore ign  S e c u r it ie s ,"  p .  71. F o r
m ore d e ta ils  ab o u t th e  ta x , see  Wall S tre e t  J o u rn a l, 
"K ennedy A sks T ax on F o re ig n -S to ck  B u y in g  and  on Long 
Term  L end ing  to  F o re ig n e rs ,"  Ju ly  19, 9163, p . 4.
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36flow of free  commerce, w hich is  w rong to do an y tim e ."  T ra n s ­
ac tions in  C anadian and  c e r ta in  o th e r  sec u ritie s  as well as fo reign  
d ire c t in v estm en t by  U .S . firm s w ere n o t su b jec t to th is  law. This 
law was e ffec tiv e  on b o th  th e  NYSE and  th e  AMEX on A u g u st 19, 
1963 and  was abo lished  in  J a n u a ry  1974.
T h is  re g u la to ry  decision p rac tica lly  p ro h ib ited  U .S . 
in v e s to rs  from in te rn a tio n a l portfo lio  d iv e rs ifica tio n . For domestic 
firm s, th is  ta x  is n o t e x p ec ted  to have  had  any  d ire c t im pact and  
all in d ire c t im plications of i t  shou ld  be re fle c ted  in a  m ark e t ra te  of 
r e tu r n .  T he Dow Jo n es  in d u s tr ia l  av erag e  declined  3 .82  p o in ts  to 
close a t 695.50 on Ju ly  19, a f te r  th e  announcem ent of th e  ta x , 
w hich can  be re g a rd e d  as a s lig h t decline. H ow ever, fo r  MNCs, if 
th ey  could p ro v id e  d iv e rs ifica tio n  se rv ice  to  in v e s to rs , th e  im posi­
tion of a tax  on in te rn a tio n a l portfo lio  in v estm en t made in v e s to rs  
a p p re c ia te  m ore th e  MNCs' d iv e rs ifica tio n  se rv ic e . T h e re fo re , they  
would be w illing to p u rc h a se  MNCs' sh a re s  as s u b s ti tu te s  fo r in te r ­
n a tio n a l portfo lio  d iv e rs ifica tio n  and  th u s  b o ost th e  p ric e  of MNCs' 
s h a re s . T h u s  i t  is ex p ec ted  th a t  if th e  d iv e rs ifica tio n  se rv ice  
ex is ted  an d  was valuab le  to  in v e s to rs , m ark e t reac tio n  tow ard  MNCs 
with re s p e c t to th e  in te re s t  equalization  ta x  would be favo rab le  
w hile no p a r tic u la r  reac tio n  would o ccu r fo r dom estic firm s. The 
n e c e ssa ry  condition  fo r  th e  above h y p o th es is  is th a t  th e  m arke t 
m ust recogn ize  m ultina tiona lity  of a firm . T h u s , we employ a n o th e r
^ T he Wall S tre e t  J o u rn a l , "U .S . T ra d in g  in F oreign  S tocks 
an d  B onds Seen B ein g  C u t S h a rp ly  by  K ennedy P lan ,"  Ju ly  19, 
1963, p . 3.
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e v en t from w hich a d ire c t te s t  re g a rd in g  th e  m ark e t recogn ition  of 
th e  m ultina tiona lity  of a firm  can be pe rfo rm ed .
(2 ) F oreign  D irec t In v estm en t Program
On Ja n u a ry  2, 1968, P re s id e n t Jo h n so n  p laced  m andatory  
lim its on o v e rsea s  in v estm en ts  by  U .S . firm s. T h u s , fo re ig n  d irec t 
in v estm en t was su b jec t to t ig h t m andato ry  con tro ls  as p a r t  of a 
s tr in g e n t  new crackdow n on th e  U .S . w orsen ing  balance of p a y ­
m ents d e fic its . In  1965, v o lu n ta ry  con tro ls  on new fo re ign  d ire c t 
in v estm en t by  U .S . firm s w ere im posed, and  th e se  w ere followed by 
th is  m andato ry  co n tro l as the  U .S . balance of paym ents d e fic its  was 
n o t im proved . T h is program  also in c luded  low ering  of th e  s till-  
v o lu n ta ry  ceilings on b an k  len d in g  to fo re ig n e rs  and  p ro p o sa ls  of 
leg isla tion  to  re s tra in  to u r is t  tra v e l ab ro ad  an d  ex p ed ite  th e  r e tu rn  
of fo re ig n  p ro f its . T h is  program  also in c lu d ed  p rov isions fo r  more 
financ ia l a ids fo r  e x p o r te r s . T he main e ffec ts  of th is  con tro l on 
MNCs shown on th e  Wall S tre e t Jo u rn a l on J a n u a ry  2, 1968 a re  as 
fo llow s.
1) U .S . com panies a re  fo rb id d en  to  m ake "any new cap ita l 
outflow s" fo r  d ire c t in vestm en t in  th e ir  su b s id ia rie s  in 
w este rn  E urope (e x c ep t in G reece an d  F in land ) and  in 
m ost o th e r  developed  n a tio n s . H ow ever, com panies a re  
p e rm itted  to  re in v e s t annually  from fo re ig n  ea rn in g s  up  
to  35% of th e ir  av erag e  to ta l in v estm en t (of fu n d s  from 
th e  U .S . and  re in v e s te d  e a rn in g s )  d u r in g  1965 and  
1966.
I l l
2) The do llars th a t  may be s e n t from th e  U .S . w hen added  
to  th e  re in v e s te d  earn ing 's  in le ss-d ev e lo p ed  c o u n tr ie s , 
can n o t p ro d u ce  a to ta l th a t  exceeds in any  one y e a r  
110% of th e  com pany 's av erag e  in v estm en ts  in  the  
c o u n trie s  in  th e  1965-1966 b ase  p e rio d .
3) C anada, J a p a n , A u stra lia , B rita in  and  o il-p ro d u cin g  
n a tio n s  a re  tre a te d  se p a ra te ly . In  th e se  n a tio n s , a 
U .S . com pany 's new cap ita l t r a n s fe rs  from d ire c t in v e s t­
m en t, to g e th e r  w ith re in v estm en t e a rn in g s , is lim ited to 
65% of th e  av e rag e  of su ch  in v estm en t in  1965-1966.
4) Each d ire c t- in v e s to r  company m ust r e tu rn  to th e  U .S . 
a t  le a s t once a y e a r  a sh a re  of i ts  fo re ig n  e a rn in g s . 
T he am ount is eq u a l to th e  g re a te r  of:
a )  T he same p e rc e n ta g e  of i ts  sh a re  of to ta l e a rn in g s  
from  th e  th re e  a re a s  as i t  re p a tr ia te d  d u rin g  
1964-1966 o r
b )  As m uch of i ts  sh a re  of e a rn in g s  as may exceed  th e  
lim its s e t fo r  cap ita l t ra n s fe rs  in  each g ro u p .
I t  was e x p ec ted  th a t  th e  d ire c t in v e s to rs  a ffec ted  would be defined
as a com pany o r  in d iv idua l in  th e  U .S . which owned o r a cq u ired  an
in te re s t  of 10% o r m ore of th e  ea rn in g s  o r  c ap ita l of a fo reign  
37b u s in e ss  v e n tu re . O bv iously , th is  re g u la to ry  decision is 
37T his is th e  opinion of M r. T ro w b rid g e , Commerce 
S e c re ta ry  a t  th a t  tim e, e x p re s se d  in  th e  Wall S tre e t  Jo u rn a l 
"P re s id e n t A ct to  N arrow  Paym ents G ap: B an k e rs  A re C ritica l,
In d u s tr ia lis ts  W ary," p .  3 on J a n u a ry  2, 1968. T he above d e sc r ip ­
tion  of th e  main e ffec ts  is also e x p re sse d  in th a t  Wall S tre e t 
J o u rn a l .
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e x p ec te d  to have  an ad v e rse  e ffec t on MNCs. H ow ever, to  dom estic 
f irm s, th is  p rogram  was benefic ia l since  i t  also con ta ined  o th e r  
e ffo rts  su ch  as s tre n g th e n in g  th e  v o lu n ta ry  p rog ram  of w ag e-p rice  
r e s t r a in t ,  u rg in g  o th e r  n a tio n s  to ease  tax  an d  o th e r  b a r r ie r s  to 
U .S . im ports and  a ttra c t in g  more fo re ig n  v is ito rs  an d  in v estm en t. 
F u rth e rm o re , r e s t r a in ts  on fo re ig n  len d in g  b y  U .S . b an k s he lped  
U .S . firm s ob ta in  fu n d s  from U .S . so u rces  m ore easily . T h u s , i t  
is ex p ec ted  th a t  m arke t re sp o n ses  to th is  re g u la to ry  decision would 
be s ig n ifican tly  d iffe ren t betw een MNCs an d  dom estic firm s, if  the  
m ark e t recogn izes th e  m ultina tionality  of a firm . MNCs a re
e x p ec ted  to h ave  n eg a tiv e  a re sp o n se  w hile dom estic firm s a re  
e x p ec ted  to h ave  a p ositive  one.
M ethodology and  P ro ced u re
T he e v en t re s id u a l analy sis  re q u ire s  an equ ilib rium  model of 
a firm 's  ex p ec ted  ra te  of r e tu r n .  In  th is  s tu d y , th e  m arke t model 
is  assum ed to be well spec ified .
* i t  = “ i + P i Rmt  + £i t  ( 5 1 5 )
w here  R^t  = r e tu r n  on a sse t i a t time t
Rmt = r e tu rn  on th e  m ark e t portfo lio  a t  time t  ( th e  
v a lu e-w eig h ted  CRSP m onthly  m ark e t in d e x .)
Uj = COV(5i t . Rmt)/V arW mt)
“ i =
Ej = a random  d is tu rb a n c e  w ith  th e  following sto ch astic  
p ro p e rtie s  
E (e .t ) = 0
IS/
E (e. , e . .)  = a., fo r  all s=t
1 1 a#d  fo r  all i and  j
= 0 , o th e rw ise .
If m onthly r e tu rn s  a re  s ta tio n a ry  w ith a m ultivaria te  norm al d is -
38tr ib u tio n  and  seria lly  u n c o rre la te d , th e  equation  is ju s tif ie d . 
Note th a t  th e  m ark e t model is  a s ta tis tic a l s ta tem en t r a th e r  th an  one 
d e riv ed  from fin an c ia l th e o ry . T his model is estim ated  o u ts id e  of 
th e  ev en t p e rio d  and  th e  fo re c a s t e r ro r s  of the  model d u rin g  the  
e v e n t p e rio d  se rv e  as a p ro x y  fo r e v e n t- re la te d  abnorm al p e r ­
fo rm ance, w hich re p re s e n ts  m arke t reac tion  to th e  ev en t. 
S pecifically , abnorm al r e tu r n s ,  e^ ,  a re  calcu la ted  fo r  stock  j on 
m onth t  as the  d iffe ren ce  betw een th e  ac tu a l r e tu rn  on m onth t  and  
th e  r e tu rn  p re d ic te d  from th e  m arke t model.
A A A
£.. = R-. - (a . + B. R .)it  i t  i r i m t '
w here  t  deno tes th e  m onth re la tiv e  to announcem ents of e v en ts .
ss A
T h e re  a re  two problem s in estim ating  p a ram ete rs  a. and  p^. F ir s t ,  
if  th e  e v en t in fluences r e tu r n s ,  th e  estim ates will be  b ia sed . 
S econd ly , if  th e  e v e n t a lte rs  th e  t ru e  p a ram ete rs  of E q. (5 .1 5 ) ,
O Q
Evidence of th e  approx im ate  norm ality  of m onthly r e tu rn s  
is g iven  b y  B la ttb e rg  an d  G onedes, an d  Fama. For m ore d e ta ils , 
see R . C . B la ttb e rg  and  N. J .  G onedes, "A Com parison of the  
S tab le  an d  S tu d e n t D is trib u tio n s  as S ta tis tic a l Models fo r  S tock 
P r ic e s ,"  Jo u rn a l of B u s in e s s , p p . 244-280, S ep tem ber, 1974 and  E. 
F . Fam a, Foundation  of F inance (New Y ork: B asic B ooks, 1976),
c h . 1.
estim ates of th e  abnorm al com ponent of r e tu r n s ,  e ^ ,  will be b iased
in  th e  opposite  d ire c tio n . To elim inate th e se  so u rces  of b ia s , a
39p ro c e d u re  su g g e s te d  by  R uback  is em ployed. D efin ing  AM as th e
A
announcem ent m onth , one s e t  of p a ram ete rs  b efo re  th e  e v e n t, or^
A
an d  is estim ated  b a sed  on d a ta  from AM-65 m onths to AM-6
A
m on th s . A second  s e t  of p a ram ete rs  a f te r  th e  e v e n t, a ^  and  p^a is 
estim ated  u s in g  th e  60 m onths b eg in n in g  6 m onths a f te r  AM (from  
AM+6 m onths to  AM+65 m o n th s ) . A bnorm al r e tu rn s  a re  ca lcu la ted  
b y :
Ei t  = Ri t  -  <“ ib  + *ib Rm t) fo r  1 ^  AM
A A
= R .+ - (a . + p. R +) fo r  t  > AMit   ̂ ia Mia mt
F o r each  m onth t  w ith in  th e  in te rv a l of 6 m onths p r io r  to 
and  6 m onths a f te r  AM, th e  p red ic tio n  e r ro r s  a re  av erag ed  across  
o b se rv a tio n  to  ob ta in  th e  av e rag e  re s id u a l, ARt  as:
- N ~
ARt = ^  Z ei t , t  = - 6 , -5 ,  -0 , +1, +2, . . . .  +6
w here  N = num b er of o b se rv a tio n s  (f irm s) .
T h ese  m onthly  a v e rag e  re s id u a ls  a re  summed o v e r e v en t 
time to  ob ta in  cum ulative av e rag e  re s id u a ls  fo r  each of th e  13 
m onths su rro u n d in g  AM.
OQ
R. S. R u b ack , "T he E ffect of D isc re tio n a ry  P rice  C ontro l 
D ecisions on E qu ity  V a lu es ,"  Jo u rn a l of F inancia l Econom ics, p p . 
83-105, M arch, 1982.
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6
CAR a a = I  AR.
“6 >6 t =-6  1
If  no u n u su a l p r ic e  m ovem ents s u r ro u n d  th e  announcem ent m onth , 
b o th  th e  ARt  an d  CARt shou ld  f lu c tu a te  random ly ab o u t z e ro . Any 
sign ifican t dev iation  from zero  will re f le c t p a r t ic u la r  e ffec ts  of the  
e v e n t. Com parisons of bo th  ARt  an d  CARt betw een MNCs and
dom estic firm s (o r  am ong th e  fo u r  g ro u p s  Gl, G2, G3 an d  G4)
would in d ica te  w h e th e r system atic  d iffe ren ces  e x is t .
C lassifica tion  of Samples
T he c lassifica tion  of two sam ples o r  fo u r g ro u p s  a re  based
solely on th e  d a ta  on th e  d e g re e  of fo re ig n  involvem ent (a  ra tio  of
fo re ig n  e a rn in g s  to to ta l e a rn in g s )  in 1965 p u b lish ed  b y  B ru ck  and  
40L ees. T he d eg ree  of fo re ig n  involvem ent of each firm  is assum ed
to h av e  been  th is  same value  in  1963 and  in  1968 w hen th e  two
e v en ts  took p lace , re sp e c tiv e ly . T able 13 shows the  num ber of 
firm s in  each c lassifica tion  and  th e  ra n g e  of fo re ig n  involvem ent. 
H ow ever, fo r  th e  t e s t s ,  some firm s a re  d e le ted  due to th e  lack  of 
co n tinuous m onthly ra te s  of r e tu rn  d a ta .
S ta tis tic a l S ignificance T e s t 
S ta tis tic a l s ig n ifican ce  of th e  abnorm al perfo rm ance is 
a s s e s se d  by  c o n s tru c tin g  t - s ta t i s t ic s  fo r  th e  AR and  th e  CAR o v e r 
an  in te rv a l of e v e n t- re la te d  tim e. H ow ever, in  th is  s tu d y , 
th e  s e c u r itie s  of th e  sam ple ex p e rien ced  an  e v en t d u r in g  th e  same







of Firm s , 
F ir s t  E ven t
2
Second E ven t Involvem ent
TUTKT/"* G1 44 44 44 o v e r 25%IVUN L , G2 91 77 87 10%-25%
n r G3 25 23 25 0%-10%J J U G4 110 83 100 0%
t i r s t  E ven t den o tes  th e  In te re s t  E qualization T ax .
Second E ven t deno tes th e  F oreign  D irec t In v estm en t Program .
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ca len d a r tim e. I t  is  ex p ec ted  th a t  ev en ts  su ch  as governm ent 
reg u la tio n s  would a ffec t a g ro u p  of s e c u ritie s ' p ric e s  simul­
ta n eo u s ly . T he so called  "ev e n t m onth c lu s te r in g "  h as  im plications 
fo r  s ta tis tic a l s ign ificance  te s t s .  As Brown and  W arner w a rn , in 
th e  announcem ent m onth (AM ), m any sec u ritie s  a re  c o rre la te d , th u s  
th e  m ark e t model re s id u a ls  (e^t ) a re  positive ly  c o rre la ted  across
se c u ritie s  in  ca len d a r tim e. C o n seq u en tly , th e  v a rian ce  of th e  AR^
41in c re a se s  an d  h en ce  th e  pow er of th e  t - t e s t  will be re d u c e d .
Two m ethodologies a re  em ployed in  o rd e r  to avoid b ias in
*v
th e  t - t e s t  due to  c ro ss -se c tio n a l dependence  of e ^  in th e  AM. 
F i r s t ,  th re e  nonp aram etric  te s ts  th a t  make le ss  re s tr ic t iv e  assum p­
tions th a n  th e  t - t e s t  a re  em ployed: th e  Wilcoxon s ig n ed  ra n k  te s t ,
th e  m edian te s t  an d  th e  K ruskal-W allis t e s t s . T hese  te s ts  a re  
p e rfo rm ed  to exam ine w h e th e r th e re  a re  s ig n ific an t d iffe ren ces  in 
AR^ and  CAR^. betw een MNCs and  dom estic firm s o r among fo u r 
g ro u p s  from AM-6 m onths to  AM+6 m onths. Second, a modified 
t - t e s t  is  u sed  in  w hich th e  s ta n d a rd  dev iations of AR and  CAR are  
o b ta in ed  b a se d  on th e  d a ta  60 m onths p r io r  to AM-6  m onths. The 
m odified t-v a lu e  is  ca lcu la ted  as follows: F i r s t ,  th e  av erag e  sample
re s id u a ls  an d  th e  cum ulative re s id u a ls  in th e  exam ining p eriod  
(AM-6  m onths th ro u g h  AM+6 m onths) a re  g iven  b y :
41S. B row n an d  J .  W arner, "M easuring  S ecu rity  P rice  P e r­
fo rm an ce ,"  Jo u rn a l of F inancia l Econom ics, p p . 205-258, S ep tem ber, 
1980.
w here  NS is th e  num b er of firm s in  each sam ple. F o r estim ating
th e  v a riab ility  of ARgt an d  CARg t , ARg and  CARg a re  ca lcu la ted
42once again  fo r  each of 60 m onths b e fo re  t .
1 NS -
AR t = —  2 £-e> I  = t-6 0 , . . . .  t -1
^ NS i=l 6
and  CARg^ = I  A R ^ ,  |  = t-6 0 , . . . ,  t -1
w here  NS is  th e  num b er of firm s in each sam ple. T h en , th e  
s ta n d a rd  d ev ia tions of ARg|  and  CARg£ a re  calcu la ted  re sp ec tiv e ly  
a s :
Sg(A R |)  = V ( 1 /K - l )  [ARg^ - (1 /K ) ARs ^ ]2 
Sg(C A R |)  = 7  ( 1 /K - l )  2.g [CARs |  - (1 /K ) 2  ̂ CAR^ ] 2 
w here  K = 60 fo r  £ -  t  -6 0 , . . .  t -1 .
T hese  s ta t is t ic s  s e rv e  as p ro x ie s  fo r  th e  s ta n d a rd  dev iations of 
ARs t an d  CARg t , re sp e c tiv e ly . C o n seq u en tly , a d ju s ted  t - s ta t is t ic s  
a re  g iven  b y :
42 ~T he p a ra m e te rs , a. an d  0. fo r  £.«. a re  estim ated  b a sed  on
d a ta  from  t-120  m onths th ro u g h  t-61 m oirths. S ev era l firm s a re




t s (A Rt ) = ARs t /S s (A R ^)- VK
1
t s (CARt ) = CARs t / S g(C A R ^)- VK .
M easurem ent of Perform ance 
Two m ethods a re  em ployed to m easure  the  perform ance of 
each sample fo r  two p e rio d s  a ro u n d  th e  AM. Let Ml denote  th e  
p r io r  p e rio d  (AM-6 m onths th ro u g h  AM) and  M2 denote  th e  p o s t 
p e rio d  (AM+1 m onth th ro u g h  AM+6 m o n th s ) . T he f i r s t  te s t  s ta t is tic  
is  calcu la ted  as follows: At f i r s t  a s tan d a rd iz e d  av erag e  re s id u a l is
ca lcu la ted  fo r each sam ple.
= ARS/ SS<AV
I t  is assum ed th a t  Qgt a re  iden tically  d is tr ib u te d  in d ep en d en t 
random  v a riab les  from a t-d is tr ib u tio n  w ith K d eg ree  o f freedom . 
F ina lly , the  te s t  s ta tis tic  fo r  each p e rio d  is the  ra tio  of th e  sam ple 
mean of Qgt to th e  s ta n d a rd  dev iation  of th is  sample m ean, which is
g iven  b y :
I M Qs t /NM *M Qs t  P = — st  _ m s t for M=F} L
a a M Qs t / NM>
w here  F and  L a re  th e  f i r s t  an d  la s t  c a len d a r m onths re sp ec tiv e ly
an d  NM is th e  num b er of m onths in  th e  p e rio d . Note th a t
43a (Q g t) = 1 due to  th e  s tan d a rd iz a tio n .
43A sim ilar te s t  s ta t is t ic  is em ployed by  A harony and  
S w ary . F o r m ore d e ta ils , see  J .  A harony an d  I .  S w ary , "E ffects of 
th e  1970 B ank H olding Company A ct: E vidence from C apital
M ark e ts ,"  Jo u rn a l of F in an ce , p p . 841-853, S ep tem ber, 1981.
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The second te s t  s ta t is t ic  is  a m easu re  by  th e  portfo lio
44m ethod of te s t in g  fo r th e  perfo rm ance  o f two d iffe re n t sam ples of
s e c u r it ie s . F o r each sam ple, 27 portfo lios a re  c o n s tru c te d
~ 45acco rd in g  to fb. Portfolio re s id u a ls , ARpt  a re  ca lcu la ted  as an 
eq u a lly -w eig h ted  av e rag es  of th e  AR^. in  th a t  po rtfo lio . T w en ty - 
seven  ARpt of th e  sample of dom estic firm s a re  em ployed as ARp t of 
a co n tro l sam ple. L e t's  in tro d u ce  a v a ria b le , D pt > w hich is  the  
d iffe ren ce  betw een  ARj^  and  A R^^, w here A R ^  is th e  ARpt  of
A
MNCs while A R ^t  is th e  ARpt  of dom estic firm s. Dpt  is th e  p o r t­
folio re s id u a l d iffe ren ce  d u rin g  th e  exam ining p e rio d . T he portfo lio
te s t  s ta t is t ic  is  d e riv ed  acco rd in g  to th e  following p ro c e d u re : In
o rd e r  to s tan d a rd iz e  D pt , the  s ta n d a rd  dev iation  of Dpt  is  m easured  
b y :
S p (D p^) = J  ( 1 /K - l )  [Dp | - ( l / K ) Z |  Dp | ] 2
w here  K = 60 fo r  |  = t-6 0 , . . . ,  t -1 
T he s ta n d a rd iz e d  portfo lio  re s id u a l is th u s  g iven  by :
V  ■ V W > '
Sim ilar p ro c e d u re s  a re  u sed  by  J a f fe , M andelker and  
W einstein. F o r m ore d e ta ils , see  J .  J a f fe , "T he E ffect of R egula­
tion C hanges on In s id e r  T ra d in g ,"  Bell Jo u rn a l of Economics and 
M anagem ent S c ien ce , p p . 93-121, S p r in g , 1974; M andelker, "R isk 
an d  R e tu rn : T he C ase of M erging F irm s,"  p p . 303-335; an d  M.
W einstein , "The E ffect of R atin g  C hange A nnouncem ent on Bond 
P r ic e ,"  Jo u rn a l of F inancial Econom ics, p p . 329-350, D ecem ber, 
1977.
45 .T he  num ber of firm s fo r  each portfo lio  is  sometimes d if­
f e re n t  (3 , 4 , o r  5) since  th e  num ber of firm s fo r each  sam ple is 
d i f f e r e n t .
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U n d er th e  nu ll h y p o th e s is  of no d iffe ren ce  in  perform ance betw een
two sam ples, E [F p t ]=0. I t  is  also assum ed th a t  th e  F a re
id en tica lly  d is tr ib u te d  in d e p en d e n t d raw ings from a t-d is tr ib u tio n
w ith K d e g re e s  of freedom . N ex t, av erag e  s ta n d a rd iz e d  re s id u a l
d iffe re n c e s , SF. a re  com puted as follows: F i r s t ,  th e  mean of F .
_ NP
is  ca lcu la ted  as Ft = ( l/N P )  I  Fpj-, w here NP is th e  num ber of p o r t ­
folios (27 p o rtfo lio s ) . Now, SF^ is m easured  by
SFt  = F t / ( 1 /  VNP)
SFt  is ex p ec ted  to  be  d raw n from a t-d is tr ib u tio n  w ith  (K -l)M
d e g re e s  of freedom  (1593 d e g re e s  of freedom ). I t  is  ex p ec ted  th a t
SFt  h as  a s ta n d a rd  norm al d is tr ib u tio n  since  (K -l)M  is la rg e .
F in a lly , th e  cum ulative portfo lio  t  s ta t is t ic s  a re  ca lcu la ted  fo r  the
p e rio d  of Ml an d  fo r  th e  p e rio d  of M2 re sp ec tiv e ly . F o r 7 m onths
from AM-6 m onths to  AM,
 _______  AM
CSF, = ( 1 /  V"NM) [ I  SF.]
1 t=AM-6 1
w here  C SFj is th e  cum ulative portfo lio  t  s ta t is t ic  fo r  th e  M l. 
S im ilarly , CSFg is m easu red  fo r M2. T he te s t  s ta t is tic s  will ind ica te  
w h e th e r th e  d iffe ren ces  in  abnorm al r e tu rn s  fo r th e  exam ining time 
p e rio d  a re  s ig n ifican tly  d iffe re n t from zero .
Em pirical R esu lts  
(T h e  In te r e s t  E qualization T ax )
T he abnorm al perfo rm ance of s to ck s  on m onths re la tiv e  to
th e  announcem ent m onth of th e  In te r e s t  E qualization T ax  is  exam ined,
an d  T able 14 re p o r ts  th e  AR^ and  CARt of th e  sample of MNCs and  
of th e  sam ple of dom estic firm s and  c o rre sp o n d in g  t-v a lu e s .
F ig u re s  3 and  4 show th e  ARt and  CARt of MNCs an d  of domestic 
firm s. T he CAR of MNCs beg in s  a t 0.25% and  reach es  -1.26% by  
th e  announcem ent m onth . The CAR of MNCs declines f u r th e r  to 
-4.35% six  m onths la te r .  D uring  th is  13 m onth p e rio d , MNCs 
a p p e a r  to have  ex p erien ced  a 4.6% d ecrease  in  th e  CAR. H ow ever, 
th e  t  s ta t is t ic s  asso c ia ted  w ith ARt  and  CARt  show no sig n ifican t 
d ev iations from zero  d u rin g  th is  time p e rio d , w hich in d ica tes
random  m ovem ents of th e  AR .̂ and  th e  CAR^. In  p a r tic u la r , in the  
announcem ent m onth , th e  AR of MNCs is  neg a tiv e  b u t  in s ig n ifican tly  
d iffe re n t from z e ro , w hich te n d s  to re fu te  the  a rgum en t th a t m arket 
re sp o n se  to MNCs should  be favo rab le  if MNCs p ro v id e  d iv e rs ific a ­
tion se rv ice . If  MNCs had  p ro v id ed  d iv ers ifica tio n  s e rv ic e , one 
would have  no ticed  a s ig n ifican tly  p ositive  AR in  th e  announcem ent 
m onth an d  th e  CAR a f te r  th e  announcem ent m onth should  h ave  been  
p o s itiv e . The CAR of dom estic firm s beg in s  a t 3.47%, which is 
s ta tis tic a lly  d iffe re n t from zero  a t  the  0.01 level and  th en  declines 
to  2.53% in  th e  announcem ent m onth . D u rin g  th e  time p e rio d , th re e  
ARs of dom estic firm s a re  s ig n ifican tly  d iffe re n t from zero  a t th e  
0.01 lev e l. No p a r tic u la r  reaso n s o r  e v en ts  a re  found  w hich m ight 
exp lain  su ch  s ig n ifican t d ev ia tio n s. T he CAR in  th e  la s t  m onth is
n eg a tiv e  an d  in s ig n ifican tly  d iffe re n t from z e ro , w hich is sim ilar to
th e  f in d in g  fo r  MNCs. As shown by  Brown an d  W arner, th e  CARs 
fo r  a g iven  sample may ap p ea r to f lu c tu a te  g re a tly  from zero , even
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TABLE 14
ARt  AND CARt  AROUND THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF 
INTEREST EQUALIZATION TAX









AM-6 121 0.00256 0.00256 106 0.03466 0.03466
(0.3617) (0 .3617) (4.5213)** (4 .5213)* :
AM-5 121 0.00103 0.00259 106 0.01292 0.04758
(0.1479) (0 .1677) (1 .6468) (2 .0326)*
AM-4 121 -0.01226 -0.00867 106 -0.02429 0.02329
(-1 .7033) (-0 .3588) (-3 .1015)** (0.8243)
AM-3 121 -0.00440 -0.01306 106 -0.00559 0.01770
(-0 .5871) (-0 .4147) ( - 0 .6886) (0 .5535)
AM-2 121 0.00414 -0.00892 106 0.01380 0.03150
(0.5537) (-0 .2596) (1 .6964) (0.8481)
AM-1 121 0.00578 -0.00314 106 0.00206 0.03352
(0.7862) (-0 .0876) (0 .2649) (0.8243)
AM 121 -0.00947 -0.01261 106 -0.00826 0.02529
(-1 .4198) (-0 .3310) (-1 .1099) (0.5683)
AM+1 121 0.00065 -0.01196 106 -0.01678 0.00851
(0.0953) (-0 .2939) (-2 .1580)* (0.1763)
AM+2 121 -0.00938 -0.02134 106 -0.01234 -0.00383
(-1 .3633) (-0 .4 8 8 6 ) (-1 .6 6 8 5 ) (-0 .0 9 2 3 )
AM+3 121 -0.00505 -0.02639 106 -0.01375 -0.01758
(-0 .7 1 6 5 ) (-0 .5690) (-1 .8 1 1 8 ) (-0 .3 5 3 4 )
AM+4 121 -0.00375 -0.03015 106 0.00950 -0.00808
(-0 .6228) (-0 .6303) (1 .4415) (-0 .1356)
AM+5 121 -0.00907 -0.03921 106 -0.02905 -0.03714
(-1 .3 6 9 5 ) (-0 .7 8 7 1 ) (-4 .40449)**  (-0 .6 7 3 2 )
AM+6 121 -0.00431 -0.04352 106 -0.01004 -0.04718
(-0 .6 5 5 3 ) (-0 .8405) (-1 .4353) (-0 .8 3 2 2 )
AM in d ica tes  th e  announcem ent m onth . 
T he f ig u re s  in  p a re n th e se s  a re  t-v a lu e s . 
* S ig n ifican t a t  th e  0 ,05 level. 
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in  th e  ab sen ce  of abnorm al perfo rm ance. A ccord ing  to th e ir  sim ula­
tio n , b y  th e  end  of AM+10 m on ths, th e  0 .95  frac tile  of CARs tak es  
on a value of o v e r 9% an d  th e  0.05 frac tile  tak es  on a value of 
ab o u t -9% even  in  th e  ab sen ce  of abnorm al perfo rm ance. B ased  on 
th e  value of CARs in  AM+6 m onths and  co rre sp o n d in g  t - s ta t i s t ic s ,  
th e re  does n o t a p p ea r to be  any  abnorm al perform ance fo r th e  
MNCs o r th e  dom estic firm s. T his f in d in g  implies th a t  th e  In te re s t  
E qualization T ax  did  no t h ave  any s ig n ifican t e ffec t on th e  m arke t 
value of MNCs o r  dom estic firm s, which te n d s  to deny  th e  ex isten ce  
of a d iv e rs ifica tio n  se rv ic e . H ow ever, su ch  a re s u lt  could have 
h ap p en ed  because  th e  m ark e t d id  n o t recogn ize  th e  m ultina tionality  
of a firm .
T able  15 show s re s u lts  of th e  t - t e s t  and  th re e  non- 
param etric  te s ts  w ith  re sp e c t to  th e  n u ll h y p o th e sis  of no 
s ig n ifican t d iffe ren ces  in ARj. and  in CARt betw een MNCs and 
dom estic firm s. T hese  te s ts  a re  ex ten d ed  to  th e  fo u r c lassifications 
of firm s, and  re s u lts  a re  re p o rte d  in  Table 16. E xcep t fo r  ARs in 
th e  6 m onths p r io r  to AM, th e re  a re  no s ta tis tic a lly  s ig n ifican t 
d iffe ren ces  in AR^ betw een MNCs an d  dom estic firm s. T he AR a t 6 
m onths p r io r  to AM is s ig n ifican tly  d iffe ren ce  from zero  a t th e  0.01 
level. CARs a re  also  s ig n ifican tly  d if fe re n t u n til two m onths p r io r  
to AM, m ainly due to  th e  AR fo r  6 m onths p r io r  to  AM. H ow ever, 
a f te r  AM-2 m o n th s , no s ig n ific an t d iffe ren ces  a re  fo u n d . Table 16 
shows th a t  th e  ARs a t 6 m onths p r io r  to  AM a re  s till s ta tis tic a lly  
d iffe re n t from each o th e r ,  w hich im plies th a t  a firm with a h igh
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TABLE 15
TEST RESULTS OF DIFFERENCES IN ABNORMAL 
PERFORMANCE BETWEEN MNCs AND 
DOMESTIC FIRMS


























































* S ign ifican t a t th e  0 .05 level.
**Sign ifican t a t th e  0.01 level. 
K-W den o tes  K ruskal-W allis te s t .
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TABLE 16
TEST RESULTS OF DIFFERENCES IN ABNORMAL 
PERFORMANCE AMONG GROUPS
Month t-T e s t WILCOXON MEDIAN K-W
AR-6 N/A N/A CHISQ=17.48** CHISQ=19.14**
AR-4 N/A N/A CHISQ= 2.10 CHISQ= 2.49
AR-2 N/A N/A CHISQ= 2.65 CHISQ= 2.64
AR-0 N/A N/A CHISQ= 2.50 CHISQ= 0.36
AR+2 N/A N/A CHISQ= 0 .74 CHISQ= 0.26
AR+4 N/A N/A CHISQ= 2.09 CHISQ= 3 .42
AR+6 N/A N/A CHISQ= 3.14 CHISQ= 1.74
CAR-4 N/A N/A CHISQ= 2.49 CHISQ= 7.44
CAR-2 N/A N/A CHISQ= 5.08 CHISQ= 4 .80
CAR-0 N/A N/A CHISQ= 3.15 CHISQ= 3.99
CAR+2 N/A N/A CHISQ= 0.79 CHISQ= 0.85
CAR+4 N/A N/A CHISQ= 1.06 CHISQ= 0.79
CAR+6 N/A N/A CHISQ= 0.74 CHISQ= 0.38
N /A  in d ica tes  th a t  th is  te s t  is  n o t available fo r  fo u r c lass ifica tio n s. 
^ S ig n if ic a n t  a t th e  0.01 level.
K-W deno tes K ruskal-W allis te s t .
d eg ree  of m ultina tiona lity  ten d s  to  h av e  a low er AR th an  a firm  w ith 
a lower d eg ree  of fo re ig n  involvem ent. No m ore s ig n ifican t d if­
fe ren ces  in  e ith e r  AR o r  CAR a re  fo u n d . In  p a r t ic u la r ,  CARs a f te r  
AM+2 m onths a re  alm ost id en tica l among g ro u p s  re g a rd le ss  of th e  
m ultina tionality  of a firm . F ina lly , th e  o v era ll abnorm al p e r ­
form ances of MNCs and dom estic firm s fo r  two time p e rio d s  ( th e  
p r io r  announcem ent p e rio d  and  th e  p o s t announcem ent p e rio d ) a re  
re p o r te d  in  Table 17. T h is tab le  also con tains the  d iffe ren ces  in  
abnorm al perfo rm ance betw een  MNCs an d  dom estic firm s fo r two time 
p e rio d s . MNCs have  n eg ativ e  b u t  in s ig n ifican tly  d iffe ren t from zero  
P values fo r  b o th  p e rio d s  while dom estic firm s have  a p o sitiv e  P 
value (0 .1576) fo r  th e  p r io r  pe rio d  and  a n eg a tiv e  P value 
(-0 .5 1 0 0 ) fo r  th e  p o s t p e rio d . N e ith e r , how ever, is s ig n ifican tly  
d iffe re n t from zero . The s ta tis tic  fo r  th e  d iffe ren ce  in abnorm al 
perform ance (C SF ) fo r th e  p r io r  p e rio d  is  -0 .9783 and fo r th e  p o s t 
p e rio d  is  0.1742, which a re  n o t s ig n ifican tly  d iffe ren t from zero . 
T hese  re s u lts  in d ica te  th a t  no s ig n ifican tly  p o sitiv e  abnorm al p e r ­
form ance was rea lized  b y  sh a reh o ld e rs  of MNCs, w hich re je c ts  th e  
h y p o th esis  of th e  ex is ten ce  of d iv e rs ifica tio n  se rv ice . F u rth e rm o re , 
th e re  w ere no s ig n ific an t d iffe ren ces  in  abnorm al perfo rm ance 
betw een  MNCs and  dom estic firm , w hich m ight have  h ap p en ed  if 
MNCs h ad  p ro v id ed  d iv ers ifica tio n  se rv ic e . The re s u lts  also 




ABNORMAL PERFORMANCE STATISTICS 
(T h e  In te re s t  E qualization T ax )
Period P-V alue CSF
MNC DC
Ml -0.0918 0.1576 -0.9783
M2 -0.2441 -0.5100 -0.1742
Ml in d ica tes  th e  p r io r  time p e rio d  from AM-6 m onths 
to  AM.
M2 in d ica tes  th e -p o s t time p e rio d  from AM+1 m onths 
to AM+6 m onths.
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In  conclusion , th e  te s t  fa ils  to fin d  an announcem ent e ffec t 
of th e  In te re s t  E qualization T ax  on th e  value  of MNCs. F u r th e r ­
m ore, no p ositive  abnorm al perfo rm ance is  found  a f te r  the  
announcem ent m onth . More im p o rtan tly , no sig n ifican t d iffe ren ces  
in  abnorm al perfo rm ance a re  found  in  th e  announcem ent m onth and  
la te r .  T he o v era ll re s u lts  ten d  to su p p o rt th e  idea th a t th e  m arke t 
n e v e r  ex p ec ted  th e  In te re s t  Equalization tax  to be beneficia l to 
MNCs, even  th o u g h  it  should  have  been  benefic ia l if MNCs rea lly  
had  p ro v id ed  d iv ers ifica tio n  se rv ic e . T h e re fo re , th e  h y p o th e sis  of 
th e  ex is ten ce  of d iv e rs ifica tio n  se rv ice  seems to be re je c te d . 
H ow ever, th is  re s u l t  could o ccu r if th e re  was a d iversifica tion  
se rv ice  and  th e  m ark e t fa iled  to recogn ize  the  m ultina tionality  of a 
firm . T h u s , a re s id u a l analy sis  w ith re sp e c t to th e  m arke t 
recogn ition  of m ultina tionality  of a firm  will follow.
Em pirical R esu lt 
(T h e  F o reign  D irec t In v estm en t P rogram )
In  th is  t e s t ,  th e  m arke t recogn ition  of m ultina tionality  of a 
firm  is th e  c e n tra l is su e . S ince th e  F o re ign  D irec t In v estm en t 
P rogram  is ex p ec ted  to have  h ad  n eg a tiv e  im pacts on MNCs, th e  
m ark e t is  ex p ec ted  to have  re sp o n d ed  n eg ativ e ly  if i t  recogn ized  
th e  m ultina tionality  of a firm . H ow ever, from a macroeconomic p o in t 
of v iew , th is  p rogram  would su p p o sed ly  im prove defic its  in  th e  
balance of paym ents an d  help  U .S . firm s to ob ta in  fu n d s  m ore 
eas ily . F o r th e se  re a so n s , th e  n eg a tiv e  im pact on MNCs m ight have 
b een  m itiga ted . T h e re fo re , a p ro p e r  te s t  may be to  com pare 
abnorm al perfo rm ance betw een MNCs an d  dom estic firm s.
Table 18 re p o r ts  ARt> CARt  an d  co rre sp o n d in g  t-v a lu e s  of 
MNCs an d  dom estic firm s, w hile F ig u re s  5 an d  6 show ARt and  
CARt  of MNCs an d  dom estic firm s su rro u n d in g  th e  announcem ent 
m onth . In te re s t in g ly , in  th e  announcem ent m onth , th e  AR of 
dom estic firm s is  s ig n ific an tly  p o sitiv e  (2.32%) while th a t  of MNCs is 
n e g a tiv e  (-0.43% ) b u t  in s ig n ific an tly  d if fe re n t from z e ro . A sim ilar 
re s u l t  is  found  in  fo u r  m onths a f te r  th e  announcem ent. T he CARs 
of MNCs a re  n eg a tiv e  from AM-3 m onths th ro u g h  AM+6 m onths while 
th o se  of dom estic firm s tak e  on p o sitiv e  v a lues from AM th ro u g h  
AM+6 m on ths. In p a r t ic u la r ,  in th e  AM+4 m onth , th e  CAR of 
dom estic firm s reach es  4.07% an d  th a t  of MNCs declines to -2.37%, 
w hich re s u lts  in  a 6.44% d iffe ren ce  in  CA Rs. If  we only look a t th e  
AR of MNCs in  th e  AM, th e  announcem ent e ffec t is n o t s ta tis tic a lly  
s tro n g  enough  to  accep t th e  h y p o th e s is  of th e  m arke t recogn ition  of 
m ultina tiona lity  of a firm . B u t w hen th e  abnorm al perfo rm ance of 
MNCs is  com pared w ith th a t  of dom estic f irm s, i t  a p p ea rs  th a t  
m a rk e t re sp o n se s  a re  d if fe re n t be tw een  MNCs an d  dom estic firm s 
w ith re s p e c t to th e  fo re ig n  d ire c t in v estm en t p ro g ram . T he re su lts  
of s ta t is tic a l te s ts  re g a rd in g  d iffe ren ces  in abnorm al perfo rm ance 
betw een  th e  two sam ples an d  among fo u r  g ro u p s  a re  re p o r te d  in 
T ab le  19 an d  T able 20, re sp e c tiv e ly . T he te s t  re s u l ts  show th a t  in 
AM an d  AM+4 m o n th s , th e  ARs of MNCs a re  s ig n ifican tly  sm aller 
th an  th o se  of dom estic firm s. C o n seq u en tly , in  th e  AM+4 m onth , 
th e  CAR of MNCs is s ig n ific an tly  sm aller th an  th a t  of dom estic 
firm s. H ow ever, a t th e  en d  of th e  exam ining  p e rio d , no sig n ifican t
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TABLE 18
ARt  AND CARt AROUND THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE FOREIGN 
DIRECT INVESTMENT PROGRAM
Month MNC DC
N um ber of 
Firm s AR CAR
N um ber of 
Firm s AR CAR
AM-6 131 0.01335 0.01335 125 0.01230 0.01230
(1 .8583) (1 .8583) (1.4888) (1 .4888)
AM-5 131 0.00075 0.01409 125 0.00390 0.01620
(1.01069) (0 .6468) (0 .4772) (0.6472)
AM-4 131 -0.00322 0.01088 125 -0.01192 0.00428
(-0 .4779) (0 .5214) (-1 .5329) (0 .1165)
AM-3 131 -0.01510 -0.00423 125 -0.02006 -0.01578
(-2 .0519)* (-0 .0 2 5 9 ) (-2 .3772)* (-0 .4525)
AM-2 131 -0.01346 -0.01768 125 -0.00684 -0.02262
(-1 .8691) -0 .4125) (-0 .8195) (-0 .5729)
AM-1 131 0.00783 -0.00985 125 0.00997 -0.01265
(1 .1931) (-0 .3757) (1 .3478) (-0 .2491)
AM 131 -0.00435 -0.01421 125 0.02315 0.01050
(-0 .6 0 6 1 ) (-0 .4536) (2.7018)** (0.2116)
AM+1 131 -0.00648 -0.02069 125 0.00462 0.01512
(-0 .8947) (-0 .5715) (0 .5469) (0.3019)
AM+2 131 -0.01076 -0.03144 125 -0.01337 0.00175
(-1 .4787) (-0 .7 6 8 3 ) (-1 .7 0 6 4 ) (0 .0195)
AM+3 131 0.00865 -0.02280 125 0.01204 0.01379
(1.2781) (-0 .5 4 0 8 ) (1 .6057) (0 .2549)
AM+4 131 -0.00089 -0.02368 125 0.02689 0.04068
(-0 .1 4 1 8 ) (-0 .5 3 5 4 ) (3.7436)** (0.7683)
AM+5 131 -0.00412 -0.02780 125 -0.00913 0.03156
(-0 .6 9 4 8 ) (-0 .6061) (-1 .3 6 7 2 ) (0 .5520)
AM+6 131 -0.00541 -0.03221 125 -0.01542 0.01614
(-0 .8 0 4 8 ) (-0 .6 8 6 1 ) (-2 .0349)* (0.2737)
T he f ig u re s  in  p a re n th e se s  a re  t-v a lu e s . 
* S ig n ifican t a t  th e  0 .05  level. 
^ S ig n if ic a n t  a t th e  0.01 level.
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TABLE 19
TEST RESULTS OF DIFFERENCES IN ABNORMAL 
PERFORMANCE BETWEEN MNCs AND 
DOMESTIC FIRMS








Z = -2 .1395* 
Z = -0 .9912
CHISQ=0.14 
CHISQ=1.88 














































* S ig n ifican t a t th e  0 .05  level.
♦♦S ign ifican t a t th e  0.01 level. 
K-W den o tes  K ruskal-W allis te s t .
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TABLE 20
TEST RESULTS OF DIFFERENCES IN ABNORMAL 
PERFORMANCE AMONG GROUPS
Month t-T e s t WILCOXON MEDIAN K-W
AR-6 N/A N/A CHISQ=2.94 CHISQ=1.80
AR-4 N/A N/A CHISQ=3.17 CHISQ=6.64
AR-2 N/A N/A CHISQ=3.38 CHISQ=4.80
AR-0 N/A N /A CHISQ=12.06** CHISQ=10.74**
AR+2 N/A N/A CHISQ=1.96 CHISQ=0.55
AR+4 N/A N/A CHISQ=6.38* CHISQ=11.40**
AR+6 N/A N/A CHISQ=3.3 CHISQ=6.17
CAR-4 N/A N/A CHISQ=0.18 CHISQ=1.13
CAR-2 N /A N/A CHISQ=5.59 CHISQ=3.93
CAR-0 N/A N/A CHISQ=1.67 CHISQ=2.74
CAR+2 N/A N/A CHISQ=0.78 CHISQ=2.30
CAR+4 N/A N/A CHISQ=2.89 CHISQ=4.42
CAR+6 N/A N/A CHISQ=1.63 CHISQ=2.60
N/A  in d ica tes  th a t  th is  te s t  is n o t availab le . 
* S ig n ifican t a t th e  0.05 level.
^ S ig n if ic a n t  a t th e  0.01 level.
K-W deno tes K ruskal-W allis te s t .
d iffe ren ce  in  CARs is  fo u n d . When th e  te s ts  a re  app lied  to fo u r 
c la ss ific a tio n s , in  th e  AM and  AM+4 m onth , ARs a re  also s ig ­
n ifican tly  d iffe re n t from each  o th e r , w hich im plies th a t  a firm  with 
a h ig h  d eg ree  of fo re ig n  involvem ent te n d s  to  have  low er abnorm al 
p erfo rm ance  th a n  a firm  w ith  a sm aller d e g re e  of fo re ig n  invo lve­
m en t. No s ta tis tic a lly  d iffe re n t CARs among g ro u p s  a re  fo u n d . 
F in a lly , th e  o v era ll abnorm al p erfo rm ances of MNCs and  dom estic 
firm s fo r  two time p e rio d s  a re  re p o r te d  in  T able 21, to g e th e r  w ith 
th e  s ta t is t ic s  fo r  th e  d iffe ren ces  in abnorm al perfo rm ance betw een 
MNCs an d  dom estic firm s. F o r bo th  time p e r io d s , MNCs have 
n eg a tiv e  P v a lues w hile dom estic firm s have  p o sitiv e  P v a lu es . 
H ow ever, none of the  s ta t is tic s  a re  s ig n ifican tly  d iffe re n t from 
z ero . T he s ta tis tic  fo r  th e  d iffe ren ce  in abnorm al perform ance 
(C S F ) fo r  th e  p r io r  p e rio d  is -0 .8114 and  fo r th e  p o s t p e rio d  is 
-0 .9877 , w hich a re  c o n s is te n t w ith th e  h y p o th e s is  b u t  a re  too weak 
to  accep t th e  h y p o th e s is . T h is f in d in g  shows th a t  fo r  13 m onths 
a ro u n d  th e  announcem ent m onth of th e  fo re ig n  d ire c t in v estm en t 
p ro g ram , th e  abnorm al perfo rm ance of MNCs (CAR) is  in  g en era l 
n eg a tiv e  an d  sm aller th an  th a t  of dom estic firm s, w hich is p o sitiv e  
a f te r  th e  announcem ent. H ow ever, su ch  d iffe ren ces  in  abnorm al 
perfo rm ance a re  n o t s ta tis tic a lly  s ig n ific a n t.
To te s t  th e  e ffec t of firm  size  on th e  m ark e t reac tio n  to the  
announcem ent of th e  F oreign  D irec t In v es tm en t P rogram , th e  
m ark e t value of each firm  is  ca lcu la ted  em ploying 1967 d a ta . T hen
TABLE 21
ABNORMAL PERFORMANCE STATISTICS 
(THE FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT PROGRAM)
P-V alue
P eriod MNC DC CSF
Ml -0.1258 0.0587 -0.8114
M2 -0.1442 0.0436 -0.9877
Ml in d ica tes  th e  p r io r  time period  from AM-6 
m onths to AM.
M2 in d ica tes  th e  p o s t time p e rio d  from AM+1 month 
to AM+6 .
45th e  av erag e  v a lu es  of firm  size a re  calcu la ted  fo r  each g ro u p  and  
s ta tis tic a lly  com pared w ith  one a n o th e r . T he o v era ll re s u lts  a re  
v e ry  sim ilar to  th e  s ta t is tic s  re p o r te d  in T able 2 and  Table 3. To 
e lab o ra te , w hen all fo u r g ro u p s  a re  com pared w ith re sp e c t to  firm 
s ize , th e re  is a s ta tis tic a lly  s ig n ifican t d iffe ren ce  in  firm size among 
g ro u p s . H ow ever, w hen G4 is excluded  from th e  te s t s ,  no s ig ­
n ifican t d iffe ren ce  e x is ts  among g ro u p s . On th e  o th e r  h a n d , 
av e rag e  re s id u a ls  of each g ro u p  ex cep t fo r  G4, re p o rte d  in T able 
22 show a system atic  d escen d in g  o rd e r  of ARs as th e  d eg ree  of 
m u ltina tionality  of th e  g ro u p  in c re a se s . F u rth e rm o re , non-
p a ram etric  te s ts  show a s ig n ifican t d iffe ren ce  in ARs among th re e
47g ro u p s  (G l ,  G2 an d  G 3). H ow ever, no su ch  re la tio n sh ip  is found  
in  th e  th e  ARs of th e  f i r s t  e v en t. A more p rec ise  te s t  is p e r ­
form ed by  re g re s s in g  ARs of each firm a t th e  announcem ent month 
on th e  d eg ree  of m u ltina tionality  of th e  firm (M p and  on th e  size of 
th e  firm  (S p  re sp e c tiv e ly .
ARi = Y0 + Y1 Si + ei (5 .1 6 )
ARi = Y0 + Y1 Mi + ni  (5 .1 7 )
T able  23 re p o r ts  estim ates of coeffic ien ts fo r  and  Sj, re sp ec tiv e ly .
F u r th e rm o re , th re e  co rre la tio n  coeffic ien ts (P ea rso n , Spearm an and
AC
F o u r g ro u p s  a re  c lassified  b a sed  on th e  d eg ree  of m ulti­
n a tio n a lity  re p o r te d  in  1965 b y  B ru ck  an d  L ees. A m ore deta iled  
d e sc rip tio n  of th e  fo u r  g ro u p s  is  g iven  in  T ab le  13.
47T he m edian te s t  g ives a c h i-sq u a re  of 17.56 an d  the  
K ruskal-W allis te s t  p ro d u ces  a c h i-sq u a re  of 15.68. B oth te s ts  




AVERAGE RESIDUALS FOR EACH GROUP AT THE 
ANNOUNCEMENT MONTH
G1 G2 G3 G4
F ir s t -0.005174 -0.01193 -0.01037 -0.007671
Second -0.01594 0.00192 0.03389 0.02047
F ir s t  deno tes th e  ev en t of th e  In te re s t  E qualization  A ct.
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it m onth




(1 .9 3 )
-0 .0045
(-0 .9 5 )
0.3410 0.004
(5 .1 6 )
(5 .1 7 )
Model V V PR>F R2 jp e c tiv e ly .
5 .17
0.0428** 
( 6 . 66)
-0.2592**
(-7 .7 4 )
0.0001 0.192
rm an and
Size in  Eq. (5 .1 6 )  is d iv ided  by  1,000 million b efo re  ru n n in g  
th e  re g re s s io n .
Mj in  Eq. (5 .1 7 ) is em ployed as a p e rc e n ta g e .
** S ig n ifican t a t the  0.01 level.
of m ulti- 
e de tailed
5 and  th e  
3oth  te s t s  
g ro u p s  a t
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48K endall) a re  calcu la ted  betw een  AR. and  S. an d  betw een AR. and
1 1 1
Mj. Table 24 p re s e n ts  th e se  s ta t is t ic s .  T he te s t  s ta t is tic s  re p o rte d  
in  Table 23 and  24 su p p o rt th e  a rg u m en t th a t th e  d iffe ren ces  in  the  
av erag e  re s id u a ls  fo r  each g ro u p  o r each  firm a re  m ainly a t t r ib u ta ­
ble to th e  d iffe ren ces  in  th e  d eg ree  of m ultina tionality  of a firm . 
Specifically , as re p o rte d  in  T able 23, th e  coeffic ien t of ML is s ig ­
n ifican tly  sm aller th an  zero , while th e  coeffic ien t of Sj is n o t 
s ig n ifican tly  sm aller th an  zero . Also, T able 24 shows s ig n ifican tly  
(a t  th e  0.01 level) n eg a tiv e  co rre la tio n  coeffic ien ts betw een av erag e  
re s id u a ls  fo r  each firm  a t th e  announcem ent m onth and  th e  deg ree  
of m ultina tionality  of a firm . No sig n ifican t re la tio n sh ip s  a re  found 
betw een th e  av erag e  re s id u a l and  th e  size of a firm a t  th e  0.05 
le v e l.
F ina lly , in  an a ttem p t to  reaffirm  th e  m arke t recogn ition  of 
th e  m u ltina tionality  of a firm , av erag e  re s id u a ls  fo r MNCs a re  
calcu la ted  fo r  16 y ea rs  (1963-1978). F or each y e a r , 12 m onthly 
av erag e  re s id u a ls  s ta r t in g  from J a n u a ry  a re  ca lcu la ted  u s in g  th e  60 
m onths p r io r  to Ja n u a ry  fo r estim atin g  a . and  0.. S ix teen  av erag e  
re s id u a ls  ou t of 192 a re  s ig n ifican tly  d iffe re n t from zero  a t th e  0.01 
level and  4 of them a re  g re a te r  o r  le s s e r  th an  3%, re sp e c tiv e ly . In 
p a r tic u la r , th e  AR in  N ovem ber, 1973 w hen th e  oil em bargo c ris is  
o c cu rred  is -3.44% while th e  AR in  J a n u a ry , 1974 w hen th e  U .S . 
governm ent elim inated th e  re s tr ic t io n s  on fo re ig n  d ire c t in v estm en ts
43F o r a de ta iled  d iscu ssio n  of th e se  n o n -p a ra m e tn c  te s t s ,  
see E . L. Lehm ann, N o n p aram etrics : S ta tis tic a l M ethods B ased  on














T he f ig u re s  in p a re n th e se s  denote  th e  sign ificance 
p ro b ab ility  of th e  co rre la tio n s .
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b y  MNCs is 5.06%. O th e r s ig n ific an t ARs a re  m ainly a ffec ted  by  
th e  m ovem ent of fo re ig n  ex ch an g e  r a te s .  F o r exam ple, the  AR in 
O c to b e r, 1971 is  -2.54% w hich is m ainly a t tr ib u te d  to th e  su b s ta n tia l 
decline in  th e  v a lue  of th e  do lla r re la tiv e  to  m ajor c u r re n c ie s . 
T h ese  f in d in g s  seem to  re in fo rce  th e  a rg u m en t th a t  th e  m arke t 
co n sid e rs  th e  e ffec ts  of in te rn a tio n a l fa c to rs  fo r  the  s to ck  p ric e s  of 
MNCs.
T he o v e ra ll re s u lts  seem to su p p o r t  th e  a rgum en t th a t  the  
m ark e t reco g n izes  th e  m u ltina tiona lity  of a firm . T he m arke t ten d s  
to in te r p r e t  th e  fo re ig n  d ire c t in v estm en t p rogram  and  ev alu a te  its  
im pact on th e  value  of a firm  ta k in g  m ultina tionality  of a firm  in to  
co n sid e ra tio n . Even th o u g h  th e  s ta t is t ic s  fo r  abnorm al perform ance 
fo r  th e  time p e rio d  a ro u n d  th e  announcem ent show no sig n ifican t 
d iffe ren c e  fo r  MNCs and  dom estic firm s, th e ir  s igns a re  co n s is ten t 
w ith  th e  h y p o th e s is  of m arke t recogn ition  of m ultina tionality  of a 
firm . F u r th e rm o re , s ta t is tic a l te s ts  on ARs in  th e  announcem ent 
m onth s tro n g ly  in d ica te  th a t  abnorm al perfo rm ance d iffe rs  acco rd in g  
to  th e  d e g re e  of fo re ig n  invo lvem ent. Specifically , firm s w ith th e  
h ig h e s t  d eg ree  of m ultina tiona lity  su f fe re d  th e  m ost. Sim ilar re s u lts  
a re  found  w hen th e  eq u a l-w eig h ted  m onthly  m arke t in d ex  is 
em ployed.
Im plications
T o g e th e r  w ith  th e  f in d in g s  from th e  second  re s id u a l 
an a ly s is  th a t  in d ica te  th e  m ark e t reco gn ition  of m ultina tionality  of a 
firm , th e  f in d in g s  from th e  f i r s t  re s id u a l analy sis  may be a ttr ib u te d
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mainly to th e  a rg u m en t th a t  th e re  is no d iv ers ifica tio n  se rv ic e . 
T he In te re s t  E qualization T ax d id  no t seem to  a ffec t MNCs and  
dom estic firm s d if fe re n tly .
T he re s u l ts  th a t  su p p o rt th e  m ark e t recogn ition  of m ulti­
n a tio n a lity  of a firm  a re  c o n s is te n t w ith th e  fin d in g s  by  Agmon and
49 50L e ssa rd  and  B rew er and  M iller. H ow ever, as f a r  as the
ex isten ce  of d iv e rs ifica tio n  se rv ice  is  c o n ce rn ed , th e  re s u lts  of th is  
s tu d y  su p p o r t th e  a rg u m en t th a t  sh a res  o f MNCs a re  poor su b ­
s t i tu te s  fo r  in te rn a tio n a l p o rtfo lio s , which in d irec tly  su g g e s ts  th a t
51no b e n e fits  a re  ga in ed  b y  in v e s to rs  th ro u g h  MNCs. T h u s , the  
m otivation fo r  fo re ig n  d ire c t in v estm en ts  b y  MNCs in  o rd e r  to 
p ro v id e  d iv e rs ifica tio n  se rv ice  and  to red u ce  th e  co st of eq u ity
49Agmon an d  L e s sa rd , " In v e s to r  R ecogn ition ,"  p p . 1049-
1055.
50B rew er and  M iller, "E valuating  th e  P robab le  Im p ac ts ,"
p p . 53-65.
51Major s tu d ie s  su p p o rtin g  th is  a rg u m en t a re  Jacq u illa t and  
Solnik , "M ultinationals A re Poor T o o ls ,"  p p . 8-12 , B rew er, 
" In v e s to r  B e n e f its ,"  p p . 13-126, and  S enchack  and  B eed les, "Is 
In d ire c t  In te rn a tio n a l,"  p p . 49-57. Note th a t  each s tu d y  employed 
a d iffe re n t model an d  p ro c e d u re . On th e  o th e r  h a n d , th e  following 
s tu d ie s  te n d  to re fu te  th e  a rg u m en t th a t sh a re s  of MNCs a re  poor 
s u b s ti tu te s  fo r  th e  in te rn a tio n a l portfo lio  in v estm en t: Agmon and
L e ssa rd , " In v e s to r  R ecogn ition ,"  p p . 1049-1055, Mikhail and  
Shaw ky, "In v estm en t P e rfo rm an ce ,"  p p . 53-66, an d  A ggarw al, 
"M ultinationality  an d  S tock  M arket V a lu atio n ,"  M anagem ent I n te r ­
n a tiona l R eview , p p . 5 -21 , F e b ru a ry , 1979.
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seems to be too w eak to exp lain  fo re ig n  d ire c t in v estm en t. S ev era l
rea so n s  fo r  su ch  a n eg a tiv e  conclusion can be en u m era ted . F ir s t ,  
52as A dler n o te s , w hen MNCs have th e  same d eg ree  of d ifficu lty  in
d iv e rs ify in g  o p e ra tio n s  in te rn a tio n a lly  as in v e s to rs  would face  in
p ortfo lio  d iv e rs ific a tio n , no d iv ers ifica tio n  se rv ice  can e x is t .
F u r th e rm o re , th e  suboptim ality  of o p era tio n a l d iv e rs ifica tio n  is
ex p ec ted  to red u ce  th e  m agnitude  of the  d ivers ifica tio n  se rv ice .
T h is suboptim ality  may re s u l t  due  to the  non-com petitive  fo re ig n
53d ire c t in v estm en t m ark e t o r  o th e r  fa c to rs  which p re v e n t MNCs
from d iv e rs ify in g  o p e ra tio n s  on b eh alf of in v e s to rs . T hese  fa c to rs
may be  o th e r  m otivations fo r  fo re ig n  d ire c t in v estm en t, w hich a re
54d e riv ed  from im perfec t n a tiona l re a l a ss e t m ark e ts  an d  im perfec t 
fa c to rs  of p ro d u c tio n  m a r k e t s .^  T he po litical r is k  fa c to r and  tax
52A d le r, "T he C ost of C ap ita l,"  p p . 119-132.
53For m ore d e ta ils , see  Lee an d  S ach d ev a , "T he Role of 
M ultinational F irm ,"  p p . 479-491.
54The oligopolistic com petition th e o ry  s ta te s  th a t ,  in  some 
c a se s , MNCs in v e s t ab ro ad  only  fo r  th e  sake  of m ark e t sh a re  o r  a b ­
so lu te  sales g row th  re g a rd le s s  of p ro f it  p o ten tia l an d  r is k s  in  o rd e r  
to d e fen d  th e ir  dom estic m arke t sh a re  as well as th e ir  w orld m arke t 
s h a re . F o r m ore d iscussion  on th e  economic th e o ry  of fo re ig n  
d ire c t in v es tm en t, see G. R agazzi, "T heo ries  of th e  D e te rm in an ts ,"  
p p . 471-498 and  C . P . K in d le b e rg e r , Am erican B u sin e ss  A b ro a d : 
Six L ec tu res  on D irec t In v estm en t (New H aven: Yale U n iv e rs ity
P re s s , 1969).
55T he p ro d u c t cycle th e o ry  s u g g e s ts  th a t  as a p ro d u c t th a t  
developed  in  th e  m ost ad v an ced  c o u n try  m a tu re s , fo re ig n  d ire c t 
in v estm en t may b e  made in o rd e r  to  re locate  th e  p ro d u c tio n  p ro cess  
in a c o u n try  w ith a low er u n it  co st of p ro d u c tio n . F o r more 
d e ta ils , see  R . V ern o n , " In te rn a tio n a l In v es tm en t an d  In te rn a tio n a l 
T rad e  in  the  P ro d u c t C y c le ,"  Q u a rte r ly  Jo u rn a l of Econom ics, p p . 
190-207, May, 1966.
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fa c to r  may in d u ce  MNCs to  dev iate  from th e  optim al fo re ig n  d irec t
in v estm en t decisions th a t sa tis fy  th e  d ivers ifica tio n  d e s ire s  of
in v e s to rs . S econd, if  r isk y  a sse ts  a re  p ric e d  in te rn a tio n a lly  ( th e
in te g ra te d  p r ic in g  h y p o th e s is ) , any  sig n ifican t b en efits  to 
56in v e s to rs  a re  no t ex p ec ted  from sh a re s  of MNCs as well as from 
in te rn a tio n a l portfo lio  in v estm en t. In v e s to rs  may p u t  little  value on 
th e  d iv ers ifica tio n  se rv ice  on the  g ro u n d s  th a t  th e re  a re  o th e r  
a lte rn a tiv e s  fo r  re d u c in g  th e  r is k  of th e ir  portfo lios w ithin  a 
dom estic cap ita l m ark e t. L as tly , if th e  im position of th e  In te re s t  
E qualization  T ax was p re d ic te d  by  th e  m a rk e t, th e  e ffec t of th is  tax  
on th e  value  of MNCs a ro u n d  th e  announcem ent m onth m ight be 
re d u c e d .
If th e  sh a re s  of MNCs in d eed  p ro v id e  an in v e s to r  w ith the  
b en e fit from in te rn a tio n a l cap ita l m arke t im perfection  ( th e  d iv e rs i­
fica tion  s e rv ic e ) , an d  in v e s to rs  recognize th e  b e n e f it, one would 
ex p e c t sh a re s  of MNCs would be sold a t  a premium com pared to 
sh a re s  of dom estic firm s. T he premium shou ld  be ro u g h ly  equal to 
th e  add itiona l costs  in c u rre d  in  homemade in te rn a tio n a l p o rtfo lio s. 
U n fo rtu n a te ly , th is  c e n tra l is su e  of th e  s tu d y  is n o t su p p o rte d  
em p irica lly . Since th e  te s t  co n s is ten tly  p ro v id es  some ev idence 
su p p o r tin g  th e  m arke t recogn ition  of m ultina tionality  of a firm , 
q u e s tio n s  a rise  w ith re s p e c t to  th e  ex isten ce  of d iv e rsifica tion
56I t  is  s till  u n c lea r w h e th e r r is k y  a sse ts  a re  p ric ed  in te r ­
n a tiona lly  o r  dom estically . S teh le  shows some ev idence  th a t  n e ith e r  
p r ic in g  h y p o th esis  can be re je c te d  in  fa v o r of th e  o th e r . F o r more 
d e ta ils , see  S teh le , "An Em pirical T e s t of th e  A lte rn a tiv e  H ypo th ­
e s e s ,"  p p . 493-502.
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57se rv ice . As Eiteman and  S tonehill n o te , th e  fo re ig n  d ire c t 
in v estm en t decision re s u lts  from a complex decision p ro cess  
m otivated  by  s tra te g ic , b eh av io ra l, an d  economic co n sid era tio n s . 
One of th e  economic ra tio n a les  fo r  fo re ig n  d ire c t in v estm en t is  to 
p ro v id e  b e n e fits  from im perfec t in te rn a tio n a l cap ita l m arke ts  to 
sh a re h o ld e rs . T h is h y p o th es is  is re je c te d  by  th is  s tu d y . How­
e v e r ,  in v e s to rs  may h ave  the  o p p o rtu n ity  to c a p tu re  th e  b en efits  of 
im perfec tions in  the  m arke ts  fo r  rea l a sse ts  and  fac to rs  of p ro d u c ­
tion  p ro v id ed  b y  MNCs. MNCs may achieve a com petitive ad van tage  
o v e r  local fo re ign  firm s th ro u g h  fo re ig n  d ire c t in v estm en ts . T ech ­
nological su p e r io rity  o r  m anageria l e x p e r tise  may red u ce  labo r o r 
m ateria l c o s ts . F o re ig n  d ire c t in vestm en t may avoid o r  red u ce  
tra d e  b a r r ie r s  asso c ia ted  w ith dom estic m anufactu re  fo r  e x p o rt.
C O
W ansley, Lane and  Y ang fin d  some ex p ec ted  gains from in te r ­
na tiona l a cq u is itio n , even  th o u g h  th ese  gains a re  no t s ta tis tic a lly  
s ig n ific a n t.
57Eiteman an d  S toneh ill, "M ultinational B u sin ess  F in an ce ,"  
p p . 231-250.
58U nder the  assum ption  th a t  b id  prem ium s a re  a p ro x y  fo r 
ex p ec ted  gains in a m e rg e r, th e y  exam ine th e  m agnitude of 
abnorm al r e tu rn s  to U .S . a cq u ired  firm s in  fo re ign  an d  domestic 
m e rg e rs . Any s ig n ifican t d iffe ren ce  is im puted  to ex p ec ted  gains 
from in te rn a tio n a l d iv e rs ifica tio n . R esu lts  in d ica te  th a t  a lthough  
d iffe ren ces  ap p ea r to e x is t ,  th e se  d iffe ren ces  a re  in s ig n ifican t when 
m ethod of paym ent an d  m erg e r ty p e  a re  co n sid e red . F o r more 
d e ta ils , see J .  W. W ansley, W. R. Lane and  H. C. Y ang, "S h a re ­
h o ld e r R e tu rn s  to  USA A cqu ired  Firm s in  F ore ign  and  Domestic 




T he lack  of d a ta  on fo re ig n  com panies limits th e  scope of 
th e  te s ts  fo r  the  h y p o th esis  of d iv e rs ifica tio n  se rv ice  to th e  U .S . 
b a se d  MNCs and  dom estic firm s. T h u s , any  re s u lts  from th is  s tu d y  
shou ld  be  accep ted  as a p a r tia l conclusion fo r U .S . b a sed  MNCs. 
An ex ten tio n  of th e  d a ta  in c lu d in g  fo re ig n  MNCs seems to  be  a 
p ro p e r  s tep  fo r  f u r th e r  re s e a rc h .
Em pirical te s ts  employed in  th is  s tu d y  a re  su b jec t to  some 
critic ism s. F i r s t ,  th e se  te s ts  b ased  on specific  p r ic in g  models ( th e  
dom estic CAPM an d  th e  in te rn a tio n a l tw o -fac to r m arke t model) may 
b e  b iased  due to  th e  u se  of a m arke t in d ex  p ro x y  in s te ad  of the  
t ru e  m arke t p o rtfo lio , which is u n o b se rv ab le . S econd, in th e  ev en t 
an a ly se s , th e  c lu s te r in g  problem  ten d s  to re d u c e  th e  c red ib ility  of 
th e  te s t  re s u l ts .  T he av erag e  p red ic tio n  e r ro r s  in  the  exam ining 
p e rio d  a p p e a r  to have  f i r s t - o r d e r  au to co rre la tio n  even  th o u g h  th ey  
a re  n o t s ig n ifican tly  a u to co rre la te d . T his problem  may be due to 
th e  au to co rre la tio n  of m onthly ra te s  of r e tu r n  w ith a common fa c to r 
s till e x is tin g  in  th e  p red ic tio n  e r r o r s .  Two a lte rn a tiv e  m ethods can 
be su g g e s te d  to  elim inate a p a t te rn  of th e  p red ic tio n  e r r o r s .  F ir s t ,  
fo r  the  estim ation o f re g re ss io n  p a ram ete rs  in  th e  m arke t m odel, the  
Seem ingly U n re la ted  R eg ress io n  (SUR) m ethod may be employed 
in s te a d  of th e  O rd in a ry  L east S q u are  (OLS) m ethod to c a p tu re  any 
co rre la tio n s  among re s id u a ls . H ow ever, since  a re g re ss io n  ( th e  
m ark e t m odel) fo r  each  firm  h as  th e  same in d e p en d e n t o b se rv a tio n , 
re g re ss io n  p a ram ete rs  from th e  SUR will be eq u iv a len t to th o se  from 
th e  OLS. S econd , th e  tw o -fac to r m arke t model can be employed to
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m easu re  p re d ic tio n  e r r o r s .  H ow ever, some problem s a rise  when the  
e v en ts  also a ffec t th e  in te rn a tio n a l fa c to r  in  th e  tw o -fac to r m arke t 
m odel. Abnorm al p re d ic tio n  e r ro r s  may d isap p e a r even  if th ey  e x is t 
w hen th e  e v en ts  a ffe c t th e  in te rn a tio n a l m ark e t index  p o s itiv e ly . 
On th e  o th e r  h a n d , w hen th e  e v en ts  have  a d v e rse  e ffec ts  on th e  
in te rn a tio n a l m ark e t in d e x , abnorm al p red ic tio n  e r ro rs  may ap p ea r 
even  if th e re  is  no abnorm al p e rfo rm an ce. In  o th e r  w o rd s , th e  
dom estic m ark e t model shou ld  be em ployed in  o rd e r  to m easure  
abnorm al p re d ic tio n  e r ro r s  due to fo re ig n -re la te d  e v e n ts .
F ina lly , exam ining th e  ra te s  of r e tu rn  of in te rn a tio n a l 
c lo sed -en d  fu n d s  a ro u n d  th e  announcem ent of th e  In te re s t  E qualiza­
tion T ax  A ct may p ro v id e  ev idence  re g a rd in g  d iv ers ifica tio n  se rv ice  
th ro u g h  a  fo re ig n  portfo lio  in v estm en t. Even if th is  s tu d y  does n o t 
su p p o r t  d iv e rs ifica tio n  se rv ice  th ro u g h  MNCs, in te rn a tio n a l closed- 
end  fu n d s  may p ro v id e  d iv ers ifica tio n  se rv ic e . H ow ever, th e  impli­
ca tions of th e  e v e n t w ith re s p e c t to in te rn a tio n a l c lo sed -en d  fu n d s  
a re  n o t co n clu siv e . T he e v en t may be  benefic ia l ow ing to th e  
p rev io u s  ho ld ing  of fo re ig n  sec u ritie s  while th e  ev en t may be  harm ­
fu l due  to th e  ad d itiona l ta x  on th e  p u rc h a se  of fo re ig n  se c u ritie s . 
Two in te rn a tio n a l c lo sed -en d  fu n d s  (ASA Limited and  E u ro fu n d ) 
th a t  h ave  su ffic ie n t d a ta  a re  availab le . In  add ition  to s ta tis tic a l 
problem s due to a small sam ple s ize , no p a r tic u la r  ev idence  is found  
to s u p p o r t  th e  h y p o th e s is  th a t  in te rn a tio n a l c lo sed -en d  fu n d s  
p ro v id e  d iv e rs ifica tio n  se rv ice .
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In conclusion , m uch w ork rem ains to  be  done b e fo re  the  
is su e  of d iv e rs ifica tio n  se rv ice  is em pirically  re so lv ed . H ow ever, 
any  b ias cau sed  b y  th e  above problem s seems n o t to be s tro n g  
enough  to re v e rs e  th e  o v era ll conclusions of th is  s tu d y .
CHAPTER 6
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS
T he e ffec ts  of o p e ra tio n a l d iv e rs ifica tio n  b y  a firm  on its  
va lue  and  sh a re h o ld e rs ' w ealth  a re  exam ined in th e  co n tex t of 
in te rn a tio n a l cap ita l m a rk e ts  an d  MNCs. T h e  h y p o th es is  of 
d iv e rs ifica tio n  se rv ice  by  MNCs is  m otivated  b y  in tro d u c in g  th re e  
to p ics : ( 1) th e  r is k  re d u c tio n  b e n e fits  of in te rn a tio n a l portfo lio
d iv e rs ifica tio n  assum ing  no re s tr ic tio n s  an d  no add itiona l c o s ts , ( 2) 
some b a r r ie r s ,  add itio n a l co s ts  an d  r is k s  th a t p re v e n t  U .S . 
in v e s to rs  from d iv e rs ify in g  th e ir  po rtfo lio  in te rn a tio n a lly , and  (3) 
th e  com plem entary re la tio n sh ip  betw een  fo re ig n  d ire c t in v estm en t 
and  in te rn a tio n a l portfo lio  in v e s tm en t, in  w hich MNCs perfo rm  th e  
u se fu l fu n c tio n  of m aking in v estm en t decisions on b eh alf of 
in v e s to rs  who h av e  some d iff icu lty  in  ach iev in g  a homemade in te r ­
n a tio n a l po rtfo lio .
A ssum ing e ffic ien t c ap ita l m ark e ts  in  w hich in v e s to rs  
recogn ize  th e  m ultina tiona lity  of a firm , th e  d iv e rs ifica tio n  s e rv ic e , 
if  it  e x is ts ,  is assum ed to be reco g n ized  an d  rew ard ed  by  
in v e s to rs . C o n seq u en tly , it  is  h y p o th e s ize d  th a t  re d u c in g  th e  cost 
of eq u ity  by  p ro v id in g  d iv e rs ifica tio n  se rv ice  may be a p u re ly  
fin an c ia l m otivation fo r  th e  fo re ig n  d ire c t in v estm en ts  by  MNCs. 
I t  is also p o in ted  o u t, h o w ev er, th a t  th e  com plem entary re la tio n sh ip
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may collapse o r  may be suboptim al if  MNCs have th e  same d eg ree  of 
d ifficu ltie s  in d iv e rs ify in g  o p e ra tio n s  in te rn a tio n a lly  as in v e s to rs  
would have  o r  if  th e  fo re ig n  d ire c t in v estm en t m arke t is a non­
com petitive m ark e t. F u rth e rm o re , it  is also em phasized th a t  any 
b e n e f its  from in te rn a tio n a l d iv e rs ifica tio n  in  portfo lio  o r  opera tion  
sho u ld  depend  on th e  p ric in g  h y p o th e s is . If  r isk y  a sse ts  a re  
p ric e d  in  an in te g ra te d  m anner, no m ore b en efits  a re  ex p ec ted  from 
th e se  in te rn a tio n a l d iv e rs if ic a tio n , in s te a d , only p u re  r is k  reduction  
is re a lized . T hese  top ics a re  d iscu ssed  in  C h ap te rs  2 and  3.
Since th e  m ark e t recogn ition  of m ultinationality  of a firm  is 
a n e c e s sa ry  condition fo r  v a lid a tin g  th e  h y p o th e sis  of d iversifica tion  
s e rv ic e , sev e ra l em pirical te s ts  on the  h y p o th esis  of m arket 
reco g n itio n  a re  pe rfo rm ed . F i r s t ,  in an a ttem p t to  exp lain  th e  low 
level of system atic  r is k  of MNCs in association  w ith the  dom estic 
m ark e t in d e x , th e  re g re ss io n  an a ly s is  em ployed e a rn in g s  v a riab ility  
as  an  ex p lan a to ry  v a riab le  shows th a t a firm  with low ea rn in g s  
v a ria b ility  te n d s  to have  low system atic  r is k  a sso c ia ted  w ith the  
dom estic m ark e t. S ince MNCs h av e  low er ea rn in g s  v a riab ility  th an  
dom estic firm s h a v e , i t  follows th a t  MNCs also have  low er system atic  
r is k .  T h is f in d in g  is in d ire c t ev idence  th a t  th e  m arke t recogn izes 
m ultina tiona lity  of a firm . T he v a lid ity  of system atic  r is k  of MNCs 
asso c ia ted  w ith th e  dom estic m ark e t as a re p re se n ta tiv e  system atic  
r is k  of a firm  is q u estio n ed  an d  exam ined. T h is q u estio n  is 
in te re s t in g  b ecause  p rev io u s  f in d in g s  s u p p o rtin g  abnorm al p e r ­
form ance from sh a re s  of MNCs a re  d ep en d en t on th e se  system atic
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r is k s  of MNCs. T e s t re s u lts  from th e  application  of the  domestic 
CAPM to th e  sample of MNCs an d  th e  sample of dom estic firm s show 
th a t  fo r  MNCs, th e  system atic  r is k  assoc ia ted  w ith th e  dom estic 
m ark e t does n o t re p re s e n t  a to ta l system atic  r is k . In s te a d , the  
dom estic system atic  r is k  c a p tu re s  only a p o rtio n  of th e  to ta l 
system atic  r is k  th a t  is su p p o sed  to be re la ted  to th e  ex p ec ted  ra te  
of r e tu r n .  T hese  re s u lts  a re  also in d ire c t ev idence th a t  th e  m arket 
recogn izes m ultina tionality  of a firm . Any em pirical fin d in g s  
re g a rd in g  abnorm al perform ance of sh a re s  of MNCs b ased  on such  
p a rtia l sy stem atic  r is k  m ust be  in te rp re te d  w ith g re a t cau tio n . A 
more d ire c t te s t  of th e  h y p o th esis  of m ark e t recogn ition  is p e r ­
form ed b y  em ploying a tw o -fac to r in te rn a tio n a l m arke t model. The 
re s u lt  su p p o rts  th e  h y p o th esis  th a t  the  g re a te r  the  fo re ig n  involve­
m ent of a firm , th e  more dependence  on the  in te rn a tio n a l m arket 
and  th e  less re liance  on th e  dom estic m ark e t. H ow ever, b ased  on 
te s ts  em ploying th e  tw o -fac to r in te rn a tio n a l CAPM, i t  is s till 
inconclusive  w h e th e r a d iv e rs ifica tio n  se rv ice  e x is ts . F ina lly , two 
re s id u a l an a ly ses  a re  p erfo rm ed  to te s t  th e  h y p o th esis  of m arket 
recogn ition  and  of th e  ex isten ce  of th e  d ivers ifica tio n  se rv ice . 
While th e  re s u lts  p ro v id e  some ev idence in fav o r of th e  m arket 
recogn ition  of m u ltina tionality  of a f irm , th e  h y p o th e s is  of the  
ex is ten ce  of a d iv e rs ifica tio n  se rv ice  is re je c te d . S ince th e  
n e c e ssa ry  condition of m arke t recogn ition  is  s a tis f ie d , th e  re jection  
of th e  h y p o th es is  is m ainly a t tr ib u te d  to th e  a rgum en t th a t  th e re  is 
no valuab le  d iv e rs ifica tio n  se rv ice  o r  th a t  th e  m arke t co n sid e rs  it of
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l i t t le  v a lu e . Two m ajor re a so n s  may be  reca lled  to  exp lain  the
re jec tio n  of th e  h y p o th e s is . T he suboptim ality  of o p era tio n al 
d iv e rs ifica tio n  may re s u l t  in no d iv e rs ifica tio n  s e rv ic e . S econd, if 
in v e s to rs  be lieve  th a t  r isk y  a sse ts  a re  p r ic e d  in te rn a tio n a lly , the  
d iv e rs ifica tio n  s e rv ic e , even  if i t  e x is ts  will h av e  little  v a lu e . 
U n fo rtu n a te ly , i t  is s till u n c le a r  w hich reaso n  is m ainly re sp o n sib le  
fo r  the  re jec tio n  of th e  h y p o th e s is . A m ore so p h is tica ted  in te rn a ­
tional p r ic in g  model would be a d esirab le  goal fo r  f u r th e r  re se a rc h  
on th is  top ic .
From a d iffe re n t p o in t of v iew , th is  s tu d y  p ro v id es  a d d i­
tional ev idence  on th e  ex is ten ce  of abnorm al perfo rm ance in the  
sh a re s  of MNCs, an is su e  th a t  h as  been  d eb a ted  fo r  th e  la s t 
decade . In  conclusion , th is  s tu d y  su p p o rts  th e  a rgum en t th a t  
p u rc h a s in g  th e  sh a re s  of MNCs is  a poor s u b s t i tu te  fo r  in te rn a tio n a l 
po rtfo lio  in v estm en t. F u rth e rm o re , i t  s u g g e s ts  th a t  th e  d iv e rs if ic a ­
tion se rv ice  m otive is too w eak to  be a financ ial ra tio n a le  beh in d  
fo re ig n  d ire c t in v estm en t, a t  le a s t among U .S . b a se d  m ultinational 
firm s. T he m otive fo r  fo re ig n  d ire c t in v estm en t in  im perfec t in te r ­
n a tio n a l c ap ita l m ark e ts  seems to  have  little  em pirical s u p p o r t . 
H ow ever, th is  r e s u l t  does n o t n e ce ssa rily  mean th a t  th e re  a re  no 
g a in s from in te rn a tio n a l d iv e rs ifica tio n  of o p e ra tio n s . Some gains 
may be rea lized  v ia  an im perfec t re a l a s s e t  m a rk e t o r  an im perfec t 
fa c to r  m ark e t.
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APPENDIX A
SOME ECONOMETRIC PROBLEMS DUE TO THE OMISSION 
OF A RELEVANT EXPLANATORY VARIABLE
G ibbons1 show s th a t  a fundam ental c lass of financ ial a s se t 
p ric in g  m odels h as  th e  following form :
E (V  = * o + |  Py Yj, i = 1, . . . .  N ( D
w here E (R ^ )  = ex p ec ted  r e tu rn  on th e  ith  a ss e t a t t .
Yq = a r is k - f re e  ra te  o r  th e  ex p ec ted  r e tu rn  on a ze ro -
b e ta  portfo lio .
p.. = a  m easure  of association  betw een th e  r e tu rn s  on
ij
s e c u rity  i and  th e  r e tu rn s  on a portfo lio  d esig n ed  
to hed g e  r is k  j .
Yj = a premium fo r r is k  j.
N = num ber of s e c u ritie s .
K = num ber of r is k s .
In te rn a tio n a lly , th is  re la tio n sh ip  inc ludes S teh le 's  tw o -fac to r in te r -
9
na tiona l CAPM. As f a r  as th e  m ultina tionality  of a firm  is
c o n ce rn ed , p .̂ a re  defined  as co v ariab ilitie s  betw een  th e  ith  firm ’s
r e tu rn s  an d  the  r a te s  of r e tu rn  on m arke t po rtfo lios in  th e  jth
c o u n try  in  w hich th e  firm has an o p era tio n al b a se . T h u s , th e  Yj
a re  r is k  prem ia asso c ia ted  w ith Pj in  th e  jth  c o u n try .
M. R . G ibbons, "M ultivariate  T e s ts  of F inancial M odels: A
New A p p ro ach ,"  Jo u rn a l of F inancial Econom ics, p p . 3-27 , M arch,
1982.
^S teh le , "An Em pirical T e s t of th e  A lte rn a tiv e  H y p o th e se s ,"  
p p . 493-502.
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Suppose th a t  fo r  MNCs, th e re  a re  a t le a s t two c o u n try -  
re la te d  r is k s  (dom estic  system atic  r is k  and  in te rn a tio n a l system atic  
r i s k )  in th e  ex  p o s t form of th e  a sse t p ric in g  model g iven  b y :
Rij = *0 + n  <*11 + <2 pi2 + zi t  (2 )
w here  = dom estic system atic  r is k  of a ss e t i.
Pi2 = in te rn a tio n a l system atic  r is k  of a s se t i.
= a random  d is tu rb a n ce  w ith th e  following sto ch astic  
p ro p e r t ie s .
E (z .)  = 01 M
E (z . , z .t ) = a., fo r  all s=t and
 ̂ J fo r  all i and  j
= 0 o th e rw ise .
Now assum e th a t  we estim ate th e  dom estic CAPM in s te ad  of 
eq uation  ( 2):
Rit = Y0 + Y1 Pi l  + e it
If  equation  (3 ) w ere c o rre c t and  once m easurem ent e r ro r s  in p ^  a re  
c o rre c te d , th e  le as t sq u a re  estim ato rs  of Vq an d  y^ would be 
u n b ia sed  an d  e ffic ien t. B u t if equation  (2 ) is c o rre c t fo r  MNCs, 
some problem s o ccu r to th e  le a s t sq u a re  estim ato rs  of y^ and  y^
A
from equation  (3 ) .  F o r y^, we have
Y2 ^ 2  “ ^ 1  + V2°2 (P  " Y0 + v2 ~ 20
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B u t from equation  (2 ) ,  we can see th a t ( R ^ R j .)  = ^ ( P ^ 'P p  +
Y2^ i 2- ^  + ( z i~z) so th a t  E (Y j) = V1+Y2 *D2i 
w here  D21 = Z(pn -p 1)(p i l -p 2>
« e u - P i ) 2
a
Sim ilarly , fo r  Yq we have
E (y0 ) = ECR-Yj Pj )̂ = Yq + Y ^  +
z l t  - u - z D‘ 
w h e re , D20 = P2 -
If Y2 i® d iffe re n t from zero , th e  le a s t sq u a re  estim ato r of y^ b ased
on th e  dom estic CAPM (e q . (3 ) )  will be b iased  u n le ss  D2  ̂ equals
zero . In  o th e r  w o rd s , p ^  and  p^2 shou ld  be u n c o rre la te d  in o rd e r
to  g e t an u n b ia sed  estim ato r of Yj- F u rth e rm o re , if  th e  co rre la tion
betw een p.. and  p 2̂ does n o t d isap p e a r as th e  sam ple size in c rease s
su ch  th a t
lim D91t*0 , 
n-*»
Ŷ  will also be  in c o n s is te n t. A lso, Yq will be  b ia sed  as long  as
^2 “ D 21 M 0
a
an d  Yq will be  in c o n s is te n t as long  as
lim (P9-D 91 {3, )^0 
n-*»
A
A nd if Y2 a n d D21 have th e  opposite  s ig n , th e  b ias of Yj will be
3
n e g a tiv e ; o th e rw ise , th e  b ias will be  p o s itiv e . We ex p ec t th a t
3T h is  d iscu ssio n  is heavily  b a se d  on th e  following books. J .  
K m enta, E lem ents of Econom etrics (New Y ork , Macmillan P u b lish in g , 
1971) an d  E . M alinvaud, S ta tis tic a l M ethods of Econom etrics 
(C h icago : R and McNally, 1966).
168
w hen p^2 *s system atic  r is k  asso c ia ted  w ith a p u re  in te rn a tio n a l
4 ~fa c to r , Dgj will be  n e g a tiv e  and  Y2 be p o sitiv e . T h u s , of
MNCs b ased  on th e  sing le  dom estic CAPM may be b iased  dow nw ard.
4
Agmon an d  L e ssa rd  show ev idence  th a t 0 ... and  p.„ a re  
n eg a tiv e ly  c o rre la te d . For more d e ta ils , see  Agmoii and  L e ssa rd , 




All p ric in g  models in tro d u c e d  in th is  s tu d y  re la te  th e  
e x -a n te  ex p ec ted  ra te  o f r e tu rn  on a r is k y  a s s e t  to i ts  e x -a n te  
covariances w ith g iven  fa c to rs . T h e re fo re , em pirical te s ts  of th e se  
models re q u ire  a h y p o th e s is  to  re la te  u n o b serv ab le  e x -a n te  ra te s  of 
r e tu rn  to o b se rv ab le  e x -p o s t ra te s  of r e tu r n .  The fa ir-gam e can 
be u sed  to re la te  th e  e x -a n te  m odels to th e  e x -p o s t m odels. How­
e v e r ,  r is k  v a riab les  can only be estim ated , u su a lly  b a sed  on m ark e t 
m odels (o n e -fa c to r dom estic m ark e t m odels). The estim ate o f r is k  
may be the  sum of th e  t ru e  value  and  a m easurem ent e r r o r .  T h u s , 
in  th e  sec o n d -s ta g e  re g re ss io n  an a ly s is , th e  o rd in a ry  le a s t sq u a re  
estim ate  of th e  risk -p rem ium  term  will be  in c o n s is te n t. M ethods 
su g g e s te d  to avoid the  problem s cau sed  b y  m easurem ent e r ro rs  
in c lu d e  th e  g ro u p in g  of o b se rv a tio n s  o r  th e  u se  of in s tru m en ta l 
v a ria b le s . S pecifically , portfo lios a re  u sed  r a th e r  th an  in d iv id u a l 
sec u ritie s  in th e  seco n d -s tag e  re g re s s io n . H ow ever g ro u p in g  
re d u c es  effic iency  in th e  te s t  and  su ch  loss in  effic iency  dep en d s 
on th e  w ithin g ro u p  v a ria tio n  of th e  in d e p en d e n t v a riab le . In  o th e r  
w o rd s , if th e  portfo lios con tain  m any s e c u r it ie s , th e  b e ta s  of th e
a
portfo lios (P p) will t>e more closely  c o n ce n tra te d  abou t one th an  
th o se  of in d iv id u a l sec u ritie s  ( p p .  C o n seq u en tly , we can ex p ec t to 
o b se rv e  only a na rro w  ran g e  of th e  e x p ec te d  r e tu r n - r i s k  re la ­
tio n sh ip  , which m eans th a t  em ploying po rtfo lio s in s te a d  of 
in d iv id u a l sec u ritie s  may re d u c e  th e  inform ation  ab o u t th e  ex p ec ted
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r e tu r n - r i s k  re la tio n sh ip  su b s ta n tia lly . Grouping: by  th e  size o f the  
in d e p e n d e n t v a riab le  will minimize th e  loss in  e ffic ien cy , which 
maximize the  betw een  g ro u p  v aria tio n  of th e  in d ep en d en t v a riab le . 
T h is is  done by  a llocating  se c u ritie s  to po rtfo lio s b ased  on a ra n k e d
5
value  of th e  estim ate of the  r is k .  H ow ever, Fama n o tes  th a t such  
a p ro c e d u re  could re s u l t  in  a " re g re ss io n  phenom enon," which 
cau se s  b u n ch in g  of p o sitiv e  an d  n eg a tiv e  m easurem ent e r ro r s  in 
estim ates  o f r is k  (po rtfo lio  b e ta s , pp) w ith in  po rtfo lio s . As a 
r e s u l t ,  th e  la rg e r  v a lues of B would te n d  to overestim ate  th e  tru e
r
pp and  v ice v e rs a . T he re g re ss io n  phenom enon can be avoided  by  
form ing po rtfo lio s  from  ra n k e d  p. calcu la ted  from d a ta  fo r  one time
A
p e rio d , b u t  th e  Pp fo r  c o rre sp o n d in g  po rtfo lio s  a re  com puted from
A
d a ta  of a su b se q u e n t p e rio d . T hese  Pp an d  ra te s  o f r e tu rn  on 
portfo lios a re  u sed  in th e  sec o n d -s ta g e  re g re ss io n  an a ly s is . F o r 
th e  s in g le -fa c to r  dom estic CAPM, th e  g ro u p in g  p ro c e d u re  is based  
on th e  system atic  r is k  of a s e c u rity  asso c ia ted  w ith a dom estic 
m ark e t. Note th a t  th is  p ro c e d u re  u se s  an in s tru m en ta l v a riab le
g
r a th e r  th a n  o b se rv ed  v a riab le  w ith e r r o r s .  S teh le no tes  th a t  if 
th e re  is a s tab le  re la tio n sh ip  betw een  th e  t ru e  value of the  
in d e p e n d e n t v a ria b le  an d  an in s tru m en ta l v a riab le  th a t  can be
C
E. F . Fam a, F oundation  of F inance (New Y ork: Basic
B ooks, 1976), C h. 9.
^R . E . S te h le , "T he V aluation of R isk  A sse ts  in  an I n te r ­
n a tio n a l C apital M arket: T h eo ry  an d  T e s ts ,"  U npub lished  P h .D .
D is se r ta tio n , S tan fo rd  U n iv e rs ity , 1976.
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id e n tif ie d , an d  th e  in s tru m e n t v a riab le  is u n c o rre la ted  in  th e  limit 
w ith bo th  th e  d is tu rb a n c e  term  of th e  o rig in a l re g re ss io n  an d  a 
m easurem ent e r r o r ,  th e  estim ate of th e  risk -p rem ium  term  will be 
c o n s is te n t. T he in s tru m e n ta l v a riab le  th a t  is sim ply an estim ate of 
Pj from th e  da ta  in th e  p rev io u s  time p erio d  will be h igh ly  co r­
re la te d  w ith an estim ate of p  ̂ in th e  te s t in g  time p e rio d , b u t can be 
o b se rv ed  in d ep en d en tly  of th e  estim ate of p^. G rouping  w ith an 
in s tru m en ta l v a riab le  is ad op ted  in  th is  s tu d y .
APPENDIX C
LISTING OF SAMPLE FIRMS
MNCs
A bbot L abora to ries  
A d d re sso g rap h  M ultigraph C orp . 
A llied Chem ical C orp .
Allis Chalm ers C orp .
Aluminum Company of America 
Am erican Can Co.
Am erican Cyanamid Co.
Am erican Home P ro d u c t C orp. 
Am erican Machine & F o u n d ry  Co. 
Am erican Metal Climax Inc . 
Am erican S ta n d a rd  In c .
A rc h e r D aniels M idland Co. 
A rm strong  C ork Co.
ASARCO In c .
B ea trice  Foods Co.
B end ix  C orp .
B lack & B eck er M anufactu ring  Co. 
B ordon In c .
B ris to l M yers Co.
B runsw ick  C orp .
B udd  Co.
B u rlin g to n  In d u s tr ie s  Inc. 
Cam pbell Soup Co.
C arborundum  Co.
C a te rp illa r  T ra c to r  Co.
C elanese C orp .
Champion S p a rk  P lug  Co. 
C hem etron C orp .
C h eseb ro u g h  Ponds Co.
Chicago Pneum atic Tool Co. 
C h ry s le r  C orp .
C ities S erv ice  Co.
C lark  Equipm ent Co.
Coca Cola Co.
C olgate Palmolive Co.
Com bustion E n g in eerin g  Inc . 
C o n tine tnal Can In c .
C o n tinen ta l Oil Co.
C rane  Co.
Crown C ork  & Seal In c .
D eer & Co.
Del Monte C orp .
Dow Chem ical Co.
D re ss e r  In d u s tr ie s ,  In c .
Du P ont E. I .  De Nemours & Co.
Eastm an Kodak Co.
Eaton C orp .
Em hart C orp .
Exxon C orp .
FMC C orp .
F ed e ra l Mogul C orp .
F ires to n e  T ire  & R u b b er Co.
F o rd  Motor Co.
G eneral Am erican T ra n sp o rta tio n  C orp . 
G eneral E lec tric  Co.
G eneral Foods Co.
G eneral Mills Inc .
G eneral M otors C o rp .
G eneral T elephone & E lec tron ics  C orp . 
G eneral T ire  & R u b b e r Co.
G illette Co.
Goodrich B . F . Co.
G oodyear T ire  & R u b b er Co.
Gulf Oil C orp .
Heinz H. J .  Co.
H ercu les In c .
Honeywell In c .
In g e rso ll R and Co.
In te rn a tio n a l B u sin ess  M achine C orp. 
In te rn a tio n a l H a rv e s te r  Co.
In te rn a tio n a l P ap e r Co.
In te rn a tio n a l T elephone & T e leg rap h  C orp . 
Jo h n s  Manville C orp .
Johnson  & Johnson  
Joy M anufac tu ring  Co.
Kellogg Co.
Kim berly C lark  C orp .
K oppers In c .
L ibby , McNeill & L ibby 
L itton  In d u s tr ie s  In c .
M allory P . R. & Co. In c .
M erck & Co. In c .
Miles L ab o ra to ries  In c .
M innesota M ining & M anufac tu ring  Co. 
Mobil Oil C orp .
M onsanto Co.
N ational B iscu it Co.
N ational C ash R e g is te r  Co.
N orton  Co.
Olin M athieson Chem ical C orp .
Owens C orn ing  F ib e rg las  C orp .
Owens Illinois In c .
P en n sa lt Chem icals C orp .
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P epsi Co. In c .
Pet In c .
P fize r Inc .
P helps Dodge C orp .
Philip M orris C orp .
Phillips Petroleum  Co.
P illsb u ry  Co.
P ro c to r & Gamble Co.
Q uaker O ats Co.
Radio C orpora tion  of America 
R alston  P u rin a  Co.
R aytheon  Co.
Revlon In c .
R eynolds M etals Co.
R ichardson  M errell In c .
Rohn & H ass Co.
SCM C orp .
S t. R egis P ap e r Co.
S ch e rin g  P lough C orp .
S co tt P a p e r Co.
Scovill M anufacturing  Co.
Simmons Co.
Smith Kline & F ren ch  L abora to ries  
S p e rry  R and C orp .
S ta n d a rd  B ran d s  In c .
S ta n d a rd  Oil Co, of C alifornia 
S ta n d a rd  Oil Co. (In d ian a )
S ta n d a rd  Oil Co. (New J e r s e y )
S te rlin g  D rug  Inc .
Sunbeam  C orp .
TRW In c .
Texaco Inc .
T exas In s tru m e n ts  Inc .
Tim ken R oller B ea rin g  Co.
Union C arb ide  C orp .
UNIROYAL In c .
U nited M erchants & M anufac tu ring  In c . 
U nited  Shoe M achinery C orp .
U pjohn Co.
W arner L am bert P harm aceutical Co. 
W estinghouse E lec tric  C orp.
W rigley W. M. J r .  Co.
Domestic Firms
A C F In d u s tr ie s  In c .
A ir P ro d u c ts  & Chem icals Inc . 
AIRCO In c .
AKZONA In c .
A llegheny Ludlum In d u s tr ie s  Inc . 
Allied P ro d u c ts  C orp .
Ambac In d u s tr ie s  In c .
Amerace C orp .
Am erada H ess C orp .
A m erican B ak eries  Co.
A m star C orp .
A m sted In d u s tr ie s  In c .
A nchor H ocking C orp .
A rm strong  R u b b er Co.
A rvin  In d u s tr ie s  In c .
A shland  Oil In c .
Avco C o rp .
A vnet In c .
B abcock & Wilcox Co.
B ethlehem  S teel C orp .
B oeing Co.
B rig g s  & S tra tto n  C orp . 
C a rp e n te r  Technology C orp . 
CECO C orp .
C en tra l Soya Inc .
C erta in  T eed  P ro d u c ts  C orp .
C ity In v e s tin g  Co.
C lu e tt Peabody & Co. In c .
Collins & Aikman C orp .
Colt In d u s tr ie s  In c .
Cone Mills C orp .
C onsolidated  Foods C orp .
C u rtis s  W right C orp .
C yclops C orp .
Dan R iv e r In c .
Dayco C orp .
Di Giorgio C orp .
Diamond In te rn a tio n a l C orp . 
Diamond Sham rock C orp . 
D onnelley R . R . & Sons Co. 
Eagle P ich er In d u s tr ie s  In c . 
E a s te rn  Gas & F uel A ssociation 
Em erson E lec tric  Co.
E vans P ro d u c ts  Co.
F a irch ild  In d u s tr ie s  In c .
F airm ont Foods Co.
F ib reb o a rd  C orp .
F lin tk o te  Co.
F re e p o rt M inerals Co.
F uqua  In d u s tr ie s  In c .
G a rd n er D en v er Co.
G eneral Cable C orp .
G eneral Dynam ics C orp .
G eneral H ost C orp .
G eneral In s tru m e n t C orp .
G eneral S ignal C lrp .
G eorgia Pacific C orp .
G erb er P ro d u c ts  Co.
G reat N o rth e rn  N ekoosa C orp. 
G reyhound  C orp .
Grumman C orp .
Hammermill P ap e r Co.
H art S ch a ffn e r & M arx 
H ershey  Foods C orp .
H eublein In c .
H oover Ball & B ea rin g  Co.
H oudaille In d u s tr ie s  In c .
I U In te rn a tio n a l C o rp .
Ideal B asic In d u s tr ie s  In c .
In land  S teel Co.
Insilco  C orp .
In te rco  In c .
In te rla k e  In c .
K e rr Mcgee C orp .
K eystone C o n stru c tio n  In d u s tr ie s  In c . 
L ibbey Owens F o rd  Co.
Lone S ta r  In d u s tr ie s  Inc .
Low enstein M. & Sons Inc .
M aytag Co.
McDonnell D ouglas C orp .
McGraw Edison Co.
McGraw Hill In c .
Mead C orp .
M idland R oss C orp .
Mohasco C orp .
N ational Can C orp .
N ational Gypsum Co.
N ational S teel C orp .
M orris In d u s tr ie s  In c .
N orth  Am erican P h ilips C orp .
N o rth ro p  C orp .
N orthw est In d u s tr ie s  In c .
P anhand le  E a s te rn  Pipe Line Co. 
P e rk in  Elmer C orp .
P hillips Van H eusen C orp .
Pennzoil Co.
P itts to n  Co.
Q u esto r C orp .
Reliance E lec tric  Co.
R epublic  S teel Co.
R evere  C opper & B ra ss  Inc . 
R exnord  In c .
R eynorld s R . J .  In d u s tr ie s  In c . 
R ohr In d u s tr ie s  In c .
R oper C orp .
Smith A . O . C o rp .
S o u th e rn  Co.
S o u th e rn  Pacific Co.
S q u are  D. Co.
S tev en s J .  P . & Co. In c .
Stokely  Van Camp In c .
S u n d s tra n d  C orp .
S ybron  C orp .
T ex asg u lf In c .
Thiokol C orp .
Toledo Edison Co.
Union Camp C orp .
Union Oil Co. of C alifornia 
Union Pacific
U nited  S ta te s  Gypsum Co.
U nited  S ta te s  Shoe C orp .
U nited  S ta te s  S tee l C orp .
V arian  A ssociation 
V ictor Com ptom eter C orp .
V ulcan M aterials C orp .
W ard Foods Inc .
W estvaco C orp .
W heeling P it tsb u rg h  S teel C orp . 
W hirlpool C orp .
White C o n stru c tio n  In d u s tr ie s  In c . 
White M eter C orp .
Williams Co.
Witco Chem ical C orp .
Z enith  Radio C orp .
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